scholarly journals Revenue optimization in the generalized second-price auction

Author(s):  
David R.M. Thompson ◽  
Kevin Leyton-Brown
2013 ◽  
Vol 1 (2) ◽  
pp. 1-15 ◽  
Author(s):  
Satoshi Takahashi ◽  
Tokuro Matsuo ◽  
Roger Y. Lee

A structure of the Internet advertisement is that the service providers decide order of placement of many advertisements and advertising fees by auctions when advertisers offer their promotions. It is known that Generalized Second Price Auction (GSP) mechanism is the most efficient auction mechanism of the advertisement auction. Searching engine companies employ GSP mechanism basically. There are a lot of researches on GSP in order to analyze and clarify its feature and advantages. However, these researches assume that traded advertisements are mutually independent. That is means that each advertisement does not influence other advertisements. Also these researches do not consider a value of advertisement, which means some criterions of a name value of a company, effectiveness and an importance, that is dependently each other. This paper proposes a new advertisement auction mechanism based on GSP with considering the value of advertisement. The authors analyze the auctioneer's profit in comparison between normal GSP, normal VCG (Vickrey-Clarke-Groves Mechanism) and their proposed mechanism.


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