Employer “Business” and “Job” Defenses in Civil Rights Actions

1994 ◽  
Vol 23 (4) ◽  
pp. 573-586
Author(s):  
Paul S. Greenlaw ◽  
John P. Kohl

In civil rights actions, employee-plaintiffs alleging discrimination must attempt to prove a prima facie case;1 and if accomplished the employer-defendant must attempt to rebut such cases with some type of defense. These defenses may be very narrow and specific in scope such as the seniority or merit system defenses explicitly provided for under the 1963 Equal Pay Act (EPA). On the other hand, broader “business” and or “job” defenses (and the wording and meaning varies from situation to situation) have been both devised by the courts as standards of behavior for employers, and stipulated for employers by legislation. This article will analyze four important of these employer defenses: (1) the legitimate business reason and its antecedents in EPA litigation; (2) the Bona Fide Occupational Qualification (BFOQ) “reasonably necessary” defense provided in both the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and in the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967; (3) the business necessity and job related standards promulgated in Griggs v. Duke Power, 401 U.S. 424 (1971), as eventually codified by the Civil Rights Act of 1991; and (4) the job relatedness/business necessity/reasonable accommodation defense of the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA). All of the above defenses pose current challenges to employers except probably the BFOQ, so that their examination should be of value to all those involved in employee relations law.

1997 ◽  
Vol 26 (3) ◽  
pp. 335-344 ◽  
Author(s):  
Suzanne M. Crampton ◽  
John W. Hodge ◽  
Jitendra M. Mishra

Historically, women have been paid less than men. This pay disparity between men and women exists even when women hold similar jobs and are comparable to men with regard to seniority and experience. The goal of the Equal Pay Act of 1963 and the Civil Rights Act of 1964 was to change this situation. The Equal Pay Act states that men and women should receive the same pay for equal work. Three decades have passed but women's wages remain less than wages for men in equal positions. The focus of this paper is a discussion of the Equal Pay Act on wage differentials between men and women. Strategies will be presented that organizations can follow to minimize compensation disparities.


2021 ◽  
Vol 14 (4) ◽  
pp. 55
Author(s):  
Richard J. Hunter, Jr. ◽  
Hector R. Lozada ◽  
Gary H. Kritz

This article presents the issues of sex discrimination, working conditions, and equal pay raised in the legal dispute between the United States Soccer Federation and the Women's National Soccer Team. The authors study the application of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the Equal Pay Act of 1963, and the implications of applying Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972 to the U.S. Soccer Federation. The authors conclude by offering some observations and suggestions on the practical course of action that the US Women’s Soccer Team may consider in attempting to solve its dispute with the Federation.


2021 ◽  
Vol 111 ◽  
pp. 143-148
Author(s):  
Martha J. Bailey ◽  
Thomas Helgerman ◽  
Bryan A. Stuart

The 1960s witnessed landmark legislation that aimed to increase women's wages, including the Equal Pay Act of 1963, Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, and the 1966 amendments to the Fair Labor Standards Act. Although the gender gap in pay changed little at the mean/median during the decade, our distributional analysis shows that women's wages converged sharply on men's below but diverged above the median. However, the bulk of women's relative pay gains are not explained by changes in observed attributes. Our findings suggest an important role for legislation in narrowing the gender gap in the 1960s.


1981 ◽  
Vol 6 (3) ◽  
pp. 585-636
Author(s):  
Mayer G. Freed ◽  
Daniel D. Polsby

The Supreme Court's decision inCity of Los Angeles Department of Water and Power v. Manharthas engendered a considerable debate, much of which has appeared in the pages of thisJournal. Defenders of theManhartdecision take its critics to task for failure to appreciate the place of that decision in the overall jurisprudence of employment discrimination. In this article, the authors challenge the underlying conception of the law of sex discrimination that is said to dictate the result inManhart. Far from erecting a per se rule against all sex classifications, the Civil Rights Act of 1964 is shown to recognize both the relevance of prevalent social norms about sex differences and the legitimacy of certain interests of employers as limited justifications for the maintenance of sex-conscious lines in some circumstances, a recognition that contrasts sharply with the statute's categorical prohibition on racial classifications. It follows from this discussion thatManhart'soutcome was not ordained by the ethos of the laws against sex discrimination.


1995 ◽  
Vol 24 (2) ◽  
pp. 139-147 ◽  
Author(s):  
Joseph Michael Pace ◽  
Zachary Smith

Affirmative action was originally meant to remove by law, as required by the Equal Pay Act and the 1964 Civil Rights Act, “artificial barriers” that often prevented women and minority groups from entering the workforce. By the late 1960's and early 1970's affirmative action had been altered to become the governmental attempt to provide compensatory opportunities for groups who experience discrimination when seeking employment. More recently the legal essence of affirmative action refers to specific guidelines and rules to recruit, hire, and promote disadvantaged groups for the purpose of eliminating the existing effects of past discriminatory practices. Despite a plethora of U.S. Supreme Court decisions, affirmative action has yet to be clearly defined as a cohesive public policy. The Court's failure to define affirmative action as a coherent constitutional and legal concept has led to widespread misinterpretation of affirmative action goals among public administrators. This notion is substantiated by examining the results of a survey of local government officials at the county and municipal level which measures their understanding and perception of federal law pertaining to affirmative action's meaning and purpose.


Author(s):  
Eric M. Dunleavy ◽  
Lia Engelsted ◽  
Alexander Morris

The purpose of this chapter is to provide a brief overview of the legal issues that are most relevant to industrial/organizational psychologists in the United States. The chapter first reviews the legal process, describing laws and acts relevant to the workplace, such as Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Executive Order (EO) 11246, Age Discrimination in Employment Act, American with Disabilities Act, and the Equal Pay Act of 1963. Next, it outlines the equal employment opportunity (EEO) enforcement agencies. It then describes the two broad theories of discrimination, disparate treatment and adverse impact, and the regulatory frameworks. The chapter provides basic primers for a set of contemporary EEO topics, including disability discrimination, pay equity, employer retaliation, and age discrimination. The chapter concludes with the notion that EEO law is constantly evolving, particularly as the scope of who is protected expands and the legal system clarifies ambiguities in the law.


2014 ◽  
Vol 28 (4) ◽  
pp. 291-308 ◽  
Author(s):  
Zafar E. Nazarov ◽  
Sarah von Schrader

Purpose: We explore whether certain employer characteristics predict Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) charges and whether the same characteristics predict receipt of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act charges.Method: We estimate a set of multivariate regressions using the ordinary least squares method.Results: Most employer-level characteristics that predict the receipt of ADA charges also predict the receipt of other types of discrimination charges.Conclusions: Our findings suggest that educational outreach efforts aimed at reducing the level of perceived disability discrimination in the workplace can be more efficient by targeting employer groups who are likely to receive charges under not only the ADA but also other statutes as well.


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