scholarly journals Research on Financing of Small and Micro Enterprises in Postepidemic Period: Based on Evolutionary Game and Numerical Simulation

2021 ◽  
Vol 2021 ◽  
pp. 1-7
Author(s):  
Yun Xu ◽  
Quan Liu
Keyword(s):  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Compensation Mechanism ◽  
Financing Mode ◽  
Epidemic Period ◽  
Intermediary Business ◽  
Business Income ◽  
The Government ◽  
Countermeasures And Suggestions ◽  
Micro Enterprises ◽  
Loan Amount

Small and microenterprises are most affected during the COVID-19 epidemic period. Despite the government introducing many preferential policies, financing for small and microenterprises is still difficult. Based on evolutionary game theory and Matlab r2017b software, this paper discusses the causes of financing problems from two aspects. By taking loan amount, loan interest rate, guarantee value, and intermediary business income as variables, the research shows that banks not only pay attention to the comprehensive return of small and microenterprises but also pay more attention to the coverage of loan principal and interest by the value of collateral. Relying on collateral for credit is still the main way, and the lack of collateral causes financing difficulties of small and microenterprises. Accordingly, this paper puts forward the countermeasures and suggestions to improve the guarantee compensation mechanism and innovate the financing mode.

scholarly journals Financing Path Analysis of Small and Micro Enterprises Based on Internet Finance

2020 ◽  
Vol 5 (4) ◽  
pp. 308
Author(s):  
Chen Cheng
Keyword(s):  
Path Analysis ◽  
Financial Services ◽  
Driving Force ◽  
Economic Status ◽  
Tax Revenue ◽  
Financing Mode ◽  
Internet Finance ◽  
Countermeasures And Suggestions ◽  
Micro Enterprises ◽  
China’S Economy

<p>Small and micro enterprises are an important part of China’s economy and an important driving force to create tax revenue. However, the financial services they obtain do not match their economic status seriously, and they often fall into the plight of insufficient capital turnover. In this context, according to the traditional financing mode of small and micro enterprises, this paper analyzes the financing mode of Internet finance, and selects the financing path represented by P2P financing, crowdfunding financing and e-commerce small loan platform, and analyzes the corresponding countermeasures and suggestions. Finally, based on the perspective of Internet finance, the financing path of small and micro enterprises is optimized and proposed.</p>

Mobile Value Added Services in Fiji

2017 ◽  
Vol 25 (2) ◽  
pp. 1-14
Author(s):  
Milind Sathye ◽  
Biman Prasad ◽  
Dharmendra Sharma ◽  
Parmendra Sharma ◽  
Suneeta Sathye
Keyword(s):  
Mobile Phones ◽  
Emerging Economies ◽  
Value Added ◽  
Policy Framework ◽  
Business Growth ◽  
Structured Interviews ◽  
Policy Initiatives ◽  
The Government ◽  
Institutional Drivers ◽  
Micro Enterprises

While mobile phones are making significant inroads in many developing countries, little is known about the institutional drivers, policy barriers and industry challenges that affect their use for business growth of micro- enterprises. The authors address this gap. After conducting semi-structured interviews of 74 women-owned micro entrepreneurs and ten key informants from the government and industry in Fiji, the authors found that appropriate policy framework, supporting infrastructure and appropriate ecosystem are required for rapid uptake of mobile value added services by women-owned micro entrepreneurs. They contribute by proposing a revised technology adoption framework as well as the four shackles theory of women micro entrepreneurs' empowerment and emancipation. The authors also highlight the policy initiatives necessary to accelerate the growth of women-owned micro enterprises by mobile value added services which could also guide other developing and emerging economies.

scholarly journals Sustainable tourism modeling: Pricing decisions and evolutionarily stable strategies for competitive tour operators

2018 ◽  
Vol 25 (5) ◽  
pp. 779-799 ◽  
Author(s):  
Yong He ◽  
Peng He ◽  
Feifei Xu ◽  
Chunming (Victor) Shi
Keyword(s):  
Sustainable Tourism ◽  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Innovation Strategy ◽  
Cost Advantage ◽  
Evolutionarily Stable Strategies ◽  
Environment Friendly ◽  
Pricing Decisions ◽  
Green Tourism ◽  
The Government ◽  
Evolutionarily Stable

In this article, we investigate two competitive tour operators (TOs) who choose between traditional tourism strategy (strategy T) and green tourism innovation strategy (strategy G). Our article attempts to address the following important issues using evolutionary game models: when would TOs facing environment-friendly tourists adopt the strategy G? How do TOs set product prices under different strategy combinations? How can the government effectively motivate TOs to pursue green tourism? Our research results show that a green tourism innovation pioneer could monopolize the market under certain conditions. Furthermore, when the environmental preference of tourists is sufficiently low, no TOs would adopt the strategy G; when it is moderate, only the TO with cost advantage (stronger TO) would adopt the strategy G; when it is sufficiently high, both TOs would select the strategy G. Our research also demonstrates that the stronger TO implements the strategy G mostly independent of the rival’s decisions, but the opposite is true for the TO with cost disadvantage (weaker TO). We further investigate potential government subsidies that can motivate TOs to carry out green tourism simultaneously. Our results suggest that to be more effective, the government first offer the green subsidy to highly competitive tourism locations and/or more innovative TOs.

scholarly journals Analysis of Smooth Implementation of Industry Poverty Alleviation considering Government Supervision

2021 ◽  
Vol 2021 ◽  
pp. 1-13
Author(s):  
Haifeng Yao ◽  
Jiangyue Fu
Keyword(s):  
Equilibrium Point ◽  
Evolutionary Game Theory ◽  
Poverty Alleviation ◽  
Equilibrium Points ◽  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Parameter Design ◽  
Game Model ◽  
Government Supervision ◽  
Proposed Model ◽  
The Government

Vigorous implementation of industrial poverty alleviation is the fundamental path and core power of poverty alleviation in impoverished areas. Enterprises and poor farmers are the main participants in industry poverty alleviation. Government supervision measures regulate their behaviors. This study investigates how to smoothly implement industry poverty alleviation projects considering government supervision. A game model is proposed based on the evolutionary game theory. It analyses the game processes between enterprises and poor farmers with and without government supervision based on the proposed model. It is shown that poverty alleviation projects will fail without government supervision given that the equilibrium point (0, 0) is the ultimate convergent point of the system but will possibly succeed with government supervision since the equilibrium points (0, 0) and (1, 1) are the ultimate convergent point of the system, where equilibrium point (1, 1) is our desired results. Different supervision modes have different effects on the game process. This study considers three supervision modes, namely, only reward mode, only penalty mode, and reward and penalty mode, and investigates the parameter design for the reward and penalty mode. The obtained results are helpful for the government to develop appropriate policies for the smooth implementation of industry poverty alleviation projects.

scholarly journals Evolutionary game of green manufacturing mode of enterprises under the influence of government reward and punishment

2020 ◽  
Vol 15 (4) ◽  
pp. 416-430
Author(s):  
A.L. Awaga ◽  
W. Xu ◽  
L. Liu ◽  
Y. Zhang
Keyword(s):  
Market Competition ◽  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Green Product ◽  
Production Mode ◽  
Manufacturing Enterprises ◽  
Green Production ◽  
Regulation Strategies ◽  
The Government ◽  
Manufacturing Mode ◽  
Reward And Punishment

Green production mode is an advanced manufacturing mode. However, due to the environmental externality of green production, it is different for a pure market mechanism to promote the evolution of green operation mode of manufacturing enterprises. Government regulation is very important. This paper establishes an evolutionary game model of whether manufacturing enterprises choose to implement green production mode when the government implements two different mechanisms of reward and punishment. Considering the complexity of strategy selection of enterprises' green production behaviour under market competition, the method constructs the simulation analysis model of enterprises' green product production behaviour with multi-subject participation. We can simulate the influence of these factors on the strategic choice of both parties (enterprises and governments) by changing the different influence factors, and studying the evolutionary law of different government guidance and regulation strategies on the production behaviour of green products. These factors include government incentives, penalties, reputations, costs, differences in the cost of implementing green production on the corporate side, corporate reputation, and false rewards or penalties. By the computer implementation of multi-subject modelling, the results show that enterprises' green product production behaviour needs the government's guidance and regulation. When formulating relevant policies, the government should combine various guidance and regulation strategies and fully consider the influence of market competition.

scholarly journals An Evolutionary Game Analysis of Synergetic Innovation behaviour in regional innovation networks

2021 ◽  
Vol 235 ◽  
pp. 03032
Author(s):  
Dong Li ◽  
Chunyan Liu
Keyword(s):  
Research Collaboration ◽  
Software Evolution ◽  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Innovation System ◽  
University Research ◽  
Regional Innovation ◽  
Related Factors ◽  
Independent Innovation ◽  
Coordination Costs ◽  
The Government

Regional innovation network has become an important way to improve national independent innovation ability and promote regional and social development. This paper studies the evolution of the synergetic innovation system of industry-university-Research Collaboration under the government behaviour, constructs an asymmetric evolutionary game model between the government and industry-university Research collaboration, and analyses the influence of parameter changes on synergetic innovation decisionmaking behaviour. The results showed that the government’s regulatory costs, subsidies from the government, the production, will take the profit resulting from the synergetic innovation behavior, coordination costs and government punishment, and one party to the cooperative behaviour decision to bring the other side of the loss factors such as size, to participate in Innovation decision-making behaviour of the subject of dynamic evolution path and the results have important influence to the use of MATLAB software evolution paths of related factors under different conditions and the trend of simulation test and verify.

scholarly journals How to Promote Compliance Management in the Electricity Market? An Analysis Based on the Evolutionary Game Model

2021 ◽  
Vol 9 ◽  
Author(s):  
Luosong Jin ◽  
Cheng Chen ◽  
Yun Li ◽  
Xiangyang Wang ◽  
Yuanyuan Cheng
Keyword(s):  
Electricity Market ◽  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Evolution Process ◽  
Regulatory Agencies ◽  
Dynamic Evolution ◽  
Model Parameters ◽  
Game Model ◽  
Compliance Cost ◽  
Compliance Management ◽  
The Government

In this paper, we aim to analyze how to effectively promote compliance management in the electricity market. We construct an evolutionary game model under the two different scenarios, i.e., the scenario without governmental supervision and the scenario with governmental supervision, and explicitly describes the strategic behaviors and dynamic evolution process of power enterprises and regulators in the power market. According to the results of the evolutionary stable strategy, we find that, in the absence of governmental supervision, the long-term stable equilibrium of power enterprises' choice of strategy “Compliance” and regulatory agencies' choice of strategy “Not bribery” is hard to be realized. Only if the government effectively supervises the compliance management of the electricity market can the ideal compliance behavior of the two stakeholders be achieved. Furthermore, we conduct a simulation study to analyze the impacts of the various model parameters on the dynamic evolution process. The specific results show that the lower compliance cost, the higher psychological cost, and the larger profit loss of the power enterprises, as well as the lower inspection cost, the higher psychological cost, and the larger rewards of the regulatory agencies, can promote the formation of compliance management. Besides, the larger penalty charged by the government is also conducive to the compliance management of the electricity market.

Evolutionary Game Analysis of the Government Supervision and Private Sector Ecological Technology Innovation Behavior for Water Environment Treatment PPP Projects on the basis of Public Participation

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Huimin Li ◽  
Fuqiang Wang ◽  
Lelin Lv ◽  
Qing Xia ◽  
Lunyan Wang
Keyword(s):  
Private Sector ◽  
Public Participation ◽  
Technology Innovation ◽  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Water Environment ◽  
Environmental Benefits ◽  
Public And Private ◽  
Government Supervision ◽  
The Government ◽  
Innovation Behavior

Ecological technology innovation with environmental benefits as the core has become an inevitable choice for water environment treatment PPP projects (WETP-PPP), and government supervision and public participation are essential driving factors for eco-technological innovation. To explore the influence of the public participation on the behavior of government and private sector in the WETP-PPP, this study constructed an asymmetric evolutionary game model of government supervision and private sector ecological technology innovation behavior under public participation. The main contribution of this study is to explore the mutual evolutionary regularity of the private sector and government supervision department and the influence of public participation level on public and private behavior in different scenarios. The results showed that the government can reduce the supervision cost by increasing the public's active participation and improving environmental regulation measures to achieve a win-win situation of economic and environmental performance.

An Analysis of Quality Liability Insurance for Prefabricated Components Using Evolutionary Game Theory

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Yan Liu ◽  
Chenyao Lv ◽  
Hong Xian Li ◽  
Yan Li ◽  
Zhen Lei ◽  
...  
Keyword(s):  
Game Theory ◽  
Evolutionary Game Theory ◽  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Payoff Matrix ◽  
Liability Insurance ◽  
Insurance Companies ◽  
Social Benefits ◽  
Simulation Calculation ◽  
The Government

Managing quality risks of prefabricated components is one of the challenges for prefabricated construction. The Quality Liability Insurance for Prefabricated Components (QLIPC) is an effective approach to transfer such risks; however, limited research has been conducted regarding the development of QLIPC. This study introduces an Evolutionary Game Theory (EGT)-based approach incorporating decisions from both the government and insurance companies. In the EGT model, a payoff matrix under disparate strategies is constructed, and the evolutionary stable strategies (ESS) are deduced. The simulation calculation is then carried out by MATLAB using sample virtual data to demonstrate the analysis. The results show that the government should act as the game promoter because the QLIPC can reduce governance cost and has significant social benefits. This research contributes a theoretical framework to analyze the QLIPC development using the EGT theory, and it could help the government to make long-term strategies for developing the QLIPC market.

Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document