scholarly journals Problem zamówień publicznych w PRL

2021 ◽  
Vol 43 (2) ◽  
pp. 361-369
Author(s):  
Krzysztof Horubski
Keyword(s):  
Market Economy ◽  
Public Procurement ◽  
Public Spending ◽  
Planned Economy ◽  
Cost Efficiencies ◽  
Centrally Planned Economy ◽  
Public Contracts ◽  
The Times ◽  
Public Contract

The article characterises selected legal solutions applied in the process of public contract award in the realities of the nationalised centrally-planned economy in the times of the Polish People’s Republic. In the study, manifestations of discrimination of private businesses in the access to public contracts are presented. Such discrimination was one of the foundations for the legislation applicable at the time. The article also highlights other features of legal acts of statutory rank governing contracts awarded by state-owned organisational units, such as the fragmented nature of their regulations, including the omission of regulations governing the procedure of reaching an agreement and executing a contract. This allowed formulating conclusions about the merely superficial role of the provisions on supplies, services, and works for state entities and the fundamental inability of these regulations to play the role attributed to public procurement in the market economy, consisting in deploying the mechanism of competition between entrepreneurs for cost-efficiencies in public spending.

scholarly journals Does the Lowest Bid Price Evaluation Criterion Make for a More Efficient Public Procurement Selection Criterion? (Case of the Czech Republic)

2015 ◽  
Vol 8 (1) ◽  
pp. 41-59 ◽  
Author(s):  
František Ochrana ◽  
Kristýna Hrnčířová
Keyword(s):  
Czech Republic ◽  
Public Procurement ◽  
Selection Criterion ◽  
Radical Change ◽  
Evaluation Criterion ◽  
The Czech Republic ◽  
Service Contracts ◽  
Bid Price ◽  
Public Contracts ◽  
Public Contract

Abstract Through the institute of public procurement a considerable volume of financial resources is allocated. It is therefore in the interest of contracting entities to seek ways of how to achieve an efficient allocation of resources. Some public contract-awarding entities, along with some public-administration authorities in the Czech Republic, believe that the use of a single evaluation criterion (the lowest bid price) results in a more efficient tender for a public contract. It was found that contracting entities in the Czech Republic strongly prefer to use the lowest bid price criterion. Within the examined sample, 86.5 % of public procurements were evaluated this way. The analysis of the examined sample of public contracts proved that the choice of an evaluation criterion, even the preference of the lowest bid price criterion, does not have any obvious impact on the final cost of a public contract. The study concludes that it is inappropriate to prefer the criterion of the lowest bid price within the evaluation of public contracts that are characterised by their complexity (including public contracts for construction works and public service contracts). The findings of the Supreme Audit Office related to the inspection of public contracts indicate that when using the lowest bid price as an evaluation criterion, a public contract may indeed be tendered with the lowest bid price, but not necessarily the best offer in terms of supplied quality. It is therefore not appropriate to use the lowest bid price evaluation criterion to such an extent for the purpose of evaluating work and services. Any improvement to this situation requires a corresponding amendment to the Law on Public Contracts and mainly a radical change in the attitude of the Office for the Protection of Competition towards proposed changes, as indicated within the conclusions and recommendations proposed by this study.

Collective bargaining, minimum wages and public procurement in Germany: Regulatory adjustments to the neoliberal drift of a coordinated market economy

2018 ◽  
Vol 60 (5) ◽  
pp. 669-690 ◽  
Author(s):  
Detlef Sack ◽  
EK Sarter
Keyword(s):  
Market Economy ◽  
Comparative Advantage ◽  
Public Procurement ◽  
Political Systems ◽  
Federal States ◽  
Electoral Support ◽  
Different Types ◽  
Lower Wage ◽  
Empirical Foundation

This article analyses different types of labour clauses in public procurement regulation that have been enacted in Germany, a coordinated market economy that has experienced a ‘neoliberal drift’ including the decline of the traditional governance of labour and contracting out. Based on an analysis of relevant regulations adopted by the 16 Germany federal states, the article corroborates insights into the prominent role of left parties advocating for labour clauses in public procurement on a much broader empirical foundation than previous research. It adds to scholarly knowledge by revealing that the relative comparative advantage of regions with lower wage levels inhibits labour clauses in federal political systems. It finds that centre-right parties are willing to stipulate certain labour clauses in order to protect small-and medium-sized enterprises, which are core parts of their electoral support base.

scholarly journals Accountancy in Poland in the period of centrally planned economy – oral history

2018 ◽  
Vol 2018 (97 (153)) ◽  
pp. 161-178
Author(s):  
Anna Karmańska
Keyword(s):  
Oral History ◽  
Market Economy ◽  
Research Method ◽  
Status Quo ◽  
Planned Economy ◽  
Accounting Practice ◽  
Basic Reason ◽  
Centrally Planned Economy ◽  
The Status ◽  
History Of

This article presents an account of an interview with Zdzisław Fedak, PhD, who participated in the work on the systemic solutions in accounting in the People’s Republic of Poland (PRL), and currently is an animator of improvements in Polish accounting practice in the conditions of market economy. The basic reason for this publication is the need to fill the gap in the picture of the determinants and characteristics of accountancy in Poland in the period of non-market economy, taking advantage of the expertise and experience of people knowing the status quo in this area. This text is part of the trend to document the history of accountancy by means of a research method known as oral history.

Information and the Market Economy

2016 ◽  
Author(s):  
David Sarokin ◽  
Jay Schulkin
Keyword(s):  
Soviet Union ◽  
Market Economy ◽  
Invisible Hand ◽  
Planned Economy ◽  
Large Measure ◽  
Subprime Mortgage ◽  
Market Signals ◽  
The Soviet Union ◽  
Mortgage Crisis ◽  
Centrally Planned Economy

The Soviet Union tried to manage the information needed to run a centrally-planned economy. Their efforts failed in large measure due to information shortcomings. Capitalism is a much better information processor, relying on the ‘invisible hand” to recognize and respond to market signals. But capitalism can have information failures too, as evidenced by Enron, the subprime mortgage crisis, and the work of information economists.

scholarly journals Accountancy in Poland in the period of centrally planned economy. A few comments from experience

2018 ◽  
Vol 2018 (99 (155)) ◽  
pp. 9-24
Author(s):  
Zdzisław Fedak ◽  
Anna Karmańska
Keyword(s):  
Oral History ◽  
Market Economy ◽  
Research Method ◽  
Planned Economy ◽  
Basic Reason ◽  
The People ◽  
Centrally Planned Economy ◽  
History Of

Accountancy in Poland in the period of centrally planned economy. A few comments from experience This article presents comments on selected aspects of the accounting law applicable in Poland in the period of the centrally planned economy. They were made based on the interview with Mr. Zdzisław Fedak, PhD, a participant of the works on the systemic solutions in accountancy in the People’s Republic of Poland (PRL). He is currently trying to stimulate improvements in the Polish accountancy practice in the conditions of market economy. The basic reason for this publication is the need to fill the gap in the picture of the surroundings and unique characteristics of accountancy in Poland in the period of the nonmarket economy, while taking into account the expertise and experience of the people who knew well the reality of those times. This text is a part of the trend to document the history of accountancy by means of the research method known as oral history.

scholarly journals Strategic Investment, Uncertainty And Distribution Reform In The P.R. China: Why A Gradual Reform Strategy Works

2011 ◽  
Vol 12 (3) ◽  
pp. 20 ◽  
Author(s):  
Clement Chow Kong Wing
Keyword(s):  
Growth Rate ◽  
Market Economy ◽  
Transition Process ◽  
Market Forces ◽  
Planned Economy ◽  
Strategic Investment ◽  
Reform Strategy ◽  
Centrally Planned Economy ◽  
Low Uncertainty

<span>This paper attempts to provide an explanation to the success of the gradual reform strategy of China by showing that such a strategy can minimize the uncertainty created in the process of transition from a centrally-planned economy to a market economy. In a commitment versus flexibility game, low uncertainty motivates enterprises to adopt a strategy of pre-committing their investment which is crucial in sustaining a faster growth rate in the industry. In addition, Chinas successful use of market forces of competition and entry is also an important factor in the transition process.</span>

From Business to Central Planning: Cooperatives in Czechoslovakia in 1918-1938 and 1948-1960

2021 ◽  
Vol 10 (3) ◽  
pp. 423-443
Author(s):  
Jan Slavíček
Keyword(s):  
Market Economy ◽  
Economic History ◽  
Free Market ◽  
Central Planning ◽  
Business History ◽  
Planned Economy ◽  
Centrally Planned Economy ◽  
Business Enterprises

The paper focuses on cooperatives — seen as business enterprises — in the First Czechoslovak Republic (1918-1938) and the period of 12 years after the communist putsch (1948-1960). It compares the functions of cooperatives, the limits placed on their (semi-)independent business activities, and their chances to decide for themselves in the market economy and the centrally planned economy. Drawing on the methods of business history and economic history, the study seeks to answer the following questions: 1. Were the cooperatives in the First Czechoslovak Republic really fully independent companies running their business on a free market? 2. Were the cooperatives in the Stalinist and early post-Stalinist Czechoslovakia really subordinated subjects in a centrally planned economy? 3. Are there any real connections in the functioning of cooperatives in these two eras? In other words, is it possible that something of the independent cooperatives survived and that the traditional interpretations (according to which the two eras were completely different and even contradictory) can be seen in new and more accurate ways?

scholarly journals Homo Economicus in the Shortage Economy

2018 ◽  
Vol 9 (4) ◽  
pp. 207-226 ◽  
Author(s):  
Hana Lipovská ◽  
Lucie Coufalová ◽  
Libor Žídek
Keyword(s):  
Economic System ◽  
Market Economy ◽  
Rational Agent ◽  
Homo Economicus ◽  
Planned Economy ◽  
Rational Agents ◽  
Economic Agents ◽  
Centrally Planned Economy ◽  
Original Survey ◽  
Higher Law

Abstract Rational agents react to incentives in the market economy as well as in the centrally planned economy. Economic laws are persistent regardless of the economic system. The legislative system changes the outcome of the game between economic agents and managers. The aim of this paper is to show how rational agents reacted to legislative incentives in the Soviet-type economy in Czechoslovakia in the 1970s and 1980s, that is, how they reacted to the general shortage in the centrally planned economy. Based on the original survey among former managers as well as on the legislative sources from the 1970s and 1980s, a taxonomy was made of economic reactions to the shortage economy. This survey was possibly the last chance to map the experiences of socialist managers who tried to run companies in the centrally planned economy. We distinguish plan manipulation in order to ensure payment bonuses; bribery in order to obtain short-supplied inputs and the creation of reserves for the purpose of fulfilling the plan. It was shown that, if the rational agent wanted to obey the higher law, he was forced to ignore lower legislation.

Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document