Personhood and the Scope of Moral Duty

In order to codify the political and partisan activity in Iraq, after a difficult labor, the Political Parties Law No. (36) for the year 2015 started and this is positive because it is not normal for the political parties and forces in Iraq to continue without a legal framework. Article (24) / paragraph (5) of the law requires that the party and its members commit themselves to the following: (To preserve the neutrality of the public office and public institutions and not to exploit it for the gains of a party or political organization). This is considered because it is illegal to exploit State institutions for partisan purposes . It is a moral duty before the politician not to exploit the political parties or some of its members or those who try to speak on their behalf directly or indirectly to achieve partisan gains. Or personality against other personalities and parties at the expense of the university entity.

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Exclusive Public Reason

10.1093/oso/9780190683023.003.0004 ◽

2018 ◽

Author(s):

Christie Hartley

Keyword(s):

Public Reason ◽

Political Liberalism ◽

Moral Duty ◽

Public Justification ◽

Moral Foundation ◽

Narrow Scope ◽

Public Reasoning ◽

Comprehensive Doctrines

This chapter develops the idea of public reason based on the shared reasons account of public justification. It is argued that the moral foundation for political liberalism delimits a narrow scope for the idea of public reason, such that public reasons are required only for matters of constitutional essentials and basic justice. It is also argued that where public reason applies, persons as citizens have a moral duty to never appeal to their comprehensive doctrines when engaging in public reasoning. Hence, an exclusive account of public reason is vindicated. Finally, we respond to various potential objections to our view, such as the claim that the shared reasons view requires identical reasoning and the claim that public reason is interderminate or inconclusive.

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Group Duties

10.1093/oso/9780198840275.001.0001 ◽

2019 ◽

Cited By ~ 4

Author(s):

Stephanie Collins

Keyword(s):

Decision Making ◽

Human Rights ◽

Systemic Reform ◽

Moral Duty ◽

Tripartite Model ◽

Group Level ◽

The United Kingdom ◽

Moral Duties ◽

Fundamental Categories ◽

Group Pattern

Moral duties are regularly attributed to groups. We might think that the United Kingdom has a moral duty to defend human rights, that environmentalists have a moral duty to push for global systemic reform, or that the affluent have a moral duty to alleviate poverty. This book asks (i) whether such groups are apt to bear duties and (ii) what this implies for their members. It defends a ‘Tripartite Model’ of group duties, which divides groups into three fundamental categories. First, combinations are collections of agents that do not have any goals or decision-making procedures in common. Combinations cannot bear moral duties. Instead, we should re-cast their purported duties as a series of duties—one held by each agent in the combination. Each duty demands its bearer to ‘I-reason’: to do the best they can, given whatever they happen to believe the others will do. Second, coalitions are groups whose members share goals but lack decision-making procedures. Coalitions also cannot bear duties, but their alleged duties should be replaced with members’ several duties to ‘we-reason’: to do one’s part in a particular group pattern of actions, on the presumption that others will do likewise. Third, collectives have group-level procedures for making decisions. They can bear duties. Collectives’ duties imply duties for collectives’ members to use their role in the collective with a view to the collective doing its duty.

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Social media platforms have a moral duty to ban misinformation about vaccines: Two leading thinkers on vaccine hesitancy and misinformation debate this crucial question

Index on Censorship ◽

10.1177/0306422020981283 ◽

2020 ◽

Vol 49 (4) ◽

pp. 76-79

Author(s):

Jonathan Kennedy ◽

Julie Leask

Keyword(s):

Social Media ◽

Moral Duty ◽

Vaccine Hesitancy ◽

Crucial Question ◽

Social Media Platforms

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Premchand, nationalism and civil resistance in colonial North India

The Indian Economic & Social History Review ◽

10.1177/0019464619835663 ◽

2019 ◽

Vol 56 (2) ◽

pp. 171-194

Author(s):

Shailendra Kumar Singh

Keyword(s):

Status Quo ◽

The Other ◽

Moral Duty ◽

North India ◽

Politics Of Representation ◽

Field Of Study ◽

Apparent Lack ◽

Civil Resistance ◽

Other Hand ◽

The One

The theme of nationalism in the works of Premchand, the pre-eminent Urdu–Hindi writer of the 1920s and 1930s, not only serves as an organising principle but also constitutes a protean and contentious field of study, which has resulted in conflicting interpretations. On the one hand, his nationalist narratives are categorically denounced for their apparent lack of radicalism, while on the other hand, they are unequivocally valorised for their so-called subversive content. Both these diametrically opposed schools of criticism, however, share a common lacuna, that is, both of them tend to conflate the writer’s nationalist narratives with his peasant discourse, thereby precluding the possibility of different themes yielding different interpretations. This article examines the theme of nationalism in Premchand’s works, in general, and the question of civil resistance in particular, in order to demonstrate how the writer’s politics of representation in his nationalist writings differs from the one that we find in his peasant narratives. It argues that as opposed to the authorial valorisation of the fictive peasant’s conformity to the exploitative status quo, civil resistance in Premchand’s nationalist narratives is not only necessary and desirable but also synonymous with dharma (moral duty) itself.

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Why There Are No Epistemic Duties

Dialogue ◽

10.1017/s001221730000158x ◽

2007 ◽

Vol 46 (1) ◽

pp. 115-136 ◽

Cited By ~ 10

Author(s):

Chase B. Wrenn

Keyword(s):

Moral Duty

ABSTRACTEpistemic duties would be duties to believe, disbelieve, or withhold judgement from propositions, and they would be grounded in purely evidential considerations. I offer a new argument for the claim that there are no epistemic duties. Though people may have duties to believe, disbelieve, or withhold judgement from propositions, those duties are never grounded in purely epistemic considerations. Rather, allegedly epistemic duties are a species of moral duty.

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Cooperation with Evil Reconsidered: The Moral Duty of Resistance

Theological Studies ◽

10.1177/0040563916681993 ◽

2017 ◽

Vol 78 (1) ◽

pp. 96-120 ◽

Cited By ~ 1

Author(s):

Julie Hanlon Rubio

Keyword(s):

20Th Century ◽

Moral Theology ◽

Moral Duty ◽

Human Beings ◽

The Face ◽

Conservative Christians

The essay presents an argument for critical retrieval of the framework of cooperation with evil used by the moral manualists who dominated Catholic moral theology in the first part of the 20th century. Both “liberal” and “conservative” Christians are concerned with cooperation but differ as to which issues deserve attention and when cooperation becomes problematic. The key to moving beyond the current impasse is balancing the manualists’ tolerance for material cooperation in the face of conflicting responsibilities with the prophetic sensibilities of womanist theologians who are “troubled in their souls” by the suffering of vulnerable human beings and call Christians to take concrete steps to contribute to the decrease of that suffering.

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