scholarly journals A CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF THE DECISION OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL COURT* Maphango v Aengus Lifestyle Properties (Pty) Ltd 2012 (3) SA 531 (CC)

Obiter ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 33 (3) ◽  
Author(s):  
Moses Retselisitsoe Phooko
Keyword(s):  
Rental Housing ◽  
City Centre ◽  
Constitutional Court ◽  
Section 8 ◽  
Lease Contract ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
Majority Judgment ◽  
Court Of First Instance ◽  
The Relationship ◽  
Court Of Appeal

The pursuit of access to better economic opportunities such as decent jobs has resulted in an astronomic influx of people into the inner city of Johannesburg, South Africa. As a result there is a high demand for rental housing. This presents an opportunity to make profit for those who leasepremises in order to generate an income. The demand for rental housing has arguably caused the escalation of rental prices, thereby causing a shortage of affordable rental housing in the city centre. The Rental Housing Act 50 of 1999 was enacted to resolve disputes that may arise from any unfair practice or matters affecting the relationship between the landlord and his tenants in respect of the lease contract. In particular, the Rental Housing Act seeks inter alia to “create mechanisms to promote the provision of rental-housing property; promote access to adequate housing through creating mechanisms to ensure the proper functioning of the rental-housing market [and] to lay down general principles governing conflict resolution in the rental-housing sector” (Preamble to the Rental Housing Act). In terms of the Rental Housing Act, the landlord or a tenant may approach the RentalHousing Tribunal and complain about an unfair practice (s 13 of the Rental Housing Act). The Rental Housing Act defines an unfair practice as “a practice unreasonably prejudicing the rights or interests of a tenant or a landlord” (s 1 of the Rental Housing Act). Where the Tribunal, at the conclusion of the hearing, is of the view that an unfair practice exists, it may rule that the exploitative rental be discontinued. The Tribunal may also make a determination about the amount of rental that must be paid by a tenant taking into account inter alia “the need for a realistic return on investment for investors in rental housing”. The argument presented in this case is that the applicants ought to have made up their case in the court of first instance and not at the appellate stage. The paper isdivided into nine sections. Section 2 provides an overview of the facts of the case, section 3 discusses the case before the High Court, section 4 discusses the case before the Supreme Court of Appeal (SCA), section 5 discusses the case in the Constitutional Court, the issues, arguments, before the court, the findings and conclusions of the court. Section 6 evaluates the parties’ submissions in light of the Rental Housing Act, the Constitution, the Gauteng Unfair Practices Regulations, and the Prevention of Illegal Eviction from and Unlawful Occupation of Land Act (PIEA) (19 of 1998). Section 7 discusses the majority judgment. Section 8 discusses the minority judgment. Section 9 is a critique of both the minority and majority judgments. The conclusion made is that the applicants should stand or fall by the arguments contained in the founding documents.

Equity and certainty in contract law

Acta Juridica ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 2021 ◽  
pp. 141-176
Author(s):  
F Brand
Keyword(s):  
Supreme Court ◽  
Contract Law ◽  
Constitutional Court ◽  
High Court ◽  
Contractual Relationships ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
The Subject ◽  
Court Of Appeal ◽  
Do So

The role of abstract values such as equity and fairness in our law of contract has been the subject of controversy for a number of years. In 2002 the Supreme Court of Appeal took the position that these values do not constitute self-standing grounds for interfering with contractual relationships. Despite this being consistently maintained by the SCA in a number of cases, some High Court judges deviated from this position on the basis that they were permitted to do so by some minority judgments and obiter dicta in the Constitutional Court. The uncertainty thus created has fortunately now been removed by the judgment of the Constitutional Court in Beadica v The Trustees for the Time being of the Oregon Trust.

scholarly journals ARRESTS WITHOUT WARRANT: THE SCA BRINGS CLARITY Minister of Safety and Security v Sekhoto 2011 1 SACR 315 (SCA); [2011] 2 All SA 157 (SCA)

Obiter ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 32 (2) ◽  
Author(s):  
Pieter du Toit
Keyword(s):  
Criminal Procedure ◽  
Prima Facie ◽  
Constitutional Court ◽  
Charles V ◽  
Personal Liberty ◽  
High Courts ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
The Right ◽  
Peace Officer ◽  
Court Of Appeal

Section 40(1) of the Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977 provides for a number of different instances where a peace officer may effect an arrest without an arrest warrant. A perusal of the reported case law pertaining to the lawfulness of arrests without warrant reveals that section 40(1)(b) of the Act, in particular, has received much attention from the courts. In terms of this subsection a peace officer may arrest without warrant any person whom he reasonably suspects of having committed an offence referred to in Schedule 1, other than the offence of escaping from lawful custody. It is settled law that any deprivation of freedom is regarded as prima facie unlawful. The arrestor therefore bears the onus of proving that the arrest was justified. The following jurisdictional facts must be present for a peace officer to rely on the defence created by section 40(1)(b) of the Criminal Procedure Act in cases, where it is alleged that the arrest was unlawful: (i) the arrestor must be a peace officer; (ii) the arrestor must entertain a suspicion; (iii) the suspicion must be that the suspect committed an offence in Schedule 1; and (iv) the suspicion must rest on reasonable grounds. For a discussion of the differenttypes of jurisdictional facts provided for in section 40(1) see Watney. In Louw v Minister of Safety and Security Bertelsman J held, with reference to the right to personal liberty, that arresting officers are under a constitutional obligation to consider whether there are no less invasive options to bring the suspect to court than the drastic measure of arrest, thereby effectively requiring a further jurisdictional fact for successful reliance by a peace officer on the provisions of section 40(1). If a reasonable apprehension exists that the suspect will abscond, or fail to appear in court if a warrant is first obtained for his or her arrest, or awritten notice or summons to appear in court is obtained, then the arrest would be constitutionally untenable and unlawful. Bertelsman J relied on academic opinion and an obiter remark made by De Vos J in Ralekwa v Minister of Safety and Security and held that the approach in Tsose v Minister of Justice that there is no rule that requires the milder method of bringing a person to court if it would be as effective as arrest, could no longer be acceptable in a constitutional dispensation. This approach was followed in a number of reported High Court judgments but not approved of in Charles v Minister of Safety and Security. In Minister of Safety and Security v Van Niekerk the Constitutional Court found it not to be in the interests of justice on the facts of the case before it to pronounce on the constitutional tenability of the approach in Tsose, but nevertheless held that the constitutionality of an arrest will be dependent upon its factual circumstances. Watney succinctly discusses some of the abovementioned developments. However, on 19 November 2010 the Supreme Court of Appeal in Minister of Safety and Security v Sekhoto (2011 1 SACR 315 (SCA), also reported in [2011] 2 All SA 157 (SCA)) held that the approach of the different high courts requiring a further jurisdictional fact for the lawfulness of an arrest did nothave proper regard for the principles in terms of which statutes must be interpreted in the light of the Bill of Rights and that they have conflated the issue of jurisdictional facts with the issue of discretion. This lucid judgment brings clarity to the issue of the lawfulness of arrests without warrant. 

Equity & Trusts Law Directions

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Gary Watt
Keyword(s):  
Supreme Court ◽  
Supreme Court Decision ◽  
Court Decision ◽  
Council Decision ◽  
Key Points ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
Farming Families ◽  
The Relationship ◽  
Court Of Appeal

Without assuming prior legal knowledge, books in the Directions series introduce and guide readers through key points of law and legal debate. Questions, diagrams and exercises help readers to engage fully with each subject and check their understanding as they progress. This book explains the key topics covered on equity and trusts courses. The content of the text is designed to emphasise the relationship between equity, trusts, property, contract and restitution to enable students to map out conceptual connections between related legal ideas. There is also a focus on modern cases in the commercial sphere to reflect the constantly changing and socially significant role of trusts and equity. The book starts by introducing equity and trusts. It then includes a chapter on understanding trusts, and moves on to consider capacity and formality requirements, certainty requirements and the constitution of trusts. Various types of trusts are then examined such as purpose, charitable, and variation trusts. The book then describes issues related to trusteeship. Breach of trust is explained, as is informal trusts of land. There is a chapter on tracing, and then the book concludes by looking at equitable liability of strangers to trust and equitable doctrines and remedies. This new edition includes coverage of significant recent cases, including the Supreme Court decision on interest to be paid by tax authorities on monies owed; the Supreme Court decision on the test of dishonesty applicable to civil matters; the Privy Council decision on the division of investment property acquired by cohabitants; the Court of Appeal decisions on Quistclose trusts; fiduciary duties in arms-length contracts; transactions prejudicing creditors; beneficiary anonymity in variation of trust cases; exemption clauses; discretion exercised beyond trustee’s authority; implications of GDPR for trustee disclosures; trustee personal liability; causation and equitable compensation; statutory relief for a professional trustee’s breach of trust; use of proprietary estoppel to reward work undertaken in farming families; costs of seeking court’s directions; injunctions ordered against persons unknown; equitable jurisdiction to rectify agreements.

The Present Law

2015 ◽  
Author(s):  
Michael Ashdown
Keyword(s):  
Supreme Court ◽  
Present State ◽  
Active Role ◽  
Starting Point ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
The Law ◽  
The Relationship ◽  
Court Of Appeal

The starting point for any consideration of the Re Hastings-Bass rule must now be the Pitt v Holt and Futter v Futter litigation, which culminated in the 2013 decision of the Supreme Court in both cases. The judgment of Lord Walker is the leading exposition of the rule, and is likely to remain so for some time. However, it is not helpful to read Lord Walker’s judgment in isolation. At first instance both Pitt v Holt and Futter v Futter were decided on the basis of law which seemed then to be well settled and entirely orthodox. However, unlike in any of the Re Hastings-Bass rule cases which preceded them, Her Majesty’s Revenue and Customs played an active role in the proceedings, and after the taxpayer succeeded at first instance in each case, obtained permission to appeal to the Court of Appeal. The present state of the law owes its shape largely to the judgment in that court of Lloyd LJ, in the first appellate decision on the Re Hastings-Bass rule, which reformulated the rule so as to accord with important principles of English equity and trusts concerning the relationship between trustees and beneficiaries, and the supervision of the court.

scholarly journals PASANG SURUT HUBUNGAN ANTARA MAHKAMAH AGUNG DENGAN KOMISI YUDISIAL DALAM SISTEM KETATANEGARAAN REPUBLIK INDONESIA

2012 ◽  
Vol 12 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Muhammad Fauzan
Keyword(s):  
Supreme Court ◽  
Judicial Power ◽  
Constitutional Court ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
The Law ◽  
The Republic ◽  
The Relationship

The relationship between the Supreme Court by the Judicial Commission in the Republic of Indonesia system is not harmonious, this is due to the first, the disharmony between the law on judicial power, including the law on Judicial Power, the law on the Supreme Court, the law on Constitutional Court and the law on the Judicial Commission. Both of the leadership character that exist in the Supreme Court and the Judicial Commission were too emphasizes in ego that one sector feel more superior than the others. To create a harmonious relationship between Supreme Court and Judicial Commission can be done by establishing intensive communication between both of them and by improvement in legislation. Keywords : relation, Supreme Court, Judicial Commission   

scholarly journals Refleksi Konstitusionalitas Pengawasan Peraturan Daerah Pasca Putusan Mahkamah Konstitusi Nomor 137/PUU-XIII/2015

2019 ◽  
Vol 16 (2) ◽  
pp. 391
Author(s):  
Firdaus Firdaus
Keyword(s):  
Local Government ◽  
Supreme Court ◽  
Judicial Review ◽  
Central Government ◽  
Constitutional Court ◽  
Legal Standing ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
The Government ◽  
And Function ◽  
The Relationship

Peraturan Daerah (Perda) sebagai produk hukum pemerintahan daerah untuk mengatur dan memerintah sendiri sebagai manifestasi otonomi, tetapi dalam praktiknya sering kali dihadapkan dengan penundaan atau pembatalan akibat fungsi pengawasan preventif atau represif oleh Pemerintah. Melalui Putusan Nomor 137/PUU-XIII/2015, Mahkamah Konstitusi (MK) meneguhkan fungsi pengawasan preventif dan membatalkan fungsi pengawasan represif dengan harapan: pertama mengakhiri dilema konstitusional fungsi Pengawasan Pemerintah terhadap Perda; kedua, memperkuat otonomi daerah; dan ketiga, meneguhkan pengujian perda sebagai kompetensi Mahkamah Agung (MA). Namun hal tersebut justru menciptakan dikotomi baru, baik terkait hubungan Pemerintah Pusat dengan pemerintahan daerah maupun dalam memaknai fungsi pengawasan represif dihubungkan dengan kompetensi MA menguji peraturan perundang-undangan di bawah undang-undang terhadap undang-undang. Bentuk dikotomi baru yang dimaksud; pertama, merevitalisasi instrumen sentralisme; dan kedua mereduksi otonomi dan fungsi kekuasaan Pemerintah dengan karakteristik yang bersifat aktif, sepihak (bersegi satu) dalam mengawasi dan memastikan pelaksanaan undangundang. Dimensi konstitusional yang harus dipastikan, bahwa pelaksanaan fungsi pengawasan represif terhadap Perda memberi kedudukan hukum bagi Pemerintah Daerah otonom untuk dapat mengajukan permohonan pengujian kepada MA.Local Regulation (Perda) as a legal product of local government is to regulate and govern itself as a manifestation of autonomy. Yet, in practice it is often confronted with delays or cancellations due to the Government's preventive or repressive supervision functions. Through Decision Number 137 / PUU-XIII / 2015, the Constitutional Court (MK) affirmed the function of preventive supervision and canceled the repressive supervision function in the hope of: first, ending the constitutional dilemma of the Government Oversight function on Local Regulations; second, strengthening local autonomy; and third, confirm the perda review as Supreme Court (MA) competency. However, this actually creates a new dichotomy, both in relation to the relationship between the Central Government and the local government and in interpreting the repressive monitoring function associated with the MA competency in examining the legislation under the regulations toward the statute. The form of the new dichotomy in intended; firstly, revitalize the instrument of centralism; and secondly reducing the autonomy and function of the Government's power with active, unilateral (onesided) characteristics in supervising and ensuring the implementation of the statute. The constitutional dimension that must be ensured is that the implementation of the repressive oversight function of the Local Regulation gives a legal standing for the autonomous local Government to be able to submit an application for judicial review to the Supreme Court.

scholarly journals The “Revolving Door” of the Customary Marriages’ Validity Requirement in Action ‒ Mbungela v Mkabi [2019] ZASCA 134

Obiter ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 42 (1) ◽  
pp. 186-193
Author(s):  
Mpho Paulus Bapela ◽  
Phillip Lesetja Monyamane
Keyword(s):  
Case Law ◽  
Case Note ◽  
Revolving Door ◽  
Constitutional Court ◽  
Plain Language ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
The Face ◽  
Specific Outcome ◽  
The Republic ◽  
Court Of Appeal

On the face of it, section 3 of the Recognition of Customary Marriages Act 120 of 1998 (RCMA) does not look ominous. Notwithstanding the plain language of the above provision, there is abundant case law and academic articles dealing with the interpretation and/or application of section 3(1)(b) in particular. A decision of the Supreme Court of Appeal (SCA) in Mbungela v Mkabi ((820/2018) [2019] ZASCA 134) adds to what is fast becoming a jurisprudence of the salient issues relating to the understanding of paragraph (b) of subsection (1). The issue of the scope of this paragraph has become more relevant in the inquiry into the transfer and/or integration of the bride into the groom’s family pursuant to the conclusion of a lobolo agreement. In his latest academic offering, Manthwa introduces this ongoing Achilles heel of customary marriages by referencing a number of cases and academic opinions; the references serve to justify the relevance of his work in the presence of so much jurisprudence on the topic. It is prudent to highlight also that Bakker provided an insightful criticism of the court a quo in Mkabe v Minister of Home Affairs ((2014/84704) [2016] ZAGPPHC 460). On the whole, it is argued here that the judgment of the SCA is incorrect in a few material respects and that the criticism by Bakker of the court a quo is legally sound and contributes meaningfully to the jurisprudence in this area.As this case note demonstrates, the SCA not only incorrectly interprets and applies the law, but the judgment also unjustifiably departs from precedents relating to the transfer and/or integration of the bride. In effect therefore, it is submitted, the SCA establishes a changeable attitude relating to the transfer and/or integration of the bride. This attitude is symptomatic of an apparent constitutional interpretation that desires a specific outcome almost at any cost. As such, this case note is relevant as it captures the latest instalment of the changing attitude towards the precepts of the transfer and/or integration of the bride. Thus, there is as much a need for continuous monitoring of this revolving door of interpretation and/or application as there is for cases dealing with this aspect. The matter is therefore considered as unsettled and merits ongoing academic discourse.This issue of unsettled law finds resonance in the pronouncements of the Constitutional Court in Bhe v Magistrate, Khayelitsha ([2004] ZACC 17 par 112).In light of the foregoing, the casuistic and often contradictory jurisdiction on the issue of transfer and/or integration of the bride is considered in the context of the constitutional injunction in terms of section 39(2) of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 (the Constitution) and the facts of the case in Mbungela v Mkabi (supra).

scholarly journals Inside McClung J.A.'s Closet in Vriend v. Alberta: The Indignity of Misrecognition, the Tool of Oppressive Privacy, and an Ideology of Equality

1969 ◽  
pp. 648
Author(s):  
James R. Olchowy
Keyword(s):  
Supreme Court ◽  
Gay Rights ◽  
Supreme Court Of Canada ◽  
Classical Liberalism ◽  
Substantive Equality ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
Interpretive Approach ◽  
Majority Judgment ◽  
Postmodern Philosophy ◽  
Court Of Appeal

Addressing recent expressions of concern about the Supreme Court of Canada's alleged inability to articulate a principled and coherent philosophy of the Charter, the author scrutinizes Vriend v. Alberta, a controversial gay-rights case in which starkly antithetical philosophical approaches to the Charter come into focus. While differentiating theoretically between modern and postmodern paradigms of justice, and contracting McClung J.A. 's majority judgment for the Alberta Court of Appeal with the ruling of the Supreme Court of Canada in Vriend, the author argues that the Supreme Court — guided by the Charter's equality provisions — has begun to articulate a postmodern philosophy of the Charter centred on the idea of inclusive justice. This emerging philosophy of inclusive justice is premised on the notion that the law works to produce the reality in which we live. not merely to reflect it. Whereas, in Vriend, McClung J.A. 's philosophy of the Charter adheres to the assumptions of modern jurisprudence and the concepts of classical liberalism — in particular, concepts such as abstract individualism, the private/public divide, and formal equality — the Supreme Court's philosophy in Vriend is coloured by postmodern insights that cogently impugn McClung J.A. 's traditional assumptions and concepts. What the Supreme Court's position makes clear is that, by resorting to a rhetoric of misrecognition, an ideology of privacy, and an ideology of equality, McClung J.A. tellingly exposes the limitations of his Charter philosophy, which actually reinforces and perpetuates the discriminatory treatment and oppression of sexual minorities in Canadian society. Juxtaposed with McClung J.A. 's questionable interpretive approach is the Supreme Court's emphasis in Vriend on achieving substantive equality — an emphasis that the author construes as underscoring how the Supreme Court has actually gone some distance toward articulating a credible postmodern philosophy of the Charter.

scholarly journals Regulation of Work Breaks in Hungary with a European Perspective

2021 ◽  
Vol 10 (1) ◽  
pp. 91-101
Author(s):  
Róbert Román
Keyword(s):  
European Perspective ◽  
Severance Pay ◽  
Rest Break ◽  
Court Of Justice ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
Work Breaks ◽  
Working Day ◽  
Court Of First Instance ◽  
Court Of Appeal ◽  
Legal Consequences

The basis for the review of the Hungarian and European rules of the rest break during the working day was the fact that there was a lawsuit to establish the illegitimacy of termination, in which I represented the plaintiff. The reason for the summary dismissal on the part of the employer was that the employee was playing cards while on a rest break during the working day. In his action, the plaintiff sought a declaration that his employer had unlawfully terminated his employment. By the judgment of the Court of First Instance, the action was dismissed, and the plaintiff was ordered to bear the court costs. By the judgment of the Court of Law proceeding by the plaintiff’s appeal, the judgement was reversed, and it ordered the defendant to pay the plaintiff severance pay as well as compensation. The defendant presented an application for review, which was not upheld. After completing the matters of fact, the Court of Appeal correctly stated that, at the time of the inspection, the plaintiff availed himself of a rest break during the working day, which was lawful; moreover, it was not disputed by the defendant. The Court of Appeal rightly concluded that the employer may prohibit the employee from playing cards during breaks in the workplace, but this must be communicated unequivocally to him, and this expectation must be consequently carried out. The Court of Appeal also rightly pointed out that in the case of explicit prohibition of some behaviours, employees must also be informed of the legal consequences, which are applicable in case of infringement of the rule. However, in the present case, this was not established, so that the lawsuit ended with the full recovery of a favourable judgment of the employee plaintiff at the Supreme Court of Justice.

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