scholarly journals Enforceability of judgments against sovereign States: critical analysis of the NML vs. Argentina injunction

2018 ◽  
Vol 14 (2) ◽  
pp. 682-706 ◽  
Author(s):  
Alejandro Gabriel Manzo

Abstract Sentences against sovereign States are difficult to enforce in courts. The Court of New York, in “NML Capital Ltd. vs. Argentina” (NML), tried to solve this situation with an injunction that blocked the payments of Argentina’s sovereign debt. The specialized literature has theoretically predicted that this injunction would cause harm to third parties and problems with other States. This article empirically corroborates these predictions with the analysis of a trial derived from NML: the “Citibank Argentina” case. The analysis of this case confirms the restraints presented by the literature about the lack of proper consideration of the requirements that the American legal system imposes for the applicability of an injunction that affects third parties and operates extraterritorially. Similarly, this paper argues that there are solid legal reasons for the authorities of third countries to declare inadmissible the extraterritorial effects of an injunction, such as the one obtained by NML, when those effects fall on assets and agents located in these authorities jurisdiction.

2019 ◽  
pp. 165-174
Author(s):  
Dov Fox

We’re used to blaming randomness or cosmic injustice when we don’t get the child we want, or when we get the one we don’t. Now cutting-edge interventions promise to deliver us from the vagaries of natural conception and the genetic lottery: Birth control and abortion prevent parenthood; gamete donation and IVF make procreation possible; and prenatal testing can detect debilitating offspring diseases even before pregnancy. These undertakings are still riddled with uncertainty—sometimes things just don’t work out; but that’s no reason to turn a blind eye when bad behavior is at fault. The American legal system protects against professional negligence in other inherently risky activities, from riding in a car to preparing a meal. Courts lay off when fate or accidents are responsible—when deer pop out onto dark roads, or homemade chicken is undercooked. But the law doesn’t hesitate to respond when auto crashes are traced to defective brakes, or food poisoning to unsanitary farming. Reproductive medicine and technology shouldn’t be any different—the stakes are high, and important interests hang in the balance. Just because would-be parents are accustomed to disappointment—because many of us have resigned ourselves to spontaneous miscarriage, or unplanned pregnancy, or an unexpected roll of the genetic dice—doesn’t make those outcomes any less serious, or misconduct that produces them any less worthy of recovery. Reproductive negligence today goes undeterred, unreported, and unredressed—the architecture of rights for procreation deprived, imposed, and confounded equips us to rethink and resolve the controversies that lie ahead.


2016 ◽  
Vol 1 (35) ◽  
Author(s):  
Antônio Paulo Soares Lopes da Silveira ◽  
Mariana Azambuja

Sem critérios: a abertura oportunizada ao magistrado para a aceitação de prova ilicitamente derivadaNo criteria: the opening provided for the judge to accept illegally derived evidence  Antônio Paulo Soares Lopes da Silveira[1]Mariana Azambuja[2] RESUMO: O trabalho tem como proposta uma reflexão sobre o artigo 157 do Código de Processo Penal, a partir das reformas introduzidas pela Lei nº 11.690/2008, na parte em que regulou a matéria relativa a prova ilícita por derivação. O objetivo central da pesquisa foi realizar uma análise crítica à abertura que o novo texto do dispositivo legal oportunizou ao magistrado para interpretar a aceitação da prova ilicitamente derivada. Outra questão bastante analisada foi o esvaziamento do texto constitucional que veda a utilização da prova ilícita no processo, haja vista que ocorreu uma verdadeira relativização da previsão. A análise da teoria dos frutos da árvore envenenada, bem como dos institutos de relativização das provas ilícitas criados no ordenamento jurídico norte-americano foram abordados, pois é a partir de sua introdução no ordenamento jurídico brasileiro, pela aludida reforma, que se consolidou a abertura para aceitação das provas ilícitas. PALAVRAS-CHAVE: Processo Penal. Provas ilícitas por derivação. Artigo 157. Frutos da árvore envenenada. ABSTRACT: The paper aims to reflect on the Article 157 of the Criminal Procedure Code, from the reforms introduced by Act No. 11,690 of 2008, to the extent that it regulated the matter concerning illegal evidence by derivation. The main objective of the research was to make a critical analysis of the opening that the new text of the legal provision provided for the judge to interpret the acceptance of illicitly derived evidence. Another issue fairly analyzed was the emptying of the constitution text, which prohibits the use of illegal evidence in the case, given that there was a real relativization of the provision. The analysis of the theory of the fruits of the poisonous tree, as well as the relativization institutes of illegal evidence created in the American legal system were addressed, because it is since its introduction into the Brazilian legal system, by the aforesaid reform, that the opening for acceptance of illegal evidence was consolidated. KEYWORDS: Criminal Procedure. Illegal evidence by derivation. Article 157. Fruits of the poisoned tree.[1] Mestre em Ciências Criminais pela Pontifícia Universidade Católica do Rio Grande do Sul – PUCRS, 2016. Especialista em Ciências Criminais pela Pontifícia Universidade Católica do Rio Grande do Sul – PUCRS, 2013 e Bacharel em Direito pelo Centro Universitário Ritter dos Reis, 2012. Advogado.[2] Mestre em Ciências Criminais pela Pontifícia Universidade Católica do Rio Grande do Sul – PUCRS, 2016. Especialista em Ciências Penais em 2014 e graduada em 2012 pela Pontifícia Universidade Católica do Rio Grande do Sul – PUCRS.


Author(s):  
Munawar Haque

Abstract  The purpose of this article is to explore the views of Sayyid Abul AÑlÉ MawdËdÊ[1] on ijtihÉd.[2] It intends to trace the origins of MawdËdÊ’s ideas within the social, cultural and political context of his time, especially the increasing influence of modernity in the Muslim world.  The study will show that MawdËdÊ’s understanding of ijtihÉd and its scope demonstrates originality.  For MawdËdÊ, ijtihÉd is the concept, the process, as well as the mechanism by which the SharÊÑah,[3] as elaborated in the Qur’Én and the Sunnah[4] is to be interpreted, developed and kept alive in line with the intellectual, political, economic, legal, technological and moral development of society.  The notion of ijtihÉd adopted by MawdËdÊ transcends the confines of Fiqh[5] (jurisprudence) and tends therefore to unleash the dormant faculties of the Muslim mind to excel in all segments of life.   [1] Sayyid Abul AÑlÉ MawdËdÊ was born on September 25, 1903 in Awrangabad, a town in the present Maharashtra state of India in a deeply religious family.  His ancestry on the paternal side is traced back to the Holy Prophet (peace be upon him).  The family had a long-standing tradition of spiritual leadership, for a number of MawdËdÊ’s ancestors were outstanding leaders of ØËfÊ Orders.  One of the luminaries among them, the one from whom he derives his family name, was KhawÉjah QuÏb al-DÊn MawdËd (d. 527 AH), a renowned leader of the ChishtÊ ØËfÊ Order. MawdËdÊ died on September 22, 1979. See Khurshid Ahmad and Zafar Ishaq Ansari, “MawlÉnÉ Sayyid Abul AÑlÉ MawdËdÊ: An Introduction to His Vision of Islam and Islamic Revival,”, in Khurshd Ahmad and Zafar Ishaq Ansari (eds.) Islamic Perspectives: Studies in Honour of MawlÉnÉ Sayyid Abul A’lÉ MawdËdÊ,  (Leicester: The Islamic Foundation,1979), 360. [2]  In Islamic legal thought, ijtihÉd is understood as the effort of the jurist to derive the law on an issue by expending all the available means of interpretation at his disposal and by taking into account all the legal proofs related to the issue.  However, its scope is not confined only to legal aspect of Muslim society.  MawdËdÊ’s concept of ijtihÉd is defined as the legislative process that makes the legal system of Islam dynamic and makes its development and evolution in the changing circumstances possible.  This results from a particular type of academic research and intellectual effort, which in the terminology of Islam is called ijtihÉd.  The purpose and object of ijtihÉd is not to replace the Divine law by man made law.  Its real object is to properly understand the Supreme law and to impart dynamism to the legal system of Islam by keeping it in conformity with the fundamental guidance of the SharÊÑah and abreast of the ever-changing conditions of the world.  See Sayyid Abul AÑlÉ MawdËdÊ, The Islamic Law and Constitution, translated and edited by Khurshid Ahmad, (Lahore: Islamic Publications Ltd, 1983), 76.[3] SharÊÑah refers to the sum total of Islamic laws and guidance, which were revealed to the Prophet MuÍammad (peace be upon him), and which are recorded in the Qur’Én as well as deducible from the Prophet’s divinely guided lifestyle (called the Sunnah). See Muhammad ShalabÊ, al-Madkhal fÊ at-TaÑ’rÊf  b alil-Fiqh al-IslÉmÊ, (Beirut: n.p., 1968),.28.[4]Sunnah is the way of life of the Prophet (peace be upon him), consisting of his sayings, actions and silent approvals. It is also used to mean a recommended deed as opposed to FarÌ or WÉjib, a compulsory one.[5]  Originally Fiqh referred to deliberations related to one’s reasoned opinion, ra’y.  Later the expression Fiqh evolved to mean jurisprudence covering every aspect of Islam.  It is also applied to denote understanding, comprehension, and profound knowledge. For an excellent exposition on the meaning of Fiqh, see Imran Ahsan Khan Nyazee, Theories of Islamic law: The methodology of ijtihÉd, (Delhi: Adam Publishers & Distributors, 1996), 20-22.


2021 ◽  
Vol 6 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Albano Gilabert Gascón

AbstractIn 2017, the majority of the United Kingdom Supreme Court held in its judgment in the Gard Marine and Energy v China National Chartering (The Ocean Victory) case that, in bareboat charters under the ‘BARECON 89’ form, if both the owner and the charterer are jointly insured under a hull policy, the damages caused to the vessel by the charterer cannot be claimed by the insurer by way of subrogation after indemnifying the owner. The interpretation of the charter party leads to the conclusion that the liability between the parties is excluded. Faced with the Supreme Court’s decision, the Baltic and International Maritime Council (BIMCO) adopted a new standard bareboat charter agreement only a few months later, the ‘BARECON 2017’ form, which amends, among other clauses, the one related to insurance. The present paper analyses (i) the new wording of the clause mentioned above and (ii) its incidence on the relationship between the parties of both the charter agreement and the insurance contract and its consequences for possible third parties. Despite BIMCO’s attempt to change the solution adopted by the Supreme Court and his willingness to allow the insurer to claim in subrogation against the person who causes the loss, the consequences, as it will be seen, do not differ much in practice when the wrongdoer is the co-insured charterer. On the contrary, when the loss is caused by a time charter or a sub-charter, in principle, there will be no impediment for the insurer to sue him.


Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document