scholarly journals The Bank For International Settlements: An Evolutionary Institution

2019 ◽  
Vol 15 (1) ◽  
pp. 19-28
Author(s):  
Michael P. Hughes ◽  
Chris Palke

Established in 1930 in Basel, Switzerland, to expedite and supervise the payment of reparations by Germany to the victors of World War I, the Bank for International Settlements (BIS) quickly evolved into a banking establishment for various national central banks to negotiate and work out mutually-beneficial monetary policies and financial arrangements outside of the usual political and national channels. During World War II the BIS stayed open as a neutral central bank for central banks and provided significant back-channel communications between the Allied and Axis powers that could not have occurred any other way. As an example, discussions for the reconstruction of post-WWII Germany were underway between German and Allied representatives to the BIS at least two years prior to Germany’s surrender in May 1945. The post-WWII BIS then went on to become a global central bank for the world’s national central banks. In spite of the BIS holding so much effective financial power on an international scale and, hence, affecting nearly everyone in the world, few have ever heard of the BIS. This includes many economists and financial-economists. Why? Although technically not a secret organization, the BIS has always maintained an intentionally low profile. The BIS has never advertised its existence. It operates through many other organizations it has either directly created or where it holds major influence. This paper discusses the BIS, its history, and its impact and influence on world events. Questions concerning the role the BIS should possibly play in world events and central banking are raised for discussion near the end of this paper. This paper is focused primarily towards both upper-level undergraduate and graduate finance and economics courses, particularly in the areas of money, banking and financial institutions, financial markets, and monetary policy. However, other courses, to include those outside of the financial-economic arena, can find great use for this subject matter as well. Such outside arenas could include political science and history courses.

1967 ◽  
Vol 9 (4) ◽  
pp. 488-506 ◽  
Author(s):  
Richard A. LaBarge ◽  
Frank Falero

The purpose of this paper is to draw together from primary sources the case history of formative policy years for the Central Bank of Honduras. This bank, like others formed throughout the underdeveloped world in the post-World War II era, was created in 1950 as a vehicle for stimulating economic growth. In retrospect over 186 months of operations this particular Central Bank has an unusually outstanding policy record—a record which argues forcefully for appropriate monetary policy as a stimulant to economic advance.The first meeting of Central Bank directors was held on May 31, 1950, for the purpose of establishing the major monetary policies under which the Bank would commence operations July 1. At that meeting the directors established a schedule of maximum interest rates to be charged by the public commercial banks and a schedule of rates at which eligible commercial paper of 12 months maturity or less could be rediscounted with the Central Bank.


1992 ◽  
Vol 1 (3) ◽  
pp. 259-279 ◽  
Author(s):  
Kenneth Mouré

Central bankers failed in their efforts to reconstruct the international gold standard on a durable basis after World War I. The gold-exchange standard did not unite them in a managed international system in the 1920s, and it perished with little regret in 1931. Stephen V. O. Clarke's monograph on central bank co-operation sees ‘considerable merit’ in the stabilisation efforts from 1924 to 1928, followed by failure to maintain the system from 1928 to 1931.1 Critics have pointed out with justice that co-operation was irregular before 1928, and that central banks continued to co-operate after 1931.2 Clarke recognizes that no conceivable improvements in central bank co-operation could have coped with the combination of political and economic convulsions in 1931; national goals necessarily took priority in central bank policies, and international objectives were determined by national experience and interest.3


Author(s):  
Matthew Kroenig

This chapter considers the United Kingdom’s rivalry with Germany in the late 18th and early 19th centuries. After nearly two centuries of ascendancy, the UK was challenged by an autocratic Germany growing in the heart of Europe. The two clashed in World War I, and the United Kingdom emerged victorious and with its largest-ever territorial expanse, expanding its empire into the Middle East. World War II took a harder toll on the UK, but, again, with the help of its navy, its financial power, and its democratic allies—and in no small part to the heedless decision-making of its autocratic rival—it once again prevailed.


Author(s):  
Michael Schiltz

Although the political and military aspects of Japanese imperialism have received ample attention from historians, other dimensions of the country’s expansionist experiment with total war have been left largely untouched. Nevertheless, technologies of “soft” power played a very substantial role; in many ways, they predated and prefigured many of the repressive and militarist hallmarks of Japanese expansionism. Gold standard adoption, for instance, was directly related to Japan’s geopolitical positioning. It was a tool for projecting financial power abroad and establishing enclave economies in the colonies, for example through the creation of gold-exchange standards, the direction of the colonies’ central banks and financial institutions, and so on. Nevertheless, the adoption of the gold standard was not an aim in itself. It was a means to a yet higher end: the very establishment of the yen as a “vehicle currency” comparable to the British pound or, after World War I, the American dollar. For that reason, policymakers in Tokyo fostered distinctly mercantilist ideas about trade and, in particular, the share of Japan’s banking institutions and the Japanese yen in financing international trade and settling international trade transactions. The institution in the vanguard of this project was the Yokohama Specie Bank (hereafter: YSB), a bank with the explicit mandate of insuring trade among regions or countries on different currencies and, by extension, different metals (gold and silver). Soon after its creation in 1879, it was made to team up with the Bank of Japan (hereafter: BOJ) and put in charge of the international aspects of the country’s financial and monetary policy. In that role, 1. It financed the bulk of Japanese imports and exports. 2. It collected specie, part of which was added to the BOJ’s currency reserve. 3. It underwrote Japan’s sovereign loan issues. 4. It represented the BOJ abroad. 5. It even issued currencies in Japan-occupied territories before and during World War II. In view of its controversial role in Japanese imperialism (especially because of point 5), the General Headquarters of the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers (SCAP) ordered its dismantling in 1946. Its assets were transferred to the newly formed Bank of Tokyo. Although it is still heavily understudied in both Japanese and Western languages, it is key to understanding in the vanguard of Tokyo’s expansionist economic project(s)


2019 ◽  
Vol 28 (3 ENGLISH ONLINE VERSION) ◽  
pp. 5-19
Author(s):  
Remigiusz Chęciński ◽  
Michał Przychodzki

The article is intended to outline the development of central banking in terms of its independence, with particular emphasis on the implementation of the idea of an independent central bank in Poland, also comparison with some other countries. The idea of central-bank independence was presented from personnel, financial and functional perspectives. In the initial phase of their development, central banks were mainly established in the form of capital-based companies. Their position and importance was determined by special privileges. The Maastricht Treaty was a normative act that had a major influence on the shape of the currently dominant concept of an independent central bank, which pursues a free monetary policy at its own discretion. The Constitution of 1997 and the Act 29 August 1997 on the National Bank of Poland of  were crucial in guaranteeing the strong position and independence of NBP from state authorities.


Cinema’s Military Industrial Complex examines how the American military has used cinema and related visual, sonic, and mobile technologies to further its varied aims. The essays in this book address the way cinema was put to work for purposes of training, orientation, record keeping, internal and external communication, propaganda, research and development, tactical analysis, surveillance, physical and mental health, recreation, and morale. The contributors examine the technologies and types of films that were produced and used in collaboration among the military, film industry, and technology manufacturers. The essays also explore the goals of the American state, which deployed the military and its unique modes of filmmaking, film exhibition, and film viewing to various ends. Together, the essays reveal the military’s deep investment in cinema, which began around World War I, expanded during World War II, continued during the Cold War (including wars in Korea and Vietnam), and still continues in the ongoing War on Terror.


Author(s):  
Mark Franko

This book is an examination of neoclassical ballet initially in the French context before and after World War I (circa 1905–1944) with close attention to dancer and choreographer Serge Lifar. Since the critical discourses analyzed indulged in flights of poetic fancy a distinction is made between the Lifar-image (the dancer on stage and object of discussion by critics), the Lifar-discourse (the writings on Lifar as well as his own discourse), and the Lifar-person (the historical actor). This topic is further developed in the final chapter into a discussion of the so-called baroque dance both as a historical object and as a motif of contemporary experimentation as it emerged in the aftermath of World War II (circa 1947–1991) in France. Using Lifar as a through-line, the book explores the development of critical ideas of neoclassicism in relation to his work and his drift toward a fascist position that can be traced to the influence of Nietzsche on his critical reception. Lifar’s collaborationism during the Occupation confirms this analysis. The discussion of neoclassicism begins in the final years of the nineteenth-century and carries us through the Occupation; then track the baroque in its gradual development from the early 1950s through the end of the 1980s and early 1990s.


2019 ◽  
pp. 096777201987609
Author(s):  
Liam McLoughlin

Dr Joseph Dudley ‘Benjy’ Benjafield qualified from University College Hospital Medical School, London in 1912. He joined the Royal Army Medical Corps during World War I and was in charge of the 37th Mobile Bacteriological Laboratory serving with the British Egyptian Expeditionary Force when the Spanish flu struck in late 1918. He observed the features and clinical course of the pandemic and published his findings in the British Medical Journal in 1919. On return to civilian life, he was appointed as Consultant physician to St George’s Hospital, Hyde Park Corner, London where he remained in practice for the rest of his career. He was a respected amateur gentleman racing driver frequently racing at the Brooklands circuit from 1924 after buying a Bentley 3-litre and entering the Le Mans 24 h race seven times between 1925 and 1935, winning in 1927. He was one of an elite club of young men known as The Bentley Boys and went on to become a founding member of the British Racing Drivers Club (BRDC) in 1927. He rejoined the Royal Army Medical Corps during World War II, serving briefly again in Egypt. He died in 1957.


2005 ◽  
Vol 15 (1) ◽  
pp. 107-144 ◽  
Author(s):  
David P. Setran

AbstractIn the years between World War I and World War II in the United States, public and religious educators engaged in an extended struggle to define the appropriate nature of character education for American youth. Within a post-war culture agonizing over the sanctions of moral living in the wake of mass violence and vanishing certitudes, a group of conservative educators sought to shore up traditional values through the construction of morality codes defining the characteristics of the “good American.” At the same time, a group of liberal progressive educators set forth a vigorous critique of these popular character education programs. This article analyzes the nature of this liberal critique by looking at one leading liberal spokesperson, George Albert Coe. Coe taught at Union Theological Seminary and Teachers College, Columbia University, and used his platform in these institutions to forge a model of character education derived from the combined influences of liberal Protestantism and Deweyan progressive education. Coe posited a two-pronged vision for American moral education rooted in the need for both procedural democracy (collaborative moral decision making) and a democratic social order. Utilizing this vision of the “democracy of God,” Coe demonstrated the inadequacies of code-based models, pointing in particular to the anachronism of traditional virtues in a world of social interdependence, the misguided individualism of the virtues, and the indoctrinatory nature of conservative programs. He proposed that youth be allowed to participate in moral experimentation, adopting ideals through scientific testing rather than unthinking allegiance to authoritative commands. Expanding the meaning of morality to include social as well as personal righteousness, he also made character education a vehicle of social justice. In the end, I contend that Coe's democratic model of character education, because of its scientific epistemological hegemony and devaluing of tradition, actually failed to promote a truly democratic character.


1996 ◽  
Vol 24 (3) ◽  
pp. 371-376
Author(s):  
Andrew Ludanyi

The fate of Hungarian minorities in East Central Europe has been one of the most neglected subjects in the Western scholarly world. For the past fifty years the subject—at least prior to the late 1980s—was taboo in the successor states (except Yugoslavia), while in Hungary itself relatively few scholars dared to publish anything about this issue till the early 1980s. In the West, it was just not faddish, since most East European and Russian Area studies centers at American, French and English universities tended to think of the territorial status quo as “politically correct.” The Hungarian minorities, on the other hand, were a frustrating reminder that indeed the Entente after World War I, and the Allies after World War II, made major mistakes and significantly contributed to the pain and anguish of the peoples living in this region of the “shatter zone.”


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