The Impact of Individual Criminal Responsibility for Offences against Cultural Property on Military Necessity

2021 ◽  
pp. 152-210
Keyword(s):  
Criminal Responsibility ◽  
Cultural Property ◽  
Military Necessity ◽  
The Impact ◽  
Individual Criminal Responsibility

Individual Criminal Responsibility in International Human Rights Law: The Contribution of the International Criminal Court

1970 ◽  
Vol 1 ◽  
Author(s):  
Justin Mohammed
Keyword(s):  
International Criminal Court ◽  
International Criminal ◽  
Criminal Responsibility ◽  
International Criminal Tribunal ◽  
Criminal Court ◽  
Added Value ◽  
Crimes Against Humanity ◽  
International Human Rights Law ◽  
The Road ◽  
Individual Criminal Responsibility

The road to developing an international institutional capacity to prosecute crimes against humanity, war crimes, and genocide has been a long one, and has in many ways concluded with the establishment of the International Criminal Court (ICC). By looking at the Nuremberg and Tokyo Tribunals, the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) and International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY), as well as the ICC, this paper traces the evolution of the concept of individual criminal responsibility to its present incarnation. It argues that while the ICC presents its own unique ‘added value’ to the prosecution of international criminals, its application of justice continues to be biased by the influence of powerful states.

Proportionality in Refugee Exclusion

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Elif Gökşen
Keyword(s):  
International Criminal ◽  
Criminal Responsibility ◽  
War Crimes ◽  
International Criminal Law ◽  
Guidance Document ◽  
Refugee Status ◽  
High Commissioner ◽  
State Practice ◽  
Proportionality Test ◽  
Individual Criminal Responsibility

Abstract In the increased discussions about international security and terrorism, the application of the exclusion clauses in Article 1 F of the 1951 Refugee Convention has become a topical and controversial issue. The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) advises states to apply a proportionality test to weigh the gravity of the crime against the consequences of exclusion for cases concerning serious non-political crimes and war crimes. However, there is no uniform approach in state practice. Also, the concept of ‘gravity of the crime’ is not clarified in any guidance document of the UNHCR. Relying on the different applications of Article 1 F of the 1951 Convention, this article questions whether the proportionality analysis is actually necessary for determining the exclusion, and how should the gravity of the crime be interpreted in such cases. First, the present article argues that the proportionality analysis is compatible with the overriding humanitarian aims of the 1951 Convention and that this analysis should be applicable to all the crimes listed in Article 1 F. Secondly, it demonstrates that the concept of ‘gravity of the crime’ should be interpreted by referring to the relevant concepts developed in international criminal law, and by considering the extent of the person’s individual criminal responsibility. This article asserts that exclusion from refugee status causes serious consequences, which sometimes might be heavier than criminal punishment. Therefore, Article 1 F should be applied with the utmost attention and sensitivity.

Individual Criminal Responsibility before the International Criminal Court

2012 ◽  
Vol 12 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-70 ◽  
Author(s):  
Barbara Goy
Keyword(s):  
International Law ◽  
International Criminal Court ◽  
Ad Hoc ◽  
International Criminal ◽  
Criminal Responsibility ◽  
International Criminal Tribunal ◽  
Case Law ◽  
Criminal Court ◽  
Former Yugoslavia ◽  
Individual Criminal Responsibility

For more than 15 years the two ad hoc Tribunals, the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) and the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR), have interpreted the requirements of different forms of individual criminal responsibility. It is thus helpful to look at whether and to what extent the jurisprudence of the ICTY/ICTR may provide guidance to the International Criminal Court (ICC). To this end, this article compares the requirements of individual criminal responsibility at the ICTY/ICTR and the ICC. The article concludes that, applied with caution, the jurisprudence of the ICTY/ICTR – as an expression of international law – can assist in interpreting the modes of liability under the ICC Statute. ICTY/ICTR case law seems to be most helpful with regard to accessorial forms of liability, in particular their objective elements. Moreover, it may assist in interpreting the subjective requirements set out in Article 30 ICC Statute.

scholarly journals Νευροεπιστήμες και ποινικό δίκαιο: υποσχέσεις και περιορισμοί σχετικά με την εκτίμηση της ικανότητας για καταλογισμό

Bioethica ◽  
2016 ◽  
Vol 2 (2) ◽  
pp. 19
Author(s):  
Γεωργία-Μάρθα Γκότση (Georgia-Martha Gkotsi)
Keyword(s):  
Brain Research ◽  
Criminal Responsibility ◽  
Scientific Data ◽  
Legal Responsibility ◽  
Criminal Cases ◽  
Criminal Trials ◽  
Political Factors ◽  
Legal Proceedings ◽  
Legal Implications ◽  
The Impact

In recent years, an explosion of interest in neuroscience has led to the development of "Neuro-law," a new multidisciplinary field of knowledge whose aim is to examine the impact and role of neuroscientific findings in legal proceedings. Neuroscientific evidence is increasingly being used in US and European courts in criminal trials, as part of psychiatric testimony, nourishing the debate about the legal implications of brain research in psychiatric-legal settings.In this paper, we aim to examine the impact of Neuroscientific evidence in the assessment of criminal responsibility. We start with a brief historical survey of the relation between brain sciences and criminal law. We then present two criminal cases in the context of which neuroimaging techniques were introduced as evidence of diminished responsibility or irresponsibility and continue with a presentation of some significant limitations and difficulties that neuroscience faces in the assessment of penal responsibility. These limitations are scientific, legal but also of philosophical and conceptual nature.We conclude that addressing moral or legal responsibility might depend on scientific data, but requires entry to very different conceptual domains. The legal system cannot delegate to another field, scientific or otherwise, the ascription of legal meaning. Neuroscientific data, however accurate and reliable they may become in the future, cannot contribute to the assessment of criminal responsibility, unless they are contextualised and completed -or even confronted- with data collected on other levels of analysis, in particular on a psychological, anamnestic, sociological and economic level. Neurosciences, as sciences, can offer functioning and biological models of behaviours, while the assignment of responsibility is a normative issue. Although neuroscientific evidence can provide assistance in the evaluation of penal responsibility by introducing new determinisms in the behavioural analysis of offenders with mental disturbances, it does not dispense with the need to define the limits of responsibility and irresponsibility of the accused. This analysis, while it needs to take account of social, moral and political factors - in addition to elements contributed by experts - ultimately belongs to the legal sphere.

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