Individual Criminal Responsibility before the International Criminal Court

2012 ◽  
Vol 12 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-70 ◽  
Author(s):  
Barbara Goy
Keyword(s):  
International Law ◽  
International Criminal Court ◽  
Ad Hoc ◽  
International Criminal ◽  
Criminal Responsibility ◽  
International Criminal Tribunal ◽  
Case Law ◽  
Criminal Court ◽  
Former Yugoslavia ◽  
Individual Criminal Responsibility

For more than 15 years the two ad hoc Tribunals, the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) and the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR), have interpreted the requirements of different forms of individual criminal responsibility. It is thus helpful to look at whether and to what extent the jurisprudence of the ICTY/ICTR may provide guidance to the International Criminal Court (ICC). To this end, this article compares the requirements of individual criminal responsibility at the ICTY/ICTR and the ICC. The article concludes that, applied with caution, the jurisprudence of the ICTY/ICTR – as an expression of international law – can assist in interpreting the modes of liability under the ICC Statute. ICTY/ICTR case law seems to be most helpful with regard to accessorial forms of liability, in particular their objective elements. Moreover, it may assist in interpreting the subjective requirements set out in Article 30 ICC Statute.

Individual Criminal Responsibility in the Execution of a "Joint Criminal Enterprise" in the Jurisprudence of the ad hoc International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia

2006 ◽  
Vol 6 (1) ◽  
pp. 63-120 ◽  
Author(s):  
Attila Bogdan
Keyword(s):  
International Law ◽  
Ad Hoc ◽  
International Criminal ◽  
Criminal Responsibility ◽  
International Criminal Tribunal ◽  
Former Yugoslavia ◽  
Criminal Enterprise ◽  
Customary International Law ◽  
Joint Criminal Enterprise ◽  
Individual Criminal Responsibility

AbstractThis article explores the development of "joint criminal enterprise" form of responsibility in the jurisprudence of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (hereinafter "Yugoslav Tribunal"). Although "joint criminal enterprise" does not appear in the Yugoslav Tribunal Statute, this form of responsibility was read into the Statute by the tribunal judges and is repeatedly relied on in finding individuals guilty in cases before the tribunal. In particular, ever since the Appeals Chamber in Prosecutor v. Tadic held that "joint criminal enterprise", as a form of accomplice liability, is "firmly established in customary international law", other Trial and Appeals Chamber decisions continue to follow this holding. This article takes a critical look at some of the fundamental issues associated with the development of "joint criminal enterprise" at the Yugoslav Tribunal, in particular the methodology employed by the Appeals Chamber in Tadic. In addition, the article also examines the similarities between "joint criminal enterprise" and U.S. conspiracy law, and whether the use of "joint criminal enterprise" at the Yugoslav Tribunal violates the "principles of legality".

Individual Criminal Responsibility in International Human Rights Law: The Contribution of the International Criminal Court

1970 ◽  
Vol 1 ◽  
Author(s):  
Justin Mohammed
Keyword(s):  
International Criminal Court ◽  
International Criminal ◽  
Criminal Responsibility ◽  
International Criminal Tribunal ◽  
Criminal Court ◽  
Added Value ◽  
Crimes Against Humanity ◽  
International Human Rights Law ◽  
The Road ◽  
Individual Criminal Responsibility

The road to developing an international institutional capacity to prosecute crimes against humanity, war crimes, and genocide has been a long one, and has in many ways concluded with the establishment of the International Criminal Court (ICC). By looking at the Nuremberg and Tokyo Tribunals, the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) and International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY), as well as the ICC, this paper traces the evolution of the concept of individual criminal responsibility to its present incarnation. It argues that while the ICC presents its own unique ‘added value’ to the prosecution of international criminals, its application of justice continues to be biased by the influence of powerful states.

Victims and the International Criminal Court: Three major issues

2003 ◽  
Vol 3 (4) ◽  
pp. 345-367 ◽  
Author(s):  
Sam Garkawe
Keyword(s):  
International Criminal Court ◽  
Ad Hoc ◽  
International Criminal ◽  
International Criminal Tribunal ◽  
Criminal Court ◽  
Former Yugoslavia ◽  
Protective Measure ◽  
Legal Representation ◽  
International Crimes ◽  
International Criminal Tribunals

AbstractThe Statute of the permanent International Criminal Court (the "ICC") agreed to in Rome in 1998 contains many provisions that deal with the specific concerns and rights of victims and survivors of the international crimes that the ICC will have jurisdiction over. It consolidates the work of the two ad hoc international criminal Tribunals (the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda) in this area, but also further enhances the role and rights of victims in a number of innovative ways. These three international criminal Tribunals thus collectively represent an important step forward in the recognition of the suffering and the position of victims and survivors of international crimes. This article will examine three main issues in relation to victims and the ICC. First, after identifying the protective measures for victims allowed at the discretion of the international criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, it will focus on the most controversial measure (which the ICC can also order) - the non-disclosure to the defence of the identity of witnesses. Does this protective measure violate a defendant's right to a fair trial? The Statute of the ICC also allows, for the first time in international criminal justice, for the right of victims to obtain their own legal representation, subject to the discretion of the ICC. The second issue is how is this going to work in practice in light of the fact that international crimes normally involve hundreds, if not thousands or even tens of thousands, of victims? And finally, while the ICC Statute provides for the possibility of reparations to victims, where will the money come from, and thus what are the chances of victims actually being able to receive compensation?

International Criminal Court and Ad Hoc Tribunals

2008 ◽  
pp. 462-478
Author(s):  
Richard Goldstone
Keyword(s):  
International Law ◽  
International Criminal Court ◽  
Ad Hoc ◽  
International Criminal ◽  
International Criminal Tribunal ◽  
Criminal Court ◽  
International Criminal Justice ◽  
Single Model ◽  
Customary International Law ◽  
International Criminal Tribunals

This article discusses contemporary international efforts to consolidate and codify significant portions of existing customary international law. It studies the ad hoc tribunals of the UN and pinpoints the successes and failures of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) and the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda. The ‘completion strategy’ of both international criminal tribunals is discussed. The article also covers the creation of ‘mixed’ courts and a single model for international criminal justice, namely the International Criminal Court.

The Settlement of Disputes Concerning States Arising From the Application of the Statute of the International Criminal Court: Balancing Sovereignty and the Need for an Effective and Independent ICC

2007 ◽  
Vol 7 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-43
Author(s):  
Juan Carlos Ochoa S.
Keyword(s):  
International Law ◽  
International Criminal Court ◽  
Dispute Settlement ◽  
Ad Hoc ◽  
International Criminal ◽  
Case Law ◽  
Criminal Court ◽  
International Criminal Tribunals ◽  
Settlement Of Disputes ◽  
The Relationship

AbstractThe tension between State sovereignty and the need of international criminal tribunals to have sufficient powers for functioning effectively and independently permeates the provisions on the settlement of disputes contained within the ICC Statute. In contrast to the Statutes and the case-law of the ad hoc international criminal tribunals, the ICC Statute gives considerable weight to States Party's sovereignty. In particular, the power of the ICC to settle any dispute concerning its judicial functions under Article 119, paragraph 1, of its Statute is weakened in the area of States Party's cooperation where the provisions of Part 9 of the Statute of that court, in addition to grant those States several possibilities for denying requests for cooperation, remain to a large extent ambiguous as to whether the ICC can scrutinise the grounds for such denials. Yet, it is submitted that the ICC Statute as a whole provides the ICC with sufficient bases to assert such a power. This contribution also casts some light on the relationship between the ICC and States non-party to its Statute from the perspective of the rules on dispute settlement laid down in that international instrument and general international law.

Politics, anti-politics, international justice: language and power in the Special Court for Sierra Leone

2006 ◽  
Vol 32 (4) ◽  
pp. 587-602 ◽  
Author(s):  
TIM KELSALL
Keyword(s):  
International Law ◽  
Sierra Leone ◽  
International Criminal Court ◽  
International Criminal ◽  
International Criminal Tribunal ◽  
Criminal Court ◽  
International Justice ◽  
Former Yugoslavia ◽  
Language And Power ◽  
War And Conflict

The Special Court for Sierra Leone (SCSL) is located in a fortified compound in central Freetown. Inside its militarised space a project of global significance is unfolding. Together with the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, and the International Criminal Court, the SCSL is an experiment in bringing the rule of international law and governance to regions recently destabilised by war and conflict.

Individual Criminal Responsibility

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Chantal Meloni
Keyword(s):  
International Law ◽  
International Criminal Court ◽  
International Criminal ◽  
Criminal Responsibility ◽  
Criminal Liability ◽  
Strict Liability ◽  
International Community ◽  
Criminal Court ◽  
International Crimes ◽  
Individual Criminal Responsibility

The recognition of individual criminal responsibility under international law is relatively recent. The commission of mass atrocities during the 20th century prompted the international community to recognize that individuals can be criminally responsible directly under international law and to work for the establishment of an international criminal court having jurisdiction on international crimes committed by individuals. Thus, after World War II, the principle was established that individuals—and not only states—can be the addressee of obligations, commit crimes, and therefore bear criminal responsibility directly under international law. As affirmed by the judges sitting in Nuremberg: “Crimes against international law are committed by men, not by abstract entities, and only by punishing individuals who commit such crimes can the provisions of international law be enforced.” As a consequence, it is now undisputed that individuals shall be punished for the commission of crimes under international law (or “international crimes”) that seriously damage the interest of the international community as a whole, so that the goals of prevention and deterrence can be achieved. This principle is now well expressed in the Preamble of the Rome Statute of 1998, where it affirms that “the most serious crimes of concern to the international community as a whole must not go unpunished” and that the International Criminal Court aims “to put an end to impunity for the perpetrators of these crimes and thus to contribute to the prevention of such crimes.” The attribution of criminal responsibility to individuals does not exclude that states can be held responsible for the violations of international law that also potentially amount to international crimes; however, individual criminal responsibility under international law possesses the same legal nature as the criminal responsibility under domestic law, whereas the responsibility of states is of an international/civil nature. Given the macro-criminal dimension of the crimes at stake, which normally involve the state apparatus and are committed by an organized group or in a systematic manner, the process of “individualization” of the responsibility encounters more than one challenge. First, the issue of immunities for heads of states and other subjects under international law; second, the regulation of the modes of liability, which need to take into account the collective dimension of commission of international crimes. To overcome some of the difficulties, the rules of attribution of criminal liability to individuals had been partly reinterpreted and new modes of liability developed. Moreover, the principle of personal culpability excludes collective and strict liability. As a consequence, several grounds to exclude criminal responsibility are recognized. Finally, the enforcement of individual criminal responsibility for international crimes is the real challenge in a context of collective commission and macro-dimension of the crimes, where, moreover, the mechanisms of enforcement are not homogeneous.

scholarly journals The Legacy of the ICTY and ICTR in China

AJIL Unbound ◽  
2016 ◽  
Vol 110 ◽  
pp. 245-250
Author(s):  
Bing Bing Jia
Keyword(s):  
Criminal Law ◽  
International Criminal Court ◽  
Rome Statute ◽  
Ad Hoc ◽  
International Criminal ◽  
International Criminal Tribunal ◽  
Criminal Court ◽  
Decision Makers ◽  
International Criminal Law ◽  
International Tribunal

Legacy is a matter that may become topical when its creator finally stops producing. Normally, the silent years would be many before the thought of legacy enters into open, formal discourse among lawyers and decision-makers. This comment treats the meaning of the word as relative to the circumstances in which it is invoked. The more closely it is used in relation to the present, the more distant it drifts from its literal meaning, to the extent that it denotes what the word “impact” signifies. This essay questions whether the word “legacy” is apt in describing the footprint of the work of the two ad hoctribunals in China, where its influence has, as a matter of fact, been waning ever since the adoption of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court in 1998 (“Rome Statute” ). The Chinese example suggests that the work of the tribunals is (at least so far) no more significant to international criminal law than the illustrious Nuremberg and Tokyo Trials of the 1940s. The most major impact (a more apposite term than legacy) of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) and the International Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) for China may be that China’s policy with regard to the tribunals, manifested mostly in the United Nations, has determined its approach to the International Criminal Court (“ICC” ). For that, the work of the tribunals could be considered as having left China something in the nature of an indirect legacy.

Current Trends in the Definition of ‘Perpetrator’ by the International Criminal Court: From the Decision on the Confirmation of Charges in the Lubanga case to the Katanga judgment

2015 ◽  
Vol 28 (2) ◽  
pp. 349-371 ◽  
Author(s):  
ALICIA GIL GIL ◽  
ELENA MACULAN
Keyword(s):  
International Criminal Court ◽  
International Criminal ◽  
Criminal Responsibility ◽  
Criminal Court ◽  
Basic Principles ◽  
Critical Elements ◽  
Current Trends ◽  
The One ◽  
Definition Of ◽  
Individual Criminal Responsibility

AbstractThe jurisprudence of the International Criminal Court (ICC) up to the Lubanga judgment showed definite interpretive trends on the modes of principal liability. This article aims first to make a critical assessment of these trends by focusing on methodological and substantive aspects. On the one hand, the practice of having resort to theories derived from Continental legal systems, albeit legitimate, is based on a methodology that raises some concerns as to the selection and (mis)interpretation of such theories. On the other hand, the Court has clearly adopted a wide interpretation of some critical elements in which the different modes of principal liability are grounded. This choice has caused a significant expansion of the scope of principal liability as well as a breach of the principles of legality and of individual criminal responsibility. In our opinion, the underpinning of these interpretations is a flawed understanding of the criteria for distinguishing between principals and accessories.This perspective has been overturned by the Katanga judgment, on which the second part of this article will focus. This judgment correctly argues that the distinction between perpetrators and accomplices is grounded only on the autonomous or vicarious character of their contribution to the offence. Furthermore, it follows a partly different approach as to both the methodology and the interpretation of the constitutive elements of principal liability. In our view, this approach better fits both the relevant statutory provision and the basic principles of criminal law.

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