Is the Kantian Transcendentalism Idealism? Kant's Conceptual Realism
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In my paper I argue, relying on Kantian definitions and conceptual distinctions, the thesis that Kantian transcen-dental philosophy, which he characterizes as a second-order system of transcendental idealism, is not [empirical] idealism, but a form of realism (resp. compatible with empirical realism [A370-1]). As arguments in favor of this “realistic” thesis, I consistently develop a realistic interpretation of the Kant’s concept of appearance (the theory of “two aspects”), as well as of Kantian Copernican revolution, of his theory of intuition as cognitive ability which 'giving' ‘us objects, of the concept of double affection and noumenal causality.
2009 ◽
Vol 58
(5)
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pp. 334-341
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2015 ◽
Vol 53
(1)
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pp. 405-420
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2018 ◽
Vol 47
(9)
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pp. 1971-1981
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1990 ◽
Vol 25
(2)
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pp. 105-110
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