scholarly journals High-Roller Impact: A Large Generalized Game Model of Parimutuel Wagering

2017 ◽  
Vol 03 (01) ◽  
pp. 1750006 ◽  
Author(s):  
Erhan Bayraktar ◽  
Alexander Munk
Keyword(s):  
Nash Equilibrium ◽  
Existence And Uniqueness ◽  
Large Scale ◽  
Pure Strategy ◽  
Sufficient Conditions ◽  
Game Model ◽  
Generalized Game ◽  
Generalized Games ◽  
Necessary And Sufficient ◽  
Strategy Nash Equilibrium

How do large-scale participants in parimutuel wagering events affect the house and ordinary bettors? A standard narrative suggests that they may temporarily benefit the former at the expense of the latter. To approach this problem, we begin by developing a model based on the theory of large generalized games. Constrained only by their budgets, a continuum of diffuse (ordinary) players and a single atomic (large-scale) player simultaneously wager to maximize their expected profits according to their individual beliefs. Our main theoretical result gives necessary and sufficient conditions for the existence and uniqueness of a pure-strategy Nash equilibrium. Using this framework, we analyze our question in concrete scenarios. First, we study a situation in which both predicted effects are observed. Neither is always observed in our remaining examples, suggesting the need for a more nuanced view of large-scale participants.

A Necessary and Sufficient Condition for Partial Monotonicity of Noncooperative Games

2020 ◽  
pp. 2050006
Author(s):  
Naoki Matsumoto
Keyword(s):  
Nash Equilibrium ◽  
Pure Strategy ◽  
Noncooperative Games ◽  
Noncooperative Game ◽  
Sufficient Condition ◽  
Necessary And Sufficient Condition ◽  
Partial Monotonicity ◽  
Person Game ◽  
Necessary And Sufficient ◽  
Strategy Nash Equilibrium

It is a classical and interesting problem to find a Nash equilibrium of noncooperative games in the strategic form. It is well known that the game always has a mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium, but it does not necessarily have a pure-strategy Nash equilibrium. Takeshita and Kawasaki proved that every noncooperative partially monotone game has a pure-strategy Nash equilibrium, that is, the partial monotonicity is a sufficient condition for a noncooperative game to have a pure-strategy Nash equilibrium. In this paper, we prove the necessary and sufficient condition for a noncooperative [Formula: see text]-person game with [Formula: see text] to be partially monotone. This result is an improvement of Takeshita and Kawasaki’s result.

scholarly journals Bounded solutions of a difference equation with finite number of jumps of operator coefficient

2020 ◽  
Vol 12 (1) ◽  
pp. 165-172
Author(s):  
A. Chaikovs'kyi ◽  
O. Lagoda
Keyword(s):  
Difference Equation ◽  
Finite Number ◽  
Existence And Uniqueness ◽  
Bounded Solution ◽  
Sufficient Conditions ◽  
Operator Coefficient ◽  
Bounded Solutions ◽  
Piecewise Constant ◽  
Variable Operator ◽  
Necessary And Sufficient

We study the problem of existence of a unique bounded solution of a difference equation with variable operator coefficient in a Banach space. There is well known theory of such equations with constant coefficient. In that case the problem is solved in terms of spectrum of the operator coefficient. For the case of variable operator coefficient correspondent conditions are known too. But it is too hard to check the conditions for particular equations. So, it is very important to give an answer for the problem for those particular cases of variable coefficient, when correspondent conditions are easy to check. One of such cases is the case of piecewise constant operator coefficient. There are well known sufficient conditions of existence and uniqueness of bounded solution for the case of one jump. In this work, we generalize these results for the case of finite number of jumps of operator coefficient. Moreover, under additional assumption we obtained necessary and sufficient conditions of existence and uniqueness of bounded solution.

ON COURNOT COMPETITION UNDER RANDOM YIELD

2013 ◽  
Vol 30 (04) ◽  
pp. 1350007 ◽  
Author(s):  
XIAOMING YAN ◽  
YONG WANG
Keyword(s):  
Nash Equilibrium ◽  
Production Cost ◽  
Pure Strategy ◽  
Cournot Competition ◽  
Random Yield ◽  
Cournot Model ◽  
Random Capacity ◽  
Strategy Nash Equilibrium

We look at a Cournot model in which each firm may be unreliable with random capacity, so the total quantity brought into market is uncertain. The Cournot model has a unique pure strategy Nash equilibrium (NE), in which the number of active firms is determined by each firm's production cost and reliability. Our results indicate the following effects of unreliability: the number of active firms in the NE is more than that each firm is completely reliable and the expected total quantity brought into market is less than that each firm is completely reliable. Whether a given firm joins in the game is independent of its reliability, but any given firm always hopes that the less-expensive firms' capacities are random and stochastically smaller.

The three kinds of degree distributions and nash equilibrium on the limiting random network

2019 ◽  
Vol 20 (05) ◽  
pp. 2050033
Author(s):  
Dong Han ◽  
Min Xia
Keyword(s):  
Nash Equilibrium ◽  
Random Network ◽  
Sufficient Conditions ◽  
Curved Surface ◽  
High Dimensional ◽  
Game Model ◽  
Curved Surfaces

A generalized dynamically evolving random network and a game model taking place on the evolving network are presented. We show that there exists a high-dimensional critical curved surface of the parameters related the probabilities of adding or removing vertices or edges such that the evolving network may exhibit three kinds of degree distributions as the time goes to infinity when the parameters belong to the super-critical, critical and sub-critical curved surfaces, respectively. Some sufficient conditions are given for the existence of a regular Nash equilibrium which depends on the three kinds of degree distributions in the game model on the limiting random network.

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