Equity and certainty in contract law

Acta Juridica ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 2021 ◽  
pp. 141-176
Author(s):  
F Brand

The role of abstract values such as equity and fairness in our law of contract has been the subject of controversy for a number of years. In 2002 the Supreme Court of Appeal took the position that these values do not constitute self-standing grounds for interfering with contractual relationships. Despite this being consistently maintained by the SCA in a number of cases, some High Court judges deviated from this position on the basis that they were permitted to do so by some minority judgments and obiter dicta in the Constitutional Court. The uncertainty thus created has fortunately now been removed by the judgment of the Constitutional Court in Beadica v The Trustees for the Time being of the Oregon Trust.

Author(s):  
Michael Tsele

When a party refers to evidentiary material in the course of litigation, ordinarily this party is under an obligation to make this evidence available to his opponent, particularly when called upon to do so. However, over the years various principles have developed which make this obligation subject to certain limitations. The Fochville cases dealt with a situation where a party to litigation sought to withhold certain information from its adversary, notwithstanding the fact that the material had been relied upon as a ground for the institution of the litigation. This note critiques the judgments of the High Court and in particular the Supreme Court of Appeal in this dispute. In so doing, it draws on useful foreign law to argue that the Supreme Court of Appeal's judgment was an unfortunate one in that the court failed to clarify with reasonable precision the circumstances in which a party to litigation involving children's interests may legitimately resist disclosing evidence to his adversary, in which the party resisting disclosure invokes the principle of public interest immunity. In this regard, the note concludes that the High Court's overall approach to the issue is to be preferred.       


Obiter ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 32 (3) ◽  
Author(s):  
J Neethling ◽  
JM Potgieter

In Le Roux v Dey a vice-principal at a well-known secondary school in Pretoria instituted two separate claims for sentimental damages under the actio iniuriarum for insult (infringement of dignity) and defamation (infringement of reputation) against three school learners. The defendants published manipulated pictures of the plaintiff and the principal of the school depicting them both naked and sitting alongside each other with their hands indicative of sexual activity or stimulation. The school crests were superimposed over their genital areas. The plaintiff succeeded with both claims in the High Court (Dey v Le Roux 2008-10-28 case no 21377/06 (GNP)) butthe Supreme Court of Appeal (Le Roux v Dey 2010 4 SA 210 (SCA)) held that the separate claim for insult was ill-founded because in assessing damages for defamation, the court should also take the plaintiff’s humiliation into account. The Supreme Court of Appeal nevertheless confirmed the trial court’s award of R45 000. The defendants appealed to the Constitutional Court.


Acta Juridica ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 2021 ◽  
pp. 321-342
Author(s):  
A Price

In 2019 Dale Hutchison called upon the Constitutional Court to resolve the apparent conflict between certain of its judgments and those of the Supreme Court of Appeal relating to the most burning issue in South African contract law, namely, the extent to which a judge can refuse to enforce an otherwise valid contract on the grounds that it would be unduly harsh, unfair or unreasonable to do so. Two of the Constitutional Court’s judgments handed down simultaneously in 2020 – Beadica 231 CC v Oregon Trust and AB v Pridwin Preparatory School – answered Dale’s call. In Beadica, the notion that abstract values such as fairness, reasonableness and good faith serve as directly applicable standards that courts may use to control contractual content and enforcement was rejected. The established Barkhuizen test for public policy should be employed instead, ‘it was held’. Nonetheless Pridwin provides fresh impetus to the horizontal application of constitutional rights to contracting parties in terms of s 8(2) of the Constitution. The courts will have to use the latter tool carefully and incrementally, particularly in the context of commercial contracting, if the careful balance between contractual fairness and certainty achieved in Beadica is to be preserved.


Author(s):  
Gary Watt

This book provides a detailed and conceptual analysis of trusts and equity; concentrating on those areas of the subject that are most relevant in the contemporary arena, such as the commercial context. It utilizes expertise in teaching, writing, and researching to enliven the text with helpful analogies and memorable references to extra-legal sources such as history, literature, and film. In this way, the book also stimulates students to engage critically with concepts. This new edition is not merely updated but fully revised to include a new layout and a number of features designed to make the text even more accessible to student readers, one of which is a new context feature at the start of each chapter. This new revised edition also includes the latest legal developments, including decisions of the Supreme Court on dishonesty in relation to the civil liability of strangers to trusts (Ivey v. Genting Casinos UK Ltd (t/a Crockfords Club (2017)) and on equitable relief against forfeiture (The Manchester Ship Canal Company Ltd v. Vauxhall Motors Ltd (2019)). A great many new cases in the Court of Appeal and the High Court have been added, including twenty or more in 2019 alone. Other recent devlepments including law commission reports and academic commentary are also included. Further reading and discussion of anticipated reforms has been updated throughout in light of the latest legal developments.


Obiter ◽  
2017 ◽  
Vol 38 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Darren Subramanien

The judgment of the Supreme Court of Appeal (SCA) in Panamo Properties v Nel NNO (2015 (5) SA 63 (SCA)) is important because it clarifies certain controversial provisions of the Companies Act 71 of 2008 regarding the interpretation and application of section 129(1) of the Act, and the non-compliance by a company with the further requirements of sections 129(3) and (4), as well as the effect of section 129(5). In a number of cases in the various divisions of the High Court, it has been held that, where a company is placed in business rescue pursuant to a resolution of its board of directors, but thereafter fails to comply with the procedural requirements of section 129, the effect is to cause the business-rescue proceedings to terminate.  The reason for this was said to flow from the provisions of section 129(5), which provide that non-compliance with procedural formality, in terms of sections 129(3) and (4), results in the resolution placing the company under business rescue lapsing and becoming a nullity. The SCA held that non-compliance does not automatically result in the business rescue being terminated. Non-compliance is a ground for applying to court to set aside the resolution in terms of section 130(1)(a)(iii). But such resolution will be set aside only if it is otherwise just and equitable to do so, in terms of section 130(5), and the business rescue terminates in terms of section 132(2)(a)(i) once an order setting aside the resolution has been granted.


2019 ◽  
Vol 34 (2) ◽  
Author(s):  
Sipho Stephen Nkosi

The note is about the appeal lodged by the late Mrs Winnie Madikizela-Mandela to the SCA against the decision of the Eastern Cape High Court, Mthatha, dismissing her application for review in 2014. In that application, she sought to have reviewed the decision of the Minister of Land Affairs, to transfer the now extended and renovated Qunu property to Mr Mandela and to register it in his name. Because her application was out of time, she also applied for condonation of her delay in making the application. The court a quo dismissed both applications with costs, holding that there had been an undue delay on her part. Mrs Mandela then approached the Supreme Court of Appeal, for special leave to appeal the decision of the court a quo. Two questions fell for decision by the SCA: whether there was an unreasonable and undue delay on Mrs Mandela’s part in instituting review proceedings; and whether the order for costs was appropriate in the circumstances of the case. The SCA held that there was indeed an unreasonable delay (of seventeen years). Shongwe AP (with Swain, Mathopo JJA, Mokgothloa and Rodgers AJJA concurring) held that the fact that there had been an undue delay does not necessarily mean that an order for costs should, of necessity, particularly where, as in this case, the other litigant is the state. It is the writer’s view that two other ancillary points needed to be raised by counsel and pronounced on by the Court: (a) the lawfulness and regularity of the transfer of the Qunu property to Mr Mandela; and (b) Mrs Mandela’s status as a customary-law widow—in relation to Mr Mandela.


Author(s):  
Motseotsile Clement Marumoagae

This article reflects on the law relating to pension interest in South Africa. In particular, it assesses whether the Supreme Court of Appeal in Ndaba v Ndaba had adequately clarified how this area of law should be understood. In light of the inconsistent approaches from various divisions of the High Court, it has not always been clear how the courts should interpret the law relating to pension interest in South Africa. In this paper, aspects of this area of law which have been clarified by the Supreme Court of Appeal are highlighted. This paper further demonstrates aspects of this area of law which the Supreme Court of Appeal did not settle and would potentially be subject to future litigation. This paper is based on the premise that while Ndaba v Ndaba is welcomed, the Supreme Court of Appeal nonetheless, missed a golden opportunity to authoritatively provide a basis upon which the law relating to pension interest in South Africa should be understood. 


Author(s):  
Mercedes Iglesias Bárez

The case is somewhat Bildu a break with the doctrine that the Constitutional Court has constructed about the outlawing of political parties. The control of political parties in the process of proclamation of candidates, the value of the condemnation of terrorism and the role to be played to the High Court in monitoring the decisions of the Supreme Court, are in part a new meaning in the controversial decision the Constitutional Court.El caso Bildu representa, en cierta forma, una ruptura con la doctrina que el Tribunal Constitucional ha construido acerca de la ilegalización de partidos políticos. El control de formaciones políticas en la fase de proclamación de candidatos, el valor de la condena del terrorismo o el papel que le corresponde desempeñar al Alto Tribunal en la fiscalización de las decisiones del Tribunal Supremo, tienen en parte un nuevo sentido en la controvertida decisión del Tribunal Constitucional.


Author(s):  
Jamil Ddamulira Mujuzi

Abstract Case law, amongst other sources, shows that many people in Uganda are living together as husband and wife although they are not married. Unlike legislation in other African countries such as Tanzania and Malawi, in Uganda, the pieces of legislation governing marriages are silent on the issue of presumption of marriage. Likewise, unlike in Kenya and South Africa where legislation does not provide for presumption of marriage but courts have held that such a presumption exists based on long cohabitation, Ugandan courts, the High Court, and the Court of Appeal, have held that Ugandan law does not recognise marriage based on long cohabitation (marriage by repute). However, courts will presume the existence of a marriage where a marriage ceremony took place. Since 2003, attempts to enact legislation to provide for the presumption of marriage in Uganda have not been successful. In this article, the author argues that there is still room for the Supreme Court to hold, on the basis of common law, that Ugandan law recognises the principle of presumption of marriage. This recognition would also be in line with Uganda’s international law obligation as the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women has called upon States Parties to CEDAW to enact legislation giving effect to de facto unions. The author relies on case law and legislation from some African countries to suggest ways in which the Supreme Court could deal with the issue of presumption of marriage.


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