Introduction

The Introduction examines why “movement” is often invoked as a term in film criticism and film theory but is rarely analyzed as an aspect of film form. The reason for this is twofold. First, because film theory has largely examined movement only as a defining property of the cinematic medium, movement is rarely singled out in film criticism. Second, because film theory has inherited the philosophical intuition that form is primarily spatial rather than temporal, formal analysis in film studies tends to break up the temporal flow of film into static units, such as in shot breakdowns and frame analyses. In film studies, then, “form” and “movement” are conceptually incompatible. As a means of thinking motion and form together, the Introduction proposes the concept of “motion forms,” generic structures, patterns, or shapes of motion. The Introduction then explores the philosophical roots of the motion form in phenomenology and Gestalt psychology, and explains how such a way of thinking about cinematic motion differs from other phenomenological approaches in film studies. Finally, the introduction outlines the six chapters of the book, each of which investigates a particular motion form that emerges throughout the history of cinema.

Philosophical Intuition Is the Capacity to Recognize one’s Epistemic Position. An Old-Fashion Approach Based on Russell, Carnap, Wittgenstein, and Husserl

Philosophical intuition has become one of the most debated problems in recent years, largely due to the rise of the movement called experimental philosophy which challenged the conviction that philosophers have some special insight into abstract ideas such as being, knowledge, good and evil, intentional action, etc. In response to the challenge, some authors claim that there is a special cognitive faculty called philosophical intuition which delivers justification to philosophical theses, while some others deny it based on experimental results. A relatively smaller group of researchers aim at clarifying what the alleged intuition is. I follow the latter path. In this paper I argue that philosophical intuition is in the first place the capacity enabling one to what I refer to as the recognition of one’s epistemic position. The latter means becoming aware of the seemingly trivial “fact” that the way in which the world manifests itself depends on the cognitive apparatus one has, thereby propelling one to draw a distinction between appearances and reality. The recognition at stake is a very specific capacity to approach the world solely as it is experienced. This capacity, I argue, is the core and the defining feature of philosophical intuition. As part of my argumentation I also distinguish between the intuition in question and its different manifestations; and then introduce a novel notion of erotetic intuition. My argument is called “old-fashion” to emphasize the fact that I draw mostly on four figures who were pivotal in the twentieth- century philosophy and whose influence on the current debate concerning philosophical intuition should be, I believe, stronger than it is; I mean Russell, Carnap, Wittgenstein, and Husserl.

SIMON L. FRANK: LIFE AND DOCTRINE

The article discusses major biographical milestones and provides a general evolution of philosophical views of the Russian philosopher Simon L. Frank. At the initial stage of the creative way, Frank is an economist and critical Marxist. Appeal to philosophy in the 1900s characterized by the influence of neo-Kantianism, the immanent philosophy and philosophy of life. Around 1908-12 Frank’s transition to the position of metaphysics begins to take shape his own philosophical system, absolute realism. One of the main features of the work of Frank is consistency. Throughout his creative career, the philosopher developed the deepened and detailed original philosophical intuition - the intuition of the supra-rational unity of being - which was already fixed in his early philosophical works. Absolute being is a concrete metalogical reality, revealed in the living knowledge Simultaneously, the potentiality and transfiniteness of absolute being acts as the basis of individuality and creativity of man, the source of his freedom. The philosophical method of Frank, rational comprehension of rationally incomprehensible, based on the principle of antinomic monodualism. Philosophy of religion unfolds as a phenomenological analysis of religious experience. In the social political field Frank justifies the position of liberal conservatism and Christian realism.

Gettier and the Epistemic Appraisal of Philosophical Intuition

Gettier’s 1963 paper was enormously influential. Virtually all epistemologists agreed with Gettier that the JTB analaysis was mistaken. But this conclusion evidently depended on the reliability of the shared intuitions of Gettier’s and his philosophical contemporaries about the epistemological examples described in his chapter. How reliable are such intuitions? Today many philosophers challenge the reliability of classification intuitions. How are such challenges to be addressed, and what can we learn about the comparative reliability of putative experts (e.g. philosophers) and laypersons? Here it is proposed that philosophers can study this with the help of psychological techniques—including not only interview techniques of the kind utilized by experimental philosophers but other experimental techniques as well. Ways to investigate intuition’s reliability are illustrated.

The Force of Small Gestures

In The Logic of Sensation, Gilles Deleuze describes sensation as a domain that lies beneath, over, or inside quotidian vision as if in another dimension of intensive qualitative experience masked by habitual perception. Sensation is also a way of grasping the immanence of philosophy to works of art. The logic of sensation is part and parcel of our world as lived; one might say that sensation is immanent to perceptual experience as force is immanent to matter. In Deleuze’s account of sensation, the plastic arts are less concerned with matter and figuration than they are with force and becoming. Perhaps the problem for both painting and cinema is how to see time and force differently, and to release the figural force of sensation in the image. The chapter continues by investigating the logic of sensation in recent experimental video, primarily Ernie Gehr’s Glider (2001), but also two of the author’s own recent artworks, Waterloo and Plato’s Phaedrus. The chapter concludes with an account of Henri Bergson’s lecture on philosophical intuition to argue that there is a continuous dynamic line that runs between intuition and philosophy, Image and Concept