scholarly journals (Ideo)Logical Reasoning: Ideology Impairs Sound Reasoning

2019 ◽  
Vol 10 (8) ◽  
pp. 1075-1083 ◽  
Author(s):  
Anup Gampa ◽  
Sean P. Wojcik ◽  
Matt Motyl ◽  
Brian A. Nosek ◽  
Peter H. Ditto
Keyword(s):  
Logical Structure ◽  
Logical Reasoning ◽  
Belief Bias ◽  
Logical Validity ◽  
Political Beliefs ◽  
Conservative Beliefs ◽  
Logical Errors

Beliefs shape how people interpret information and may impair how people engage in logical reasoning. In three studies, we show how ideological beliefs impair people’s ability to (1) recognize logical validity in arguments that oppose their political beliefs and (2) recognize the lack of logical validity in arguments that support their political beliefs. We observed belief bias effects among liberals and conservatives who evaluated the logical soundness of classically structured logical syllogisms supporting liberal or conservative beliefs. Both liberals and conservatives frequently evaluated the logical structure of entire arguments based on the believability of arguments’ conclusions, leading to predictable patterns of logical errors. As a result, liberals were better at identifying flawed arguments supporting conservative beliefs and conservatives were better at identifying flawed arguments supporting liberal beliefs. These findings illuminate one key mechanism for how political beliefs distort people’s abilities to reason about political topics soundly.

scholarly journals (Ideo)Logical Reasoning: Ideology Impairs Sound Reasoning

2019 ◽  
Author(s):  
Anup Gampa ◽  
Sean Wojcik ◽  
Matt Motyl ◽  
Brian A. Nosek ◽  
Peter Ditto
Keyword(s):  
Logical Structure ◽  
Logical Reasoning ◽  
Belief Bias ◽  
Logical Validity ◽  
Political Beliefs ◽  
Conservative Beliefs ◽  
Logical Errors

Beliefs shape how people interpret information and may impair how people engage in logical reasoning. In 3 studies, we show how ideological beliefs impair people's ability to: (1) recognize logical validity in arguments that oppose their political beliefs, and, (2) recognize the lack of logical validity in arguments that support their political beliefs. We observed belief bias effects among liberals and conservatives who evaluated the logical soundness of classically structured logical syllogisms supporting liberal or conservative beliefs. Both liberals and conservatives frequently evaluated the logical structure of entire arguments based on the believability of arguments’ conclusions, leading to predictable patterns of logical errors. As a result, liberals were better at identifying flawed arguments supporting conservative beliefs and conservatives were better at identifying flawed arguments supporting liberal beliefs. These findings illuminate one key mechanism for how political beliefs distort people’s abilities to reason about political topics soundly.

Reasoning Under Time Pressure

2009 ◽  
Vol 56 (2) ◽  
pp. 77-83 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jonathan St. B. T. Evans ◽  
Simon J. Handley ◽  
Alison M. Bacon
Keyword(s):  
Time Pressure ◽  
Syllogistic Reasoning ◽  
Conditional Inference ◽  
Belief Bias ◽  
Volitional Control ◽  
Logical Validity

In this study, we examine the role of beliefs in conditional inference in two experiments, demonstrating a robust tendency for people to make fewer inferences from statements they disbelieve, regardless of logical validity. The main purpose of this study was to test whether participants are able to inhibit this belief effect where it constitutes a bias. This is the case when participants are specifically instructed to assume the truth of the premises. However, Experiment 1 showed that the effect is no less marked than when this instruction is given, than when it is not, although higher ability participants did show slightly less influence of belief (Experiment 2). Contrary to the findings with syllogistic reasoning, use of speeded tasks had no effect on the extent of the belief bias (both experiments), although it did considerably reduce the numbers of inferences that were drawn overall. These findings suggest that the belief bias in conditional inference is less open to volitional control than that associated with syllogistic reasoning.

The Effect of Feedback and Meta-cognition on Belief Bias in Logical Reasoning

2020 ◽  
Vol 53 ◽  
pp. 151-169
Author(s):  
YE-EUN NAM ◽  
MYOUNGJIN LEE ◽  
YOONHYOUNG LEE
Keyword(s):  
Logical Reasoning ◽  
Belief Bias

scholarly journals Age-related differences in structural and functional prefrontal networks during a logical reasoning task

2019 ◽  
Author(s):  
Maryam Ziaei ◽  
Mohammad Reza Bonyadi ◽  
David C. Reutens
Keyword(s):  
Older Adults ◽  
Large Scale ◽  
Inferior Frontal Gyrus ◽  
Functional Results ◽  
Logical Reasoning ◽  
Anterior Cingulate ◽  
Belief Bias ◽  
Reasoning Task ◽  
Age Related ◽  
The Impact

AbstractIn logical reasoning, difficulties in inhibition of currently-held beliefs may lead to unwarranted conclusions, known as belief bias. Aging is associated with difficulties in inhibitory control, which may lead to deficits in inhibition of currently-held beliefs. No study to date, however, has investigated the underlying neural substrates of age-related differences in logical reasoning and the impact of belief load. The aim of the present study was to delineate age differences in brain activity during a syllogistic logical reasoning task while the believability load of logical inferences was manipulated. Twenty-nine, healthy, younger and thirty, healthy, older adults (males and females) completed a functional magnetic resonance imaging experiment in which they were asked to determine the logical validity of conclusions. Unlike younger adults, older adults engaged a large-scale network including anterior cingulate cortex (ACC) and inferior frontal gyrus (IFG) during conclusion stage. Our functional connectivity results suggest that while older adults engaged the ACC network to overcome their intuitive responses for believable inferences, the IFG network contributed to higher control over responses during both believable and unbelievable conditions. Our functional results were further supported by structure-function-behavior analyses indicating the importance of cingulum bundle and uncinate fasciculus integrity in rejection of believable statements. These novel findings lend evidence for age-related differences in belief bias, with potentially important implications for decision making where currently-held beliefs and given assumptions are in conflict.

Consciousness and unconsciousness of logical reasoning errors in the human brain

2002 ◽  
Vol 25 (3) ◽  
pp. 341-341 ◽  
Author(s):  
Olivier Houdé
Keyword(s):  
Human Brain ◽  
Brain Networks ◽  
Logical Reasoning ◽  
Psychology Of Reasoning ◽  
Reasoning Errors ◽  
Logical Errors ◽  
Neuroimaging Techniques

I challenge here the concept of SOC in regard to the question of the consciousness or unconsciousness of logical errors. My commentary offers support for the demonstration of how neuroimaging techniques might be used in the psychology of reasoning to test hypotheses about a potential hierarchy of levels of consciousness (and thus of partial unconsciousness) implemented in different brain networks.

scholarly journals Role of the Hippocampus During Logical Reasoning and Belief Bias in Aging

2020 ◽  
Vol 12 ◽  
Author(s):  
Maryam Ziaei ◽  
Mohammad Reza Bonyadi ◽  
David C. Reutens
Keyword(s):  
Logical Reasoning ◽  
Belief Bias

An Inverse Belief–Bias Effect

2009 ◽  
Vol 56 (2) ◽  
pp. 112-120 ◽  
Author(s):  
Henry Markovits ◽  
Cécile Saelen ◽  
Hugues Lortie Forgues
Keyword(s):  
Response Times ◽  
Modus Ponens ◽  
Logical Reasoning ◽  
Belief Bias ◽  
Bias Effect ◽  
Opposite Pattern ◽  
Do So

Two studies examined the hypothesis that accepting false premises as true in order to make the modus ponens (MP) inference requires inhibition of contradictory knowledge. Study 1 presented both MP and affirmation of the consequent (AC) inferences using either false, but plausible premises or completely unbelievable premises, with standard logical constructions using either an evaluation or a production paradigm. The rate of acceptance of the MP inferences was significantly greater with unbelievable premises than with plausible premises, in both evaluation and production, while no such effect was observed with the AC inferences. Study 2 used a computer-generated presentation allowing for measures of response times. Participants who tended to accept the MP inference with unbelievable premises took longer to do so with plausible premises than with unbelievable premises. Participants who tended to reject the MP inference showed an opposite pattern. In both studies, the observed effects were not shown for the AC inferences. The overall pattern of results was consistent with the hypothesis that inhibition is a key component of logical reasoning with false premises.

scholarly journals Thinking in a foreign language distorts allocation of cognitive effort: Evidence from reasoning.

2019 ◽  
Author(s):  
Michal Bialek ◽  
Rafal Muda ◽  
Kaiden M Stewart ◽  
Paweł Niszczota ◽  
Damian Pieńkosz
Keyword(s):  
Decision Making ◽  
Foreign Language ◽  
Logical Structure ◽  
Logical Reasoning ◽  
Cognitive Effort ◽  
Efficient Strategy ◽  
Logical Status ◽  
Reflective Processing ◽  
Decision Making Biases ◽  
Belief Logic

Bilinguals, in their foreign language, are spared from common decision-making biases. Typically, this “Foreign Language Effect” results in increased accuracy. We examined the Foreign Language Effect in the context of logical reasoning, in which reasoners are required to track the logical status of a syllogism, ignoring its believability. Across three experiments, we found the reverse Foreign Language Effect; foreign language reasoners are less able to evaluate the logical structure of syllogisms, but no less biased by their believability. One path to succeeding in reasoning tasks is always engaging in reflective processing. A more efficient strategy is metacognitively tracking whether belief-based intuitions conflict with logic-based intuitions and only reflecting when such conflict is present. We provide evidence that foreign language reasoners are less accurate because they struggle to detect belief-logic conflict, and in turn fail to engage in reflective processing when necessary to override the incorrect, intuitive response. We propose that foreign language reasoners are less able to detect belief-logic conflict either due to weakened intuitions or due to a more conservative threshold for the detection of conflict between multiple competing intuitions. Data for the experiments can be accessed publicly at https://osf.io/phbuq/

Elements of Logical Reasoning

2009 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jan von Plato
Keyword(s):  
Logical Reasoning
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