scholarly journals Calculating and Using Second Order Accurate Solutions of Discrete Time Dynamic Equilibrium Models

2003 ◽  
Vol 2003 (61) ◽  
pp. 1-26
Author(s):  
Jinill Kim ◽  
◽  
Sunghyun H. Kim ◽  
Ernst Schaumburg ◽  
Christopher A. Sims
Keyword(s):  
Discrete Time ◽  
Dynamic Equilibrium ◽  
Second Order ◽  
Equilibrium Models ◽  
Time Dynamic

scholarly journals Calculating and using second-order accurate solutions of discrete time dynamic equilibrium models

2008 ◽  
Vol 32 (11) ◽  
pp. 3397-3414 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jinill Kim ◽  
Sunghyun Kim ◽  
Ernst Schaumburg ◽  
Christopher A. Sims
Keyword(s):  
Discrete Time ◽  
Dynamic Equilibrium ◽  
Second Order ◽  
Equilibrium Models ◽  
Time Dynamic

DISCRETE TIME DYNAMIC GAMES WITH A CONTINUUM OF PLAYERS I: DECOMPOSABLE GAMES

2002 ◽  
Vol 04 (03) ◽  
pp. 331-342 ◽  
Author(s):  
AGNIESZKA WISZNIEWSKA-MATYSZKIEL
Keyword(s):  
Discrete Time ◽  
Dynamic Games ◽  
Dynamic Equilibrium ◽  
Equivalence Theorem ◽  
Time Dynamic ◽  
Response Sets ◽  
Best Response ◽  
Continuum Of Players ◽  
Discrete Time Dynamic Games ◽  
Dynamic Equilibria

The purpose of this paper is to present some simple properties and applications of dynamic games with discrete time and a continuum of players. For such games relations between dynamic equilibria and families of static equilibria in the corresponding static games, as well as between dynamic and static best response sets are examined and an equivalence theorem is proven. The existence of a dynamic equilibrium is also proven. These results are counterintuitive since they differ from results that can be obtained in similar games with a finite number of players. The theoretical results are illustrated with examples describing voting and exploitation of ecological systems.

Comparing Dynamic Equilibrium Models to Data

2001 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jesus Fernandez-Villaverde ◽  
Juan Francisco Rubio-Ramirez
Keyword(s):  
Dynamic Equilibrium ◽  
Equilibrium Models

scholarly journals Search for a moving target in a competitive environment

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Benoit Duvocelle ◽  
János Flesch ◽  
Hui Min Shi ◽  
Dries Vermeulen
Keyword(s):  
Markov Chain ◽  
Discrete Time ◽  
Competitive Environment ◽  
Moving Target ◽  
Time Varying ◽  
Greedy Strategy ◽  
Time Dynamic ◽  
Dynamic Search ◽  
Subgame Perfect Equilibria ◽  
Perfect Equilibria

AbstractWe consider a discrete-time dynamic search game in which a number of players compete to find an invisible object that is moving according to a time-varying Markov chain. We examine the subgame perfect equilibria of these games. The main result of the paper is that the set of subgame perfect equilibria is exactly the set of greedy strategy profiles, i.e. those strategy profiles in which the players always choose an action that maximizes their probability of immediately finding the object. We discuss various variations and extensions of the model.

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