The Argentine Proposal for Non-belligerency, April 1940

Argentine neutrality during World War II with its suspicious leanings toward fascism has become a cliché in inter-American relations. As far as the United States was concerned at that time, the Argentine Republic was the black sheep of the hemispheric community, the only nation that failed to cooperate wholeheartedly in the crusade against the Axis. The famous State Department “Blue Book,” so conveniently published prior to the Argentine general elections of 1946, spelled out the aid and comfort the Nazis had derived from Argentina's neutrality. By only the narrowest margin did Argentina avoid being drummed out of the hemispheric organization and barred from membership in the new United Nations.It seems strange, therefore, to recall that it was the Argentine government that first suggested, in the spring of 1940, that the nations of the Western Hemisphere discard the posture of traditional neutrality in the face of the spreading conflagration in Europe, on the grounds that it was anachronistic and did not protect their interests.

Argentine Political Instability: A Crisis of Simultaneous Quest for Authority and Equality

During the past quarter of a century, Argentina has undergone a series of diverse political experiments. These included the rise and fall of Juan Perón (1943-1955), the military caretaker governments of Generals Eduardo Lonardi and Pedro Aramburu (1955-1958), the emergence and overthrow of Arturo Frondizi (1958-1962), the interim government of José Guido (1962-1963), the election and downfall of Arturo Illía (1963-1966), and finally the coming to power of General Juan Carlos Onganía. Onganía presently rules the country with no intention of loosening his control on the levers of power.The Perón regime revealed a semitotalitarian tendency, an obsession with the building of new political authority and community. The Aramburu administration attempted to prove that the Perón regime was criminal and a destroyer of Argentine civilization. Ignoring the primacy of politics, the Frondizi government tried desperately to cope with the rapid economic development. Inertia characterized the Mia administration.

The Revolution and Mexican Foreign Policy

In recent years the foreign policy of Mexico has often been criticized in the United States. The reaction of Mexico to steps taken by the United States in Latin America—in Cuba, the Dominican Republic, and elsewhere—has led to statements about Mexican foreign policy that indicate little understanding of Mexican mentality, history, and approach to international problems. Of primary concern in any attempt to shed light on the foreign policy of Mexico is the place of the Mexican Revolution in shaping the nation's approach to international problems.The Mexican Revolution has had profound effects on the development of the country. Since the beginning of the Revolution in 1910, Mexico has followed a path to political stability unique in Latin America. The Revolution and its effects on subsequent Mexican attitudes have been studied by many scholars in attempts to learn lessons for the other developing nations of the hemisphere.

The Institutionalisation of the Mexican Revolution

“This period [1928-1934] between the murder of Obregón and the election of Lázaro Cárdenas is most perplexing,” wrote one of the most perceptive foreign observers of the Mexican scene some years ago. “If it were possible to discover what had taken hold of the leadership of Mexico in those debased and clouded years, it would illumine much of Mexican history.”What are the reasons for perplexity? Basically, they are two: that the events of this period do not seem to fit the generally accepted view that the history of Mexico from 1910 to the present day forms one grand panorama of historical evolution called the Mexican Revolution, and that the only explanation that has been offered of why they do not seems inherently improbable. The view that the Mexican Revolution is a coherent whole we owe principally to the Mexicans themselves and to sociologists who see revolutions in general and the “Great Revolutions” in particular as social rather than political events.