Did Gary Johnson and Jill Stein Cost Hillary Clinton the Presidency? A Counterfactual Analysis of Minor Party Voting in the 2016 US Presidential Election

The Forum ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 19 (2) ◽  
pp. 173-201
Author(s):  
Christopher J. Devine ◽  
Kyle C. Kopko

Abstract Hillary Clinton won the national popular vote for president in 2016, but lost to Donald Trump in the Electoral College. Trump’s margin of victory in several decisive battleground states was smaller than the combined vote for the two leading minor party candidates: Gary Johnson, of the Libertarian Party, and Jill Stein, of the Green Party. The perception that Johnson and Stein “stole” the 2016 presidential election from Clinton is widespread, and potentially consequential for future minor party candidacies, but it has not yet been rigorously tested. In this article, we extend the analysis of minor party voting in the 1992 election from Lacy, D., and B. C. Burden. 1999. “The Vote-Stealing and Turnout Effects of Ross Perot in the 1992 U.S. Presidential Election.” American Journal of Political Science 43 (1): 233–55, by using data from the 2016 Cooperative Congressional Election Study to estimate a multinomial probit model of voting behavior—including outcomes for vote choice and abstention—and calculate the predicted probabilities that Johnson and Stein voters would have voted for another candidate or abstained from voting, had one or both of these candidates been excluded from the ballot. We then reallocate Johnson’s and Stein’s votes accordingly, to estimate Clinton’s and Trump’s counterfactual vote shares nationally and within key battleground states. Our analysis indicates that Johnson and Stein did not deprive Clinton of an Electoral College majority, nor Trump the legitimacy of winning the national popular vote. We estimate that most Johnson and Stein voters would have abstained from voting if denied the choice to vote for their preferred candidate, and that most of Johnson’s remaining voters would have supported Trump.

2018 ◽  
Vol 52 (1) ◽  
pp. 20-24 ◽  
Author(s):  
Fabrice Barthélémy ◽  
Mathieu Martin ◽  
Ashley Piggins

ABSTRACTDonald J. Trump won the 2016 US presidential election with fewer popular votes than Hillary R. Clinton. This is the fourth time this has happened, the others being 1876, 1888, and 2000. In earlier work, we analyzed these elections (and others) and showed how the electoral winner can often depend on the size of the US House of Representatives. This work was inspired by Neubauer and Zeitlin (2003, 721–5) in their paper, “Outcomes of Presidential Elections and the House Size.” A sufficiently larger House would have given electoral victories to the popular vote winner in both 1876 and 2000. An exception is the election of 1888. We show that Trump’s victory in 2016 is like Harrison’s in 1888 and unlike Hayes’s in 1876 and Bush’s in 2000. This article updates our previous work to include the 2016 election. It also draws attention to some of the anomalous behavior that can arise under the Electoral College.


2020 ◽  
Vol 117 (45) ◽  
pp. 27940-27944 ◽  
Author(s):  
Robert S. Erikson ◽  
Karl Sigman ◽  
Linan Yao

Donald Trump’s 2016 win despite failing to carry the popular vote has raised concern that 2020 would also see a mismatch between the winner of the popular vote and the winner of the Electoral College. This paper shows how to forecast the electoral vote in 2020 taking into account the unknown popular vote and the configuration of state voting in 2016. We note that 2016 was a statistical outlier. The potential Electoral College bias was slimmer in the past and not always favoring the Republican candidate. We show that in past presidential elections, difference among states in their presidential voting is solely a function of the states’ most recent presidential voting (plus new shocks); earlier history does not matter. Based on thousands of simulations, our research suggests that the bias in 2020 probably will favor Trump again but to a lesser degree than in 2016. The range of possible outcomes is sufficiently wide, however, to even include some possibility that Joseph Biden could win in the Electoral College while barely losing the popular vote.


2017 ◽  
Vol 63 (7) ◽  
pp. 856-887 ◽  
Author(s):  
Pamela S. Shockley-Zalabak ◽  
Sherwyn P. Morreale ◽  
Carmen Stavrositu

This study explored voters’ perceptions of Hillary Clinton and Donald Trump regarding their general trust in the two 2016 presidential candidates, voters’ demographics, five underlying drivers of trust, and important campaign issues. The study also examined how perceptions of trust on issues were evidenced in the popular vote and in key swing states and the Electoral College. The study used two online census-representative surveys to examine registered voters’ perceptions: one survey of 1,500 respondents conducted immediately before the first presidential debate (September 7-15, 2016) and a second survey of a different sample of 1,500 immediately after the third debate (October 20-31), 2016. Analysis of the results confirmed relatively low-trust levels for both Hillary Clinton and Donald Trump and an electorate divided demographically about their trust in the two candidates. The five trust drivers yielded statistically significant differences between the candidates. Clinton was evaluated as more competent, concerned, and reliable, and a person with whom participants identified. With the second survey, Trump statistically surpassed Clinton for openness and honesty. Regarding the three issues of most importance in the campaign, Clinton and Trump had equivalent trust evaluations for dealing with the U.S. economy/jobs, but Trump was more trusted regarding terrorism/national security and Clinton was more trusted regarding health care. The overall trust evaluations for Clinton, coupled with intentions to vote, contribute to understanding Clinton’s popular vote victory. However, the importance of terrorism/national security in swing states and Trump’s trust advantage on that issue contributes to understanding the Electoral College vote by comparison with the popular vote.


2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Drew Thomas

The Bread and Peace model of US presidential elections estimates `VOTE`, the incumbent’s party’s share of the major-party vote, as a function of rates of personal-income growth and military fatalities during the incumbent president’s term. I replicate past work fitting the model to elections since 1952, confirming that income growth and war deaths account for most variation in VOTE. Using data available as of the end of October, I then develop 5 income-growth forecasts for Donald Trump’s presidential term and use them to forecast Trump’s share of the two-party vote in the 2020 election. My 5 forecasts range from 49.3% to 56.1% with a mean of 53.0%, notably higher than final polling averages of 45.6%–46.2% and a preliminary election result of 48%. An idiosyncratic factor such as the sitting president’s impeachment might account for the model overrating Donald Trump’s popular-vote performance.


2009 ◽  
Vol 42 (02) ◽  
pp. 353-357 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jack E. Riggs ◽  
Gerald R. Hobbs ◽  
Todd H. Riggs

Compared to the popular vote, the Electoral College magnifies the perception of the winner's margin of victory. In this analysis, a method of quantifying the magnitude of the advantage given to the winner due to the Electoral College's two electoral vote add-on and winner-take-all methodologies is presented. Using the electoral vote distribution that was present in the 2000 U.S. presidential election, we analyzed one million random two-candidate simulated elections. The results show that the net effect of the Electoral College is to give the winning candidate an average 29.45 electoral vote advantage per election due to the winner-take-all methodology. This winner's advantage includes an average 0.42 electoral vote advantage given to the winner per election due to the two electoral vote add-on.


PLoS ONE ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 16 (12) ◽  
pp. e0253560
Author(s):  
Keng-Chi Chang ◽  
Chun-Fang Chiang ◽  
Ming-Jen Lin

We use 19 billion likes on the posts of top 2000 U.S. fan pages on Facebook from 2015 to 2016 to measure the dynamic ideological positions for politicians, news outlets, and users at the national and state levels. We then use these measures to derive support rates for 2016 presidential candidates in all 50 states, to predict the election, and to compare them with state-level polls and actual vote shares. We find that: (1) Assuming that users vote for candidates closer to their own ideological positions, support rates calculated using Facebook predict that Trump will win the electoral college vote while Clinton will win the popular vote. (2) State-level Facebook support rates track state-level polling averages and pass the cointegration test, showing two time series share similar trends. (3) Compared with actual vote shares, polls generally have smaller margin of errors, but polls also often overestimate Clinton’s support in right-leaning states. Overall, we provide a method to forecast elections at low cost, in real time, and based on passively revealed preference and little researcher discretion.


2018 ◽  
Vol 52 (2) ◽  
pp. 239-242 ◽  
Author(s):  
Seth C. McKee ◽  
Daniel A. Smith ◽  
M. V. (Trey) Hood

ABSTRACTThe surprise outcome of the 2016 presidential election continues to raise more questions as experts grapple with the evidence for why most prognosticators considered a Hillary Clinton victory almost certain. This article uses the 2016 Cooperative Congressional Election Study data to show that a primary explanation for why the election of Donald Trump was difficult to predict is that the bulk of his support did not materialize until Election Day, in the battleground states that he had to carry to win the Electoral College.


2019 ◽  
Vol 8 (5) ◽  
pp. 134 ◽  
Author(s):  
Richard F. Potthoff

The 1968, 2000, and (future) 2024 U.S. presidential elections provide settings for deliberately provocative, offbeat scenarios that might have happened or could happen. Throughout, the Electoral College and plurality voting both receive blame. Scenario 1 exposes a quirk previously unnoticed: Under (albeit special) conditions, certain 1968 Humphrey voters could have made Humphrey rather than Nixon the election victor had they voted strategically for Wallace instead of Humphrey. In Scenario 2, overlooked nonidentifiability of undervotes would have plagued the 2000 Florida recount had the U.S. Supreme Court not halted it, thus raising questions about the foresightfulness of almost everyone involved; but, in addition, Gore missed an opportunity that, through use of proper statistical sampling, could have propelled him to victory. In Scenario 3, National Popular Vote Interstate Compact supporters fail to foresee that even one state, by changing its method for presidential voting, can wreck this innovative and widely promoted compact.


Author(s):  
Robert M. Alexander

This chapter examines common arguments surrounding the Electoral College. Many of these arguments were present with the 2016 presidential election. The election marked the sixth time the popular vote winner did not win the Electoral College vote. It also witnessed the largest number of faithless votes for president in history. Lastly, it marked the second time in the last three elections that a state split its electoral vote total. Each represents a common criticism of the institution. Proponents of the body suggested the institution worked as it should—especially in regard to protecting the interests of less populated states and supporting the two-party system. All arguments over the Electoral College ultimately relate to issues over representation. The chapter concludes by examining historical controversies relating to the Electoral College and several reform efforts aimed at the body.


2017 ◽  
Vol 22 (4) ◽  
pp. 578-593 ◽  
Author(s):  
Kate A. Ratliff ◽  
Liz Redford ◽  
John Conway ◽  
Colin Tucker Smith

This research investigated the role of gender attitudes in the United States 2016 presidential election between Hillary Clinton and Donald Trump. The results of three studies (combined N = 2,816) showed that, as expected, Trump voters were higher in hostile and benevolent sexism than were Clinton voters. Even after controlling for political ideology and gender (Studies 1, 2, and 3) and minority group attitudes (Study 3), greater hostile sexism predicted more positive attitudes toward Trump, less positive attitudes toward Clinton, and retrospective reports of having voted for Trump over Clinton (Studies 2 and 3). Benevolent sexism did not predict additional variation in voting behavior beyond political ideology and hostile sexism. These results suggest that political behavior is based on more than political ideology; even among those with otherwise progressive views, overtly antagonistic views of women could be a liability to women—and an asset to men—running for office.


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