Ius Humanitatis and the Right to Reparation for International Crimes in Foreign Domestic Courts

2014 ◽  
Vol 14 (2) ◽  
pp. 358-376
Author(s):  
Marcel Brus

This article focuses on the possibilities for victims of international crimes to obtain reparation in a foreign domestic court. The chances of success for such claims are small under traditional international law. The article questions whether the development of human rights and humanitarian ethics as a core element of international law (referred to as ius humanitatis) is having an impact on traditional obstacles to making such claims. Two elements are considered: the relevance of changing societal attitudes to the ‘rights’ of victims of such crimes and their possible effect on the interpretation and application of existing law, and whether in present-day international law humanitarian concerns have led to limiting obstacles that are still based on sovereignty, notably regarding the universality principle, prescription, and state immunity. The general conclusion is that on all these points much remains to be done.

Author(s):  
Aoláin Fionnuala Ní

Principle 29 deals with restrictions on the jurisdiction of military courts. Under this Principle, the adjudication of human rights violations by military courts is explicitly excluded, and ordinary domestic courts are mandated as the only appropriate venue of judicial oversight. Nevertheless, military courts remain functionally important for the routine and uncontroversial deployment of military law consistent with international law. The chapter first provides a contextual and historical background on Principle 29 before discussing its theoretical framework and how military courts are used in various countries such as Ireland and Turkey. Issues arising when civilians find themselves within the jurisdiction of military courts are also examined, along with the difficulties of ensuring fair trials in military courts. This chapter shows that military courts, while certainly serving important functions within the military forces of states, remain subject to human rights and humanitarian law compliance.


Author(s):  
Ambos Kai

Principle 19 outlines the duties of States with regard to the administration of justice for victims of serious human rights violations and other international crimes. Under this Principle, States must ensure that those responsible for serious crimes under international law are prosecuted, tried and adequately punished. A state’s (criminal) justice obligations have long been recognized by regional human rights courts and international human rights bodies. While the fight against impunity is the explicit aim of the International Criminal Court (ICC) and a major goal of the United Nations, the duty to prosecute lies primarily with the domestic justice system with regional or international mechanisms being subsidiary or complementary. This chapter first provides a contextual and historical background on Principle 19 before discussing its theoretical framework and how human rights courts and treaty bodies have interpreted the duty of States to investigate and prosecute serious human rights violations.


2019 ◽  
Vol 17 (2) ◽  
pp. 576-596 ◽  
Author(s):  
Tamar Hostovsky Brandes

Abstract This article examines the manner in which the rise of populism affects the use of international law by domestic courts. It argues that populism may have a negative effect on the willingness of domestic courts to refer to international law. It further argues that although such response is understandable, it is regrettable, since incorporation of international law into domestic court rulings can serve as a counter-populism measure. Maintaining international law as part of the domestic legal discourse is particularly important in a populist setting, for two reasons. First, where constitutionalism is overtaken by populists, international law can serve as an important source on which courts can draw to protect human rights. In addition, referral, analysis, and application of international law are means of maintaining pluralism in legal and public debate and, accordingly, enhancing democracy.


1999 ◽  
Vol 2 ◽  
pp. 507-520
Author(s):  
Roger O’Keefe

The European Convention on State Immunity provides for the immunity of states and their organs from the domestic courts of the respective Contracting States. In doing so, it makes no apparent distinction between those courts’ civil and criminal jurisdictions. Yet the vexed question of the immunity of state officials from the latter, especially in respect of crimes established under international law, has been spectacularly brought to the fore by the Pinochet case. It is on this question—the immunity of individual state officials from the criminal jurisdiction of foreign states specifically in respect of international crimes—that this article focuses.


1999 ◽  
Vol 2 ◽  
pp. 507-520 ◽  
Author(s):  
Roger O’Keefe

The European Convention on State Immunity provides for the immunity of states and their organs from the domestic courts of the respective Contracting States. In doing so, it makes no apparent distinction between those courts’ civil and criminal jurisdictions. Yet the vexed question of the immunity of state officials from the latter, especially in respect of crimes established under international law, has been spectacularly brought to the fore by the Pinochet case. It is on this question—the immunity of individual state officials from the criminal jurisdiction of foreign states specifically in respect of international crimes—that this article focuses.


2019 ◽  
Vol 16 (2) ◽  
pp. 407-446
Author(s):  
Clemens Treichl

Although formally provided for in particular statutes, certain international administrative tribunals continue to hold oral hearings—if at all—only on the rarest of occasions. With specific attention to the International Labour Organization Administrative Tribunal, the present paper aims 1) at recapitulating essential holdings of the European Court of Human Rights with regard to the right to access to a court in the context of employment-related claims against international organizations; and 2) at examining the relevance of oral hearings in the determination of proportionality of organizational immunity. The analysis shows that, in principle, the denial of oral hearings by international administrative tribunals results in the duty of states to afford individuals access to a court. In the realm of international law, a conflict with the obligation to grant immunity ensues. As yet, domestic courts have remained reluctant to overrule immunity on human rights grounds.


2015 ◽  
Vol 24 (1) ◽  
pp. 7-23
Author(s):  
Riccardo Pisillo Mazzeschi

In its judgment No. 238/2014 the Italian Constitutional Court, whilst appearing to show respect for the ICJ’s 2012 judgment in Jurisdictional Immunities of the State, makes notable criticisms of that judgment and insists on its own role in the progressive development of international law in the field of State immunity. In particular, the main legal argument of the Constitutional Court, based on the fundamental and inviolable character of the right of access to justice in constitutional law, can also be used, although modified to some extent, in international law. The Court’s argument can also resolve the possible conflict between the international norm of State immunity, on the one hand, and the international norms on fundamental human rights and access to justice, on the other. The present contribution seeks to demonstrate that: (a) the right of access to justice and the connected right to reparation for violations of fundamental human rights are established by two customary international norms; (b) there is a potential conflict between these norms and the norm of State immunity; (c) this conflict becomes real and concrete when the limits on access to justice and reparation laid down by immunity are unjustified in accordance with the rule of “equivalent protection”; and (d) the solution to that conflict derives from the normative superiority of the customary norms on access to justice and reparation (being peremptory in nature when functionally linked to the violation of fundamental human rights) over the norm of State immunity. The judgment of the Constitutional Court, utilizing legal reasoning that can also translate to the level of international law, demonstrates that osmosis may occur between the arguments used in constitutional and international law, and that today there is growing interaction between the domestic and international legal orders and their common values. The law of human rights, placed at the very center of the Constitutional Court’s judgment, is the field in which this community of values emerges most clearly.


Author(s):  
Lawrence O. Gostin ◽  
Benjamin Mason Meier

This chapter introduces the foundational importance of human rights for global health, providing a theoretical basis for the edited volume by laying out the role of human rights under international law as a normative basis for public health. By addressing public health harms as human rights violations, international law has offered global standards by which to frame government responsibilities and evaluate health practices, providing legal accountability in global health policy. The authors trace the historical foundations for understanding the development of human rights and the role of human rights in protecting and promoting health since the end of World War II and the birth of the United Nations. Examining the development of human rights under international law, the authors introduce the right to health as an encompassing right to health care and underlying determinants of health, exploring this right alongside other “health-related human rights.”


Author(s):  
Shai Dothan

There is a consensus about the existence of an international right to vote in democratic elections. Yet states disagree about the limits of this right when it comes to the case of prisoners’ disenfranchisement. Some states allow all prisoners to vote, some disenfranchise all prisoners, and others allow only some prisoners to vote. This chapter argues that national courts view the international right to vote in three fundamentally different ways: some view it as an inalienable right that cannot be taken away, some view it merely as a privilege that doesn’t belong to the citizens, and others view it as a revocable right that can be taken away under certain conditions. The differences in the way states conceive the right to vote imply that attempts by the European Court of Human Rights to follow the policies of the majority of European states by using the Emerging Consensus doctrine are problematic.


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