scholarly journals Relevant First-Order Logic LP# and Curry’s Paradox Resolution

2015 ◽  
Vol 4 (1) ◽  
pp. 6
Author(s):  
Jaykov Foukzon
Keyword(s):  
Order Logic ◽  
First Order Logic ◽  
First Order ◽  
Curry’S Paradox ◽  
Curry's Paradox

First-Order Logic Reasoning Support for the Semantic Web

2009 ◽  
Vol 19 (12) ◽  
pp. 3091-3099 ◽  
Author(s):  
Gui-Hong XU ◽  
Jian ZHANG
Keyword(s):  
Semantic Web ◽  
Order Logic ◽  
First Order Logic ◽  
First Order ◽  
Logic Reasoning

Boolean-valued structures

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Tim Button ◽  
Sean Walsh
Keyword(s):  
Model Theory ◽  
Order Logic ◽  
First Order Logic ◽  
Inference Rules ◽  
Mathematical Concepts ◽  
Semantic Framework ◽  
First Order ◽  
Standard Models ◽  
Boolean Valued Model ◽  
Semantic Values

Chapters 6-12 are driven by questions about the ability to pin down mathematical entities and to articulate mathematical concepts. This chapter is driven by similar questions about the ability to pin down the semantic frameworks of language. It transpires that there are not just non-standard models, but non-standard ways of doing model theory itself. In more detail: whilst we normally outline a two-valued semantics which makes sentences True or False in a model, the inference rules for first-order logic are compatible with a four-valued semantics; or a semantics with countably many values; or what-have-you. The appropriate level of generality here is that of a Boolean-valued model, which we introduce. And the plurality of possible semantic values gives rise to perhaps the ‘deepest’ level of indeterminacy questions: How can humans pin down the semantic framework for their languages? We consider three different ways for inferentialists to respond to this question.

scholarly journals Extensions in graph normal form

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Michał Walicki
Keyword(s):  
Normal Form ◽  
Fixed Points ◽  
Propositional Logic ◽  
Order Logic ◽  
First Order Logic ◽  
First Order ◽  
Special Cases

Abstract Graph normal form, introduced earlier for propositional logic, is shown to be a normal form also for first-order logic. It allows to view syntax of theories as digraphs, while their semantics as kernels of these digraphs. Graphs are particularly well suited for studying circularity, and we provide some general means for verifying that circular or apparently circular extensions are conservative. Traditional syntactic means of ensuring conservativity, like definitional extensions or positive occurrences guaranteeing exsitence of fixed points, emerge as special cases.

Relational Chase Procedures Interpreted as Resolution with Paramodulation1

1991 ◽  
Vol 15 (2) ◽  
pp. 123-138
Author(s):  
Joachim Biskup ◽  
Bernhard Convent
Keyword(s):  
Alternative Interpretation ◽  
Order Logic ◽  
First Order Logic ◽  
Inference Problem ◽  
First Order ◽  
Inference Problems ◽  
The One ◽  
The Relationship ◽  
Theoretical Foundations ◽  
Insight Into

In this paper the relationship between dependency theory and first-order logic is explored in order to show how relational chase procedures (i.e., algorithms to decide inference problems for dependencies) can be interpreted as clever implementations of well known refutation procedures of first-order logic with resolution and paramodulation. On the one hand this alternative interpretation provides a deeper insight into the theoretical foundations of chase procedures, whereas on the other hand it makes available an already well established theory with a great amount of known results and techniques to be used for further investigations of the inference problem for dependencies. Our presentation is a detailed and careful elaboration of an idea formerly outlined by Grant and Jacobs which up to now seems to be disregarded by the database community although it definitely deserves more attention.

scholarly journals Formula size games for modal logic and μ-calculus

2019 ◽  
Vol 29 (8) ◽  
pp. 1311-1344 ◽  
Author(s):  
Lauri T Hella ◽  
Miikka S Vilander
Keyword(s):  
Modal Logic ◽  
Optimal Strategy ◽  
Order Logic ◽  
First Order Logic ◽  
Kripke Models ◽  
First Order ◽  
Modal Operators ◽  
Crucial Difference ◽  
Definition Of ◽  
Person Game

Abstract We propose a new version of formula size game for modal logic. The game characterizes the equivalence of pointed Kripke models up to formulas of given numbers of modal operators and binary connectives. Our game is similar to the well-known Adler–Immerman game. However, due to a crucial difference in the definition of positions of the game, its winning condition is simpler, and the second player does not have a trivial optimal strategy. Thus, unlike the Adler–Immerman game, our game is a genuine two-person game. We illustrate the use of the game by proving a non-elementary succinctness gap between bisimulation invariant first-order logic $\textrm{FO}$ and (basic) modal logic $\textrm{ML}$. We also present a version of the game for the modal $\mu $-calculus $\textrm{L}_\mu $ and show that $\textrm{FO}$ is also non-elementarily more succinct than $\textrm{L}_\mu $.

scholarly journals The Road to Modern Logic—An Interpretation

2001 ◽  
Vol 7 (4) ◽  
pp. 441-484 ◽  
Author(s):  
José Ferreirós
Keyword(s):  
Order Logic ◽  
Point Of View ◽  
First Order Logic ◽  
Theoretical Point ◽  
Primary Role ◽  
Philosophical Discussion ◽  
Modern Logic ◽  
Core System ◽  
First Order ◽  
The Road

AbstractThis paper aims to outline an analysis and interpretation of the process that led to First-Order Logic and its consolidation as a core system of modern logic. We begin with an historical overview of landmarks along the road to modern logic, and proceed to a philosophical discussion casting doubt on the possibility of a purely rational justification of the actual delimitation of First-Order Logic. On this basis, we advance the thesis that a certain historical tradition was essential to the emergence of modern logic; this traditional context is analyzed as consisting in some guiding principles and, particularly, a set of exemplars (i.e., paradigmatic instances). Then, we proceed to interpret the historical course of development reviewed in section 1, which can broadly be described as a two-phased movement of expansion and then restriction of the scope of logical theory. We shall try to pinpoint ambivalencies in the process, and the main motives for subsequent changes. Among the latter, one may emphasize the spirit of modern axiomatics, the situation of foundational insecurity in the 1920s, the resulting desire to find systems well-behaved from a proof-theoretical point of view, and the metatheoretical results of the 1930s. Not surprisingly, the mathematical and, more specifically, the foundational context in which First-Order Logic matured will be seen to have played a primary role in its shaping.Mathematical logic is what logic, through twenty-five centuries and a few transformations, has become today. (Jean van Heijenoort)

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