Belief Bias, Logical Reasoning and Presentation Order on the Syllogistic Evaluation Task

Author(s):  
Nicola J. Lambell ◽  
Jonathan St. B.T Evans ◽  
Simon J. Handley
2020 ◽  
Vol 53 ◽  
pp. 151-169
Author(s):  
YE-EUN NAM ◽  
MYOUNGJIN LEE ◽  
YOONHYOUNG LEE

2019 ◽  
Author(s):  
Maryam Ziaei ◽  
Mohammad Reza Bonyadi ◽  
David C. Reutens

AbstractIn logical reasoning, difficulties in inhibition of currently-held beliefs may lead to unwarranted conclusions, known as belief bias. Aging is associated with difficulties in inhibitory control, which may lead to deficits in inhibition of currently-held beliefs. No study to date, however, has investigated the underlying neural substrates of age-related differences in logical reasoning and the impact of belief load. The aim of the present study was to delineate age differences in brain activity during a syllogistic logical reasoning task while the believability load of logical inferences was manipulated. Twenty-nine, healthy, younger and thirty, healthy, older adults (males and females) completed a functional magnetic resonance imaging experiment in which they were asked to determine the logical validity of conclusions. Unlike younger adults, older adults engaged a large-scale network including anterior cingulate cortex (ACC) and inferior frontal gyrus (IFG) during conclusion stage. Our functional connectivity results suggest that while older adults engaged the ACC network to overcome their intuitive responses for believable inferences, the IFG network contributed to higher control over responses during both believable and unbelievable conditions. Our functional results were further supported by structure-function-behavior analyses indicating the importance of cingulum bundle and uncinate fasciculus integrity in rejection of believable statements. These novel findings lend evidence for age-related differences in belief bias, with potentially important implications for decision making where currently-held beliefs and given assumptions are in conflict.


2019 ◽  
Vol 10 (8) ◽  
pp. 1075-1083 ◽  
Author(s):  
Anup Gampa ◽  
Sean P. Wojcik ◽  
Matt Motyl ◽  
Brian A. Nosek ◽  
Peter H. Ditto

Beliefs shape how people interpret information and may impair how people engage in logical reasoning. In three studies, we show how ideological beliefs impair people’s ability to (1) recognize logical validity in arguments that oppose their political beliefs and (2) recognize the lack of logical validity in arguments that support their political beliefs. We observed belief bias effects among liberals and conservatives who evaluated the logical soundness of classically structured logical syllogisms supporting liberal or conservative beliefs. Both liberals and conservatives frequently evaluated the logical structure of entire arguments based on the believability of arguments’ conclusions, leading to predictable patterns of logical errors. As a result, liberals were better at identifying flawed arguments supporting conservative beliefs and conservatives were better at identifying flawed arguments supporting liberal beliefs. These findings illuminate one key mechanism for how political beliefs distort people’s abilities to reason about political topics soundly.


Author(s):  
Maryam Ziaei ◽  
Mohammad Reza Bonyadi ◽  
David C. Reutens

Author(s):  
Henry Markovits ◽  
Cécile Saelen ◽  
Hugues Lortie Forgues

Two studies examined the hypothesis that accepting false premises as true in order to make the modus ponens (MP) inference requires inhibition of contradictory knowledge. Study 1 presented both MP and affirmation of the consequent (AC) inferences using either false, but plausible premises or completely unbelievable premises, with standard logical constructions using either an evaluation or a production paradigm. The rate of acceptance of the MP inferences was significantly greater with unbelievable premises than with plausible premises, in both evaluation and production, while no such effect was observed with the AC inferences. Study 2 used a computer-generated presentation allowing for measures of response times. Participants who tended to accept the MP inference with unbelievable premises took longer to do so with plausible premises than with unbelievable premises. Participants who tended to reject the MP inference showed an opposite pattern. In both studies, the observed effects were not shown for the AC inferences. The overall pattern of results was consistent with the hypothesis that inhibition is a key component of logical reasoning with false premises.


2019 ◽  
Author(s):  
Anup Gampa ◽  
Sean Wojcik ◽  
Matt Motyl ◽  
Brian A. Nosek ◽  
Peter Ditto

Beliefs shape how people interpret information and may impair how people engage in logical reasoning. In 3 studies, we show how ideological beliefs impair people's ability to: (1) recognize logical validity in arguments that oppose their political beliefs, and, (2) recognize the lack of logical validity in arguments that support their political beliefs. We observed belief bias effects among liberals and conservatives who evaluated the logical soundness of classically structured logical syllogisms supporting liberal or conservative beliefs. Both liberals and conservatives frequently evaluated the logical structure of entire arguments based on the believability of arguments’ conclusions, leading to predictable patterns of logical errors. As a result, liberals were better at identifying flawed arguments supporting conservative beliefs and conservatives were better at identifying flawed arguments supporting liberal beliefs. These findings illuminate one key mechanism for how political beliefs distort people’s abilities to reason about political topics soundly.


Author(s):  
Jan von Plato
Keyword(s):  

Author(s):  
Andreas Voß ◽  
Klaus Rothermund ◽  
Dirk Wentura

Abstract. In this article, a modified variant of the Affective Simon Task (AST; De Houwer & Eelen, 1998 ) is presented as a measure of implicit evaluations of single stimuli. In the AST, the words “good” or “bad” have to be given as responses depending on the color of the stimuli. The AST was combined with an evaluation task to increase the salience of the valence of the presented stimuli. Experiment 1 investigated evaluations of schematic faces showing emotional expressions. In Experiment 2 we measured the valence of artificial stimuli that acquired valence in a game context during the experiment. Both experiments confirm the validity of the modified AST. The results also revealed a dissociation between explicit and implicit evaluations.


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