Welfare Implications of Uncertain Social Security Reform

2020 ◽  
Vol 48 (4) ◽  
pp. 425-466
Author(s):  
Jaeger Nelson

Policy uncertainty is a type of aggregate risk that has important economic and welfare implications. In this article, I develop a simple general equilibrium overlapping generations model in which households are uncertain as to the type and timing of an inevitable Social Security reform. I document how households’ expectations over the path of future policy influences their behavior. I find that the economic and welfare effects of policy uncertainty are highly sensitive to households’ beliefs over the path of future policy.

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Sarah Lynne Salvador Daway-Ducanes

Abstract This paper analyses the macroeconomic and welfare effects of a higher retirement age within a dynamic overlapping generations framework, wherein exponential discounting and sophisticated quasi-hyperbolic discounting agents coexist in ‘mixed economies’. The transitional dynamics of economic aggregates depend on the proportion of QHD agents, and the extent to which reducing the social security tax rate mitigates crowding-out effects on savings and enables both lower pension contributions and higher pension benefits. Welfare impacts across agent types and cohorts differ accordingly: QHD agents employ the higher retirement age as a commitment mechanism to mitigate the adverse welfare implications of present-biasedness.


2018 ◽  
Vol 23 (8) ◽  
pp. 3140-3162 ◽  
Author(s):  
Pierre-Richard Agénor

This paper studies the growth and welfare effects of macroprudential regulation in an overlapping generations model of endogenous growth with banking and agency costs. Indivisible investment projects combine with informational imperfections to create a double moral hazard problem à la Holmström–Tirole and a role for bank monitoring. When the optimal monitoring intensity is endogenously determined, an increase in the required reserve ratio (motivated by systemic risk considerations) has conflicting effects on investment and growth. On one hand, requiring banks to put away a fraction of the deposits that they receive reduces the supply of loanable funds. On the other, a higher required ratio raises incentives to save and mitigates banks' incentives to monitor, thereby lowering monitoring costs and freeing up resources to increase lending. In addition, it may mitigate the systemic risk externality associated with excessive leverage. This trade-off can be internalized by choosing the required reserve ratio that maximizes growth and welfare. However, the risk of disintermediation means that in practice financial supervision may also need to be strengthened, and the perimeter of regulation broadened, if the optimal ratio is relatively high.


2018 ◽  
Vol 60 (2) ◽  
pp. 661-692 ◽  
Author(s):  
Daniel Harenberg ◽  
Alexander Ludwig

2019 ◽  
Vol 45 (4) ◽  
pp. 795-818
Author(s):  
Krzysztof Makarski ◽  
Joanna Tyrowicz ◽  
Magda Malec

2020 ◽  
pp. 39-67
Author(s):  
Miguel Fonseca

This article studies the response of social welfare to fiscal consolidations, by focusing on a less debated characteristic of fiscal plans: the speed of deleveraging. A neoclassical overlapping generations model is calibrated to the German economy, and a sequence of reductions of the same size in the debt‑ to GDP ratio are simulated considering different adjustment periods. Welfare gains are found to be larger in slow, delayed fiscal consolidations, due to the presence of incomplete markets. It is also found that the aggregate welfare response depends on the distribution of wealth and the type of fiscal instrument used.


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