Full Blooded Conceptual Realism as a Response to Skeptical Relativism

In this paper, I discuss full-blooded Platonism (the claim that all possible mathematical objects exist) as a response to the skeptical problem in the philosophy of mathematics as to how empirical beings can cognize non-empirical mathematical objects. I then attempt to develop an analogous position regarding the applicability of concepts to reality in response to the skeptical problem regarding how we can cognize an objective reality through human-constructed concepts. If all concepts meeting certain minimal conditions structure reality under some aspect, then objective knowledge is possible, regardless of how these concepts arose historically.

Is the Kantian Transcendentalism Idealism? Kant's Conceptual Realism

In my paper I argue, relying on Kantian definitions and conceptual distinctions, the thesis that Kantian transcen-dental philosophy, which he characterizes as a second-order system of transcendental idealism, is not [empirical] idealism, but a form of realism (resp. compatible with empirical realism [A370-1]). As arguments in favor of this “realistic” thesis, I consistently develop a realistic interpretation of the Kant’s concept of appearance (the theory of “two aspects”), as well as of Kantian Copernican revolution, of his theory of intuition as cognitive ability which 'giving' ‘us objects, of the concept of double affection and noumenal causality.

Full-Blooded Conceptual Realism as a Response to Skeptical Relativism

In this paper, I discuss full-blooded Platonism (the claim that all possible mathematical objects exist) as a response to the skeptical problem in the philosophy of mathematics as to how empirical beings can cognize non-empirical mathematical objects. I then attempt to develop an analogous position regarding the applicability of concepts to reality in response to the skeptical problem regarding how we can cognize an objective reality through human-constructed concepts. If all concepts meeting certain minimal conditions structure reality under some aspect, then objective knowledge is possible, regardless of how these concepts arose historically.

Actualist versus Naturalist and Conceptual Realist Interpretations of Hegel's Metaphysics

The understanding of Hegel's metaphysics that is here argued for—that it is a metaphysics of the actual world—may sound trivial or empty. To counter this, in part one the actualist reading of Hegel's idealism is opposed to two other currently popular interpretations, those of the naturalist and the conceptual realist respectively. While actualism shares motivations with each of these positions, it is argued that it is better equipped to capture what both aim to bring out in Hegel's metaphysics, but also better able to resist criticisms of each of these opposed positions made from the viewpoint of the other. Like the conceptual realist, the actualist wants to affirm the objectivity of concepts in the world—an idea that can seem antithetical to the naturalist. While the position of “liberal naturalism” makes concessions to such a position, this feature is more easily accommodated by the actualist. However, like the liberal naturalist, the actualist is also suspicious of an implicit “supernaturalist” dimension of conceptual realism and, by weakening the scope of realism to the actual world, is better able to avoid it. The second and third parts of the paper attempt to show how the actualist position is reflected in Hegel's account of judgments and syllogisms in The Science of Logic. His account of judgments provides an irreducible place for judgments that are object-presupposing on the one hand and subject-locating on the other. Because such judgments are the components of syllogisms, these syllogisms have objectivity, but this is a type of objectivity within which we, as subjects, are by necessity located. The actual world has a conceptual structure because we conceptualizing beings belong to it.

The simplicity of divine ideas: theistic conceptual realism and the doctrine of divine simplicity

There has been little discussion of the compatibility of Theistic Conceptual Realism (TCR) with the doctrine of divine simplicity (DDS). On the one hand, if a plurality of universals is necessary to explain the character of particular things, there is reason to think this commits the proponent of TCR to the existence of a plurality of divine concepts. So the proponent of the DDS has a prima facie reason to reject TCR (and vice versa). On the other hand, many mediaeval philosophers accept both the existence of divine ideas and the DDS. In this article I draw on mediaeval and contemporary accounts of properties and divine simplicity to argue that the two theories are not logically incompatible.

Countable additivity, idealization, and conceptual realism

This paper addresses the issue of finite versus countable additivity in Bayesian probability and decision theory – in particular, Savage’s theory of subjective expected utility and personal probability. I show that Savage’s reason for not requiring countable additivity in his theory is inconclusive. The assessment leads to an analysis of various highly idealized assumptions commonly adopted in Bayesian theory, where I argue that a healthy dose of, what I call, conceptual realism is often helpful in understanding the interpretational value of sophisticated mathematical structures employed in applied sciences like decision theory. In the last part, I introduce countable additivity into Savage’s theory and explore some technical properties in relation to other axioms of the system.

Spór o uniwersalia

The problem of universals has been taken over by the medieval philosophers through the commentators, especially by Porfiriusz. Medieval philosophers had united issues mentioned by Porfiriusz with response to Boecjusz, creating an alternative: “thing” or “ word”. The most staunch phase of the dispute took place in the XI and XII centuries around two positions: “a realistic” and “nominalistic”, there has been an attempt to reach a compromise by marginal discarding; then three concepts was developed: “conceptualism” (“sermonizm”), “moderate conceptual realism” or “set theory”.

The Dignity of Reality

Greek art is traditionally considered the birthplace and highpoint of artistic idealism; the same judgment is applied, with the exception of portraits and historical reliefs, to Roman art. In addition, recent art theory strongly emphasizes the fundamentally constructing character of the visual arts. Yet the Greeks and Romans themselves considered their art as basically mimetic. In order to overcome this contradiction, the notions of conceptual realism and conceptual reality are introduced. The real world, as it is formed and perceived by human beings, is conceptually constructed; figurative art is a translation from the medium of conceptual reality into the medium of images.

Kantian Prequel

This chapter argues that Kant in the Critique of Pure Reasons and his Prolegomena problematized the distinction between substance and attribute long before the advent of analytic philosophy. Kant did so because he realized that the distinction between the concepts of substance and attribute is problematic if the concept of causation is problematic, for the reasons Hume gave. Kant’s efforts, including his Metaphysical Deduction and Second Analogy, to transcendentally justify the employment of the category of substantia et accidens were ultimately a failure. This set the stage for Moore’s conceptual realism, an ontological scheme free of both substances and attributes.