scholarly journals Using Facebook data to predict the 2016 U.S. presidential election

PLoS ONE ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 16 (12) ◽  
pp. e0253560
Author(s):  
Keng-Chi Chang ◽  
Chun-Fang Chiang ◽  
Ming-Jen Lin

We use 19 billion likes on the posts of top 2000 U.S. fan pages on Facebook from 2015 to 2016 to measure the dynamic ideological positions for politicians, news outlets, and users at the national and state levels. We then use these measures to derive support rates for 2016 presidential candidates in all 50 states, to predict the election, and to compare them with state-level polls and actual vote shares. We find that: (1) Assuming that users vote for candidates closer to their own ideological positions, support rates calculated using Facebook predict that Trump will win the electoral college vote while Clinton will win the popular vote. (2) State-level Facebook support rates track state-level polling averages and pass the cointegration test, showing two time series share similar trends. (3) Compared with actual vote shares, polls generally have smaller margin of errors, but polls also often overestimate Clinton’s support in right-leaning states. Overall, we provide a method to forecast elections at low cost, in real time, and based on passively revealed preference and little researcher discretion.

2012 ◽  
Vol 45 (04) ◽  
pp. 669-674 ◽  
Author(s):  
Michael J. Berry ◽  
Kenneth N. Bickers

Nearly all forecast models of US presidential elections provide estimates of the national two-party vote (Campbell 2008). Each of the nine forecasts published in the 2008 forecasting issue ofPS: Political Science and Politicsmade national popular vote total predictions for the major party candidates, while only one provided an expected result in the Electoral College (Klarner 2008). These national vote models are assumed to be reliable forecasts of who is likely to win the general election. In most cases, this assumption is reasonable. It becomes problematic, however, at precisely the point that forecasts are most interesting: when elections are close. In tight elections, national forecasts can and have produced a “winner” different from the actual winner. Consider the forecasts and ultimate outcome of the 2000 election. Each of the 2000 presidential election forecasts predicted vice president Al Gore to win a majority of the two-party popular vote, which he did, but none correctly predicted governor George W. Bush to assume the presidency (Campbell 2001). Never in US history have White House residents been determined through a national popular vote. Presidential elections are decided through contests in the states and the District of Columbia. The forecast model we developed explicitly models the presidential contest based on factors inherent to these 51 jurisdictions. This modeling approach allows us to make a projection of the Electoral College result, which popular vote estimates cannot.


2018 ◽  
Vol 52 (1) ◽  
pp. 20-24 ◽  
Author(s):  
Fabrice Barthélémy ◽  
Mathieu Martin ◽  
Ashley Piggins

ABSTRACTDonald J. Trump won the 2016 US presidential election with fewer popular votes than Hillary R. Clinton. This is the fourth time this has happened, the others being 1876, 1888, and 2000. In earlier work, we analyzed these elections (and others) and showed how the electoral winner can often depend on the size of the US House of Representatives. This work was inspired by Neubauer and Zeitlin (2003, 721–5) in their paper, “Outcomes of Presidential Elections and the House Size.” A sufficiently larger House would have given electoral victories to the popular vote winner in both 1876 and 2000. An exception is the election of 1888. We show that Trump’s victory in 2016 is like Harrison’s in 1888 and unlike Hayes’s in 1876 and Bush’s in 2000. This article updates our previous work to include the 2016 election. It also draws attention to some of the anomalous behavior that can arise under the Electoral College.


2020 ◽  
Vol 117 (45) ◽  
pp. 27940-27944 ◽  
Author(s):  
Robert S. Erikson ◽  
Karl Sigman ◽  
Linan Yao

Donald Trump’s 2016 win despite failing to carry the popular vote has raised concern that 2020 would also see a mismatch between the winner of the popular vote and the winner of the Electoral College. This paper shows how to forecast the electoral vote in 2020 taking into account the unknown popular vote and the configuration of state voting in 2016. We note that 2016 was a statistical outlier. The potential Electoral College bias was slimmer in the past and not always favoring the Republican candidate. We show that in past presidential elections, difference among states in their presidential voting is solely a function of the states’ most recent presidential voting (plus new shocks); earlier history does not matter. Based on thousands of simulations, our research suggests that the bias in 2020 probably will favor Trump again but to a lesser degree than in 2016. The range of possible outcomes is sufficiently wide, however, to even include some possibility that Joseph Biden could win in the Electoral College while barely losing the popular vote.


2017 ◽  
Vol 63 (7) ◽  
pp. 856-887 ◽  
Author(s):  
Pamela S. Shockley-Zalabak ◽  
Sherwyn P. Morreale ◽  
Carmen Stavrositu

This study explored voters’ perceptions of Hillary Clinton and Donald Trump regarding their general trust in the two 2016 presidential candidates, voters’ demographics, five underlying drivers of trust, and important campaign issues. The study also examined how perceptions of trust on issues were evidenced in the popular vote and in key swing states and the Electoral College. The study used two online census-representative surveys to examine registered voters’ perceptions: one survey of 1,500 respondents conducted immediately before the first presidential debate (September 7-15, 2016) and a second survey of a different sample of 1,500 immediately after the third debate (October 20-31), 2016. Analysis of the results confirmed relatively low-trust levels for both Hillary Clinton and Donald Trump and an electorate divided demographically about their trust in the two candidates. The five trust drivers yielded statistically significant differences between the candidates. Clinton was evaluated as more competent, concerned, and reliable, and a person with whom participants identified. With the second survey, Trump statistically surpassed Clinton for openness and honesty. Regarding the three issues of most importance in the campaign, Clinton and Trump had equivalent trust evaluations for dealing with the U.S. economy/jobs, but Trump was more trusted regarding terrorism/national security and Clinton was more trusted regarding health care. The overall trust evaluations for Clinton, coupled with intentions to vote, contribute to understanding Clinton’s popular vote victory. However, the importance of terrorism/national security in swing states and Trump’s trust advantage on that issue contributes to understanding the Electoral College vote by comparison with the popular vote.


2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
◽  
Simon Power

<p>The United States presidential election in 2000 was one of the closest in history. In 1960, the winner of the popular vote in that presidential election won by the narrowest of margins. Forty years separated the two results, and both involved a sitting Vice President losing to a relative newcomer.  This study sets out the backgrounds of each of the four presidential candidates who competed in 1960 and 2000 and aims to understand the character of each by examining the influences on their lives and the development of their defining character traits. The second aim is to understand the authentic nature of their character by applying several theoretical frameworks to each of them. The application of these theoretical models is done in the context of the outcomes of the 1960 and 2000 elections and, in particular, the losing candidates’ reactions to those results. It is at this most crucial moment that decision-making best reflects whether the candidate’s reaction is authentic in the context of his character development.</p>


2009 ◽  
Vol 42 (02) ◽  
pp. 353-357 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jack E. Riggs ◽  
Gerald R. Hobbs ◽  
Todd H. Riggs

Compared to the popular vote, the Electoral College magnifies the perception of the winner's margin of victory. In this analysis, a method of quantifying the magnitude of the advantage given to the winner due to the Electoral College's two electoral vote add-on and winner-take-all methodologies is presented. Using the electoral vote distribution that was present in the 2000 U.S. presidential election, we analyzed one million random two-candidate simulated elections. The results show that the net effect of the Electoral College is to give the winning candidate an average 29.45 electoral vote advantage per election due to the winner-take-all methodology. This winner's advantage includes an average 0.42 electoral vote advantage given to the winner per election due to the two electoral vote add-on.


1974 ◽  
Vol 68 (1) ◽  
pp. 113-134 ◽  
Author(s):  
Steven J. Brams ◽  
Morton D. Davis

The purpose of this article is to assess the effect of the winner-take-all feature of the Electoral College on the allocation of resources by candidates to the states in a presidential campaign. Conceptualizing the campaign as a two-person zero-sum infinite game, it is found that the main effect of this feature is to induce candidates to allocate campaign resources roughly in proportion to the 3/2's power of the electoral votes of each state, which creates a peculiar bias that makes voters living in the largest states as much as three times as attractive campaign targets as voters living in the smallest states. Empirically, it is shown that the 3/2's rule explains quite well the time allocations of presidential and vice-presidential candidates in the 1960, 1964, 1968, and 1972 campaigns; for presidential campaigns in 1976 and 1980, optimal allocations are indicated for all fifty states and the District of Columbia. A comparison with optimal allocations under a system of direct popular-vote election of the president reveals that such a system would be less susceptible to manipulative strategies than the Electoral College as well as being compatible with the egalitarian principle of “one man, one vote.”


2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Clemens Nollenberger ◽  
Gina-Maria Unger

Forecasts of US presidential elections have gained considerable attention in recent years. However, as became evident in 2016 with the victory of Donald Trump, most of them consider presidential elections only at the national level, neglecting that these are ultimately decided by the Electoral College. In order to improve accuracy, we believe that forecasts should instead address outcomes at the state-level to determine the eventual Electoral College winner. We develop a political economy model of the incumbent vote share across states based on different short- and long-term predictors, referring up to the end of the second quarter of election years. Testing it against election outcomes since 1980, our model correctly predicts the eventual election winner in 9 out of 10 cases – including 2016 –, with the 2000 election being the exception. For the 2020 election, it expects Trump to lose the Electoral College, as only 6.2 percent of simulated outcomes cross the required threshold of 270 Electoral Votes, with a mean prediction of 106 Electoral Votes.


The Forum ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 19 (2) ◽  
pp. 173-201
Author(s):  
Christopher J. Devine ◽  
Kyle C. Kopko

Abstract Hillary Clinton won the national popular vote for president in 2016, but lost to Donald Trump in the Electoral College. Trump’s margin of victory in several decisive battleground states was smaller than the combined vote for the two leading minor party candidates: Gary Johnson, of the Libertarian Party, and Jill Stein, of the Green Party. The perception that Johnson and Stein “stole” the 2016 presidential election from Clinton is widespread, and potentially consequential for future minor party candidacies, but it has not yet been rigorously tested. In this article, we extend the analysis of minor party voting in the 1992 election from Lacy, D., and B. C. Burden. 1999. “The Vote-Stealing and Turnout Effects of Ross Perot in the 1992 U.S. Presidential Election.” American Journal of Political Science 43 (1): 233–55, by using data from the 2016 Cooperative Congressional Election Study to estimate a multinomial probit model of voting behavior—including outcomes for vote choice and abstention—and calculate the predicted probabilities that Johnson and Stein voters would have voted for another candidate or abstained from voting, had one or both of these candidates been excluded from the ballot. We then reallocate Johnson’s and Stein’s votes accordingly, to estimate Clinton’s and Trump’s counterfactual vote shares nationally and within key battleground states. Our analysis indicates that Johnson and Stein did not deprive Clinton of an Electoral College majority, nor Trump the legitimacy of winning the national popular vote. We estimate that most Johnson and Stein voters would have abstained from voting if denied the choice to vote for their preferred candidate, and that most of Johnson’s remaining voters would have supported Trump.


2019 ◽  
Vol 8 (5) ◽  
pp. 134 ◽  
Author(s):  
Richard F. Potthoff

The 1968, 2000, and (future) 2024 U.S. presidential elections provide settings for deliberately provocative, offbeat scenarios that might have happened or could happen. Throughout, the Electoral College and plurality voting both receive blame. Scenario 1 exposes a quirk previously unnoticed: Under (albeit special) conditions, certain 1968 Humphrey voters could have made Humphrey rather than Nixon the election victor had they voted strategically for Wallace instead of Humphrey. In Scenario 2, overlooked nonidentifiability of undervotes would have plagued the 2000 Florida recount had the U.S. Supreme Court not halted it, thus raising questions about the foresightfulness of almost everyone involved; but, in addition, Gore missed an opportunity that, through use of proper statistical sampling, could have propelled him to victory. In Scenario 3, National Popular Vote Interstate Compact supporters fail to foresee that even one state, by changing its method for presidential voting, can wreck this innovative and widely promoted compact.


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