scholarly journals Henri Bergson’s Philosophical Intuition as reflexions on the nature of philosophical creativity

2016 ◽  
Vol 9 (2) ◽  
pp. 24-36
Author(s):  
Irina Blauberg ◽  
Keyword(s):  
Philosophical Intuition

Introduction

2021 ◽  
pp. 1-18
Author(s):  
Jordan Schonig
Keyword(s):  
Film Studies ◽  
Formal Analysis ◽  
Film Theory ◽  
Gestalt Psychology ◽  
Film Criticism ◽  
Philosophical Intuition ◽  
History Of ◽  
Generic Structures ◽  
Temporal Flow ◽  
Film Form

The Introduction examines why “movement” is often invoked as a term in film criticism and film theory but is rarely analyzed as an aspect of film form. The reason for this is twofold. First, because film theory has largely examined movement only as a defining property of the cinematic medium, movement is rarely singled out in film criticism. Second, because film theory has inherited the philosophical intuition that form is primarily spatial rather than temporal, formal analysis in film studies tends to break up the temporal flow of film into static units, such as in shot breakdowns and frame analyses. In film studies, then, “form” and “movement” are conceptually incompatible. As a means of thinking motion and form together, the Introduction proposes the concept of “motion forms,” generic structures, patterns, or shapes of motion. The Introduction then explores the philosophical roots of the motion form in phenomenology and Gestalt psychology, and explains how such a way of thinking about cinematic motion differs from other phenomenological approaches in film studies. Finally, the introduction outlines the six chapters of the book, each of which investigates a particular motion form that emerges throughout the history of cinema.

Worlds in Collision: Owen and Huxley on the Brain

1997 ◽  
Vol 10 (2) ◽  
pp. 343-365 ◽  
Author(s):  
C.U.M. Smith
Keyword(s):  
Biological Sciences ◽  
Social Context ◽  
Scientific Advance ◽  
Societal Factors ◽  
The Social ◽  
Philosophical Intuition ◽  
Biological World ◽  
Richard Owen ◽  
The Brain

The ArgumentThis paper makes use of the 1860 clash between T. H. Huxley and Richard Owen to examine the role of social context in scientific advance in the biological sciences. It shows how the social context of nineteenth-century England first favored the Coleridge-Owenite interpretation of the biological world and then, at mid-century and subsequently, allowed the Darwin-Huxley interpretation to win through. It emphasizes the complexity of the clash. Professional, personal, and generational agendas as well as scientific theory and fundamental philosophical intuition were at stake. The history, ultimately, provides a useful instance of Schutz ‘s and Scheler ‘s concept of societal factors controlling and selecting between flows of idealfactoren. Although Huxley is conventionally regarded as the victor I conclude by suggesting that the issue is not yet closed and that profound philosophical issues remain unresolved.

Gettier and the Epistemic Appraisal of Philosophical Intuition

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Alvin I. Goldman
Keyword(s):  
Experimental Techniques ◽  
Psychological Techniques ◽  
Interview Techniques ◽  
Philosophical Intuition ◽  
Epistemic Appraisal

Gettier’s 1963 paper was enormously influential. Virtually all epistemologists agreed with Gettier that the JTB analaysis was mistaken. But this conclusion evidently depended on the reliability of the shared intuitions of Gettier’s and his philosophical contemporaries about the epistemological examples described in his chapter. How reliable are such intuitions? Today many philosophers challenge the reliability of classification intuitions. How are such challenges to be addressed, and what can we learn about the comparative reliability of putative experts (e.g. philosophers) and laypersons? Here it is proposed that philosophers can study this with the help of psychological techniques—including not only interview techniques of the kind utilized by experimental philosophers but other experimental techniques as well. Ways to investigate intuition’s reliability are illustrated.

scholarly journals Philosophical Intuitions

2010 ◽  
pp. 54-80 ◽  
Author(s):  
Mark Fedyk
Keyword(s):  
Interesting Property ◽  
Gettier Case ◽  
Philosophical Intuition ◽  
Reliable Source ◽  
Representation Structure ◽  
The Difference

What exactly is a philosophical intuition? And what makes such an intuition reliable, when it is reliable? This paper provides a terminological framework that is able answer to the first question, and then puts the framework to work developing an answer to the second question. More specifically, the paper argues that we can distinguish between two different "evidential roles" which intuitions can occupy: under certain conditions they can provide information about the representational structure of an intuitor's concept, and under different conditions, they can provide information about whether or not a property is instantiated. The paper describes two principles intended to capture the difference between the two sets of conditions---that is, the paper offers a principle that explains when an intuition will be a reliable source of evidence about the representation structure of an intuitor's concept, and another principle that explains when an intuition will be a reliable source of evidence about whether or not a property is instantiated. The paper concludes by briefly arguing that, insofar as philosophers are interested using intuitions to determine whether or not some philosophically interesting property is instantiated by some scenario (for instance, whether knowledge is instantiated in a Gettier-case), the reliability of the intuition in question does not depend on whether or not the intuition is widely shared.

The evidential status of philosophical intuition

2005 ◽  
Vol 121 (3) ◽  
pp. 193-224 ◽  
Author(s):  
Janet Levin
Keyword(s):  
Philosophical Intuition

Bergson, Berkeley, and Philosophical Intuition

1914 ◽  
Vol 23 (4) ◽  
pp. 430
Author(s):  
A. C. Armstrong
Keyword(s):  
Philosophical Intuition
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