scholarly journals The Problem of Moral Progress and Stoic Cosmopolitanism

2021 ◽  
Vol 21 (1) ◽  
pp. 59-70
Author(s):  
Alexander A. Sanzhenakov ◽  

The article is devoted to showing the connection between the moral progress and the cos­mopolitanism of the Stoic. Since the early Stoics considered the right reason (ὀρθὸς λόγος) as one of the basic conditions for the unification of gods and humankind into a single com­munity (κοσμόπολις), anyone who intends to join to this community must develop his or her reason to the highest level. It means that the cosmopolitan must be morally perfect, which implies that he or she has successfully completed the process of moral progress. However, the concept of moral progress in Stoicism (especially in the early one) is prob­lematic because the Stoics denied a qualitative difference between vicious people and be­lieved that all bad deeds are equal. The author of the article tries to remove this contradic­tion by introducing a two-level structure of moral progress, in which the gradation of moral development and qualitative changes in the moral character of the subject are spaced. The cosmopolitanism of the Stoics and their ideas about moral progress are united not only by the concept of «right reason», but also by their doctrine of «oikeiôsis», which implies the development of natural inclinations to the highest principles of morality. Finally, the inter­dependence of moral progress and the cosmopolitanism is demonstrated by their evolution with the development of the Stoic school. This evolution is expressed in the fact that, on the one hand, the Stoics perfected the tools for moral development, which paved a clearer path to the cosmopolis, and on the other hand, they reduced the requirements for the citi­zens of the cosmopolis, which also led to the growth of the community of gods and people.

Author(s):  
Christopher Grout*

Abstract The extent to which members of the clergy are considered ‘employees’ for the purposes of secular employment and equality legislation has been the subject of much discussion, but essentially remains a fact sensitive question. The Equality Act 2010 (‘the 2010 Act’) seeks to prevent discrimination on the basis of nine ‘protected characteristics’. While recognizing that the application of the 2010 Act to the variety of clergy offices is ‘not straightforward’, the Church of England (‘the Church’) has opined that an equitable approach to clergy appointments is to proceed as if they were subject to the provisions of the 2010 Act. What follows is in`tended to be a thorough review of the eligibility criteria for clergy appointment in the Church to assess their compatibility with the requirements of the 2010 Act. In addition, particular consideration will be given to Schedule 9(2) to the 2010 Act which makes specific provision relating to religious requirements concerning the protected characteristics of sex, sexual orientation, and marriage and civil partnership. In short, where the employment is for the purposes of an organized religion, such as the Church, requirements which relate to these protected characteristics will not constitute discrimination where they engage the ‘compliance or non-conflict principle’. What these principles mean and how they might operate in practice is discussed below, taking into account the likely canonical and theological justifications for discriminating against certain individuals. Whether the law strikes the right balance between, on the one hand protecting clergy and, on the other, providing the Church with the autonomy to act in accordance with its established doctrine, will be explored in the final analysis.


2015 ◽  
pp. 137-153
Author(s):  
Filip Dziedzic

The subject of the article is the justification of the thesis that the differentiation of the legal situation of parents on the basis of the Act on the Large Family Card, who have established a family with at least three children violates the constitutional principle of equality before the law. On the one hand some parents are entitled to use the card without any time limit, and on the other hand there is a group of parents who also have large families, but are totally deprived of the right. According to the author of the article, the diversity does not represent any constitutionally protected value and the discrimination occurs due to the unlimited duration of the right to own the Card by eligible parents. The result of the above, as well as the fourth (another) child’s right to the Card depending on holding the Card by the parent, is discriminatory for the children born as the fourth (next) child in the family. The article is also an attempt to answer the question which way would be the best to remove the above-mentioned discrimination thus making it most coherent with the objective and content of the analyzed regulation.


1986 ◽  
Vol 30 (3) ◽  
pp. 266-284 ◽  
Author(s):  
Colin Power

While the move towards criterion-referenced assessment in Australia represents a step in the right direction, the path is fraught with political and technical hazards. Advocates of criterion-referenced assessment tend to overdraw the distinction between norm and criterion-referenced assessment, and to play down the difficulties inherent in spelling out criteria and setting standards at the Year 12 level. Nevertheless it is a good idea to try to clarify the domains of each subject (integrated structures of knowledge and ability which underly areas of expertise) and to experiment with new tools and technologies being developed by measurement specialists. We must also recognize that we cannot hope to improve the art of assessing the quality of students' work by an infinite expansion along a scientific-technological path in all areas of the curriculum. In many areas, we will always be dependent on the expertise and judgment of connoisseurs, and judgments will always represent an uncertain blend of criteria derived from the subject and the assessors on the one hand, and norms ebbing from those being assessed on the other.


Philosophy ◽  
1988 ◽  
Vol 63 (243) ◽  
pp. 63-81 ◽  
Author(s):  
Colin Radford

Utilitarianism tells us that actions are morally right and good if and to the extent that they add to human happiness or diminish human unhappiness. And—or, perhaps, therefore—it also tells us that the best action a person can perform is that which of all the possible actions open to him is the one which makes the greatest positive difference to human happiness. Moreover, as everyone will also remember, utilitarianism further tries to tell us, perhaps intending it as a corollary of that first, main claim, that the motive for an action has nothing to do with its moral rightness or goodness. (This, of course, is just a philosopher's excessive and incorrect way of making the platitudinous point that one may do the wrong thing for the right reason and the right thing for the wrong reason.) But even if, as utilitarians, we accepted the dubious corollary, it would not follow, as many have thought, that utilitarians have no moral interest in motives. For unless, absurdly, a utilitarian believed either that there was never more than a fortuitous connection between on the one hand what we intended to do and on the other what we did and the consequences of what we did, or that, if there were such connections, we could not know of them, he must believe, as a moralist, that the best motive a person can have for performing an action is likely to be the desire to produce the happiest result. Indeed, utilitarians ought to be morally committed, it would seem, to trying to find out as much as they can about the consequences of our actions, e.g. what connections exist, if any, between how we raise children and what sort of adults they grow up to be.


1841 ◽  
Vol 131 ◽  
pp. 59-68 ◽  

Mr. F. J., the subject of the present memoir, is the son of a physician; of scrofulous diathesis, but otherwise of robust constitution; of irritable temperament, but of contented and happy disposition; and endowed with an excellent understanding, quick power of conception, and retentive memory. In both the eyes of his father, cataract (with the addition, I suspect, of glaucoma) has manifested itself within the last four years, after a severe attack of influenza. The relatives on the paternal side are predisposed to diseases of the eye, but in the mother, and in the relatives on her side, no such predisposition can be traced. With regard to the cause of the ophthalmic affections which form the subject of this paper, the mother seemed to lay much stress on the following circumstance, which, although it may possibly have had some share in the cause of one of them, can have had no influence, in my opinion, in producing the other. She stated to me that in the eighth month of her pregnancy, which up to this period had proceeded favourably, she received from her youngest child, which she was carrying in her arms, a severe blow on the eye. This accident caused inflammation of the eye, accompanied with a curious visual illusion, viz. that all objects which she saw, but especially those situated on the ground, appeared of a deep concave form; an illusion which lasted for several months. The fright experienced from the accident also brought on convulsions, which, recurring several times, extended even to the fœtus. The recurrence of these convulsions produced in the mind of the mother a continual anxiety and fear for the health of the child, while the pain arising from the ophthalmia, together with the visual illusion just mentioned, gave her fears a direction more especially towards its eyes. Delivery took place at the proper period, when the eyes of the infant, which was otherwise healthy and well-formed, were found to present a twofold defect of organization. The father, to whose statement, on account of his professional knowledge, more weight is to be attached, informed me that both eyes were turned inwards to such an extent that a portion of the cornea was hidden by the inner canthus, and that in both pupils a yellowish-white discoloration was to be observed, which, being situated behind the iris, could not be the pupillary membrane. That the strabismus and cataract of both eyes in this case were congenital, is evident from the testimony both of the parents and of the nurse, whom I have closely questioned on this subject. The latter, who can distinctly remember all the circumstances of the case, told me that when the child was a few months old, she held a light before its eyes, of which it took no notice. I ascertained also from her that the eye-balls had not that restless motion which is generally observed in those who are born blind, but that both eyes were always turned inwards, and that but rarely either the one or the other was moved from the internal canthus. It was also stated to me, that towards the end of the second year the operation of keratonyxis was performed on the right eye, upon which a severe iritis ensued, terminating in atrophy of the eye-ball. Within the next four years two similar operations were performed on the left eye, which did not indeed destroy the organ, but at the same time did not remove the opacity in the pupil. The colour of the opacity became in time, however, of a clearer white; and the patient acquired a certain sensation of light, which he did not seem to have had before the operation. Both eyes for a long time retained a disposition to inflammation, and suffered repeatedly from conjunctivitis, whence the vessels of the conjunctiva were increased in number and size to such an extent, that it was necessary they should be several times excised.


2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Asos Namiq

The contract is the Sharia of the Contracting Party as a rule that does not govern the contract only upon formation, but also upon execution, since the terms of the contract are transformed, after its formation, into a law that imposes itself, and its sanctity cannot be violated. That is, when the contract is valid and enforceable, it must be executed according to what it contains and in accordance with good faith and trust between people, and this is called the principle of binding force of the contract. Whenever the contract is binding on both parties, one of the parties cannot be the only one to rescind or amend it. The mandatory limits of the contract are not limited to what the contracting parties have agreed only, but include all of its requirements in accordance with legislative and customary rules, and what justice requires, and what is imposed by the nature of the full-time obligation of the contract. When executing the contract, the extent of the debtor’s commitment to the contract is measured in the manner in which it is implemented, and his agreement with the requirements of the contract, that is, the closer the method of implementation is with the requirements of the contract, the debtor is considered on the right path in fulfillment, and the more the method of implementation is far from the requirements of the contract, the debtor is considered in breach of his contractual obligations. Since the debtor may deviate from the prescribed path in some cases due to the difficulty of implementing the obligation on the one hand, and the difficulty of harmonizing the circumstances and methods of implementation on the other hand, the law allowed the creditor to object to the debtor’s behavior whenever he saw it as different from the contract based on the binding force of the contract. But this right granted to the creditor is not an absolute right. Rather, it is restricted by his act or statement that revealed to the debtor the safety of his conduct in the implementation of the contract, meaning that despite the recognition of the right to object to the creditor, the creditor may be suspended by what was previously issued by him, i.e. closed The door of objection to it, and this is called the rule of judgment closure that we have chosen as the subject of our study. We deal with it by research and study to show the limits of this rule, and its impact on modifying the binding force of the contract, whether by making mandatory certain clauses in the contract or even creating new clauses, or by stripping a contractual obligation of its binding force.


2020 ◽  
pp. 36-46
Author(s):  
Vitaliia Tozhyieva

In connection with the deepening globalization processes and the interaction of scientists from different countries, the linguistic terminology systems of modern Slavic languages in the second half of the XX and at the beginning of the XXI century have been enlarged with new special units, which causes quantitative and qualitative changes in their composition, interest in the problems of the origin, formation and dynamics of this terminology system. The purpose of the study is to establish the regularity of the terminological nomination of linguistic concepts in the Middle and Modern Polish periods (XVI century – 1939). Taking into account the internal and external linguistic factors that influenced the formation and functioning of linguistics terminology in the Polish language, the basic methods of term formation (semantic, morphological, syntactic) are analyzed, confirming, on the one hand, the connection with the common language, and on the other hand, the uniqueness and specificity of the subject linguistic terminology corpus. The consolidation of a special nomination in Polish linguistic terminology at different chronological sections took place in stages. The transition of special words from one category to another (preterms → quasi-terms → terms) displays a system of complex changes in the branched term system of the subject area of linguistics.


2005 ◽  
Vol 18 (4) ◽  
pp. 691-710
Author(s):  
Denis Bourque

Clause 1(b) of the Canadian Bill of Rights specifies that every person has the right to equality before the law. The purpose of this article is to analyse, on the one hand, the meaning that the judges of the Supreme Court have given to this concept of equality before the law and, on the other hand, the way in which they have applied this aforementioned principle of Clause 1(b) of the Canadian Bill of Rights. Four judgements are the subject of Mr. Bourque's study. He concerns himself with the Drybones, Lavell, Burnshine and Canard judgements. In the course of analysing these cases, Mr. Bourque brings out the shilly-shallying of the judges in connection with their concept of equality before the law. In spite of this beating about the bush two concepts emerge at the level of the judges of the Supreme Court, namely an equalitarian concept of equality before the law, and a concept which makes equivalent equality before the law and the rule of law. According to Mr. Bourque, the analysis of these four judgements shows that it is the concept which makes equivalent equality before the law and the rule of law, which represents, the position of the Supreme Court, at the present time.


2010 ◽  
Vol 4 (2) ◽  
pp. 135-156 ◽  
Author(s):  
Dorothea E. Schulz

Starting with the controversial esoteric employment of audio recordings by followers of the charismatic Muslim preacher Sharif Haidara in Mali, the article explores the dynamics emerging at the interface of different technologies and techniques employed by those engaging the realm of the Divine. I focus attention on the “border zone” between, on the one hand, techniques for appropriating scriptures based on long-standing religious conventions, and, on the other, audio recording technologies, whose adoption not yet established authoritative and standardized forms of practice, thereby generating insecurities and becoming the subject of heated debate. I argue that “recyclage” aptly describes the dynamics of this “border zone” because it captures the ways conventional techniques of accessing the Divine are reassessed and reemployed, by integrating new materials and rituals. Historically, appropriations of the Qur’an for esoteric purposes have been widespread in Muslim West Africa. These esoteric appropriations are at the basis of the considerable continuities, overlaps and crossovers, between scripture-related esoteric practices on one side, and the treatment by Sharif Haidara’s followers of audio taped sermons as vessels of his spiritual power, on the other.


Author(s):  
Iryna Rusnak

The author of the article analyses the problem of the female emancipation in the little-known feuilleton “Amazonia: A Very Inept Story” (1924) by Mykola Chirsky. The author determines the genre affiliation of the work and examines its compositional structure. Three parts are distinguished in the architectonics of associative feuilleton: associative conception; deployment of a “small” topic; conclusion. The author of the article clarifies the role of intertextual elements and the method of constantly switching the tone from serious to comic to reveal the thematic direction of the work. Mykola Chirsky’s interest in the problem of female emancipation is corresponded to the general mood of the era. The subject of ridicule in provocative feuilleton is the woman’s radical metamorphoses, since repulsive manifestations of emancipation becomes commonplace. At the same time, the writer shows respect for the woman, appreciates her femininity, internal and external beauty, personality. He associates the positive in women with the functions of a faithful wife, a caring mother, and a skilled housewife. In feuilleton, the writer does not bypass the problem of the modern man role in a family, but analyses the value and moral and ethical guidelines of his character. The husband’s bad habits receive a caricatured interpretation in the strange behaviour of relatives. On the one hand, the writer does not perceive the extremes brought by female emancipation, and on the other, he mercilessly criticises the male “virtues” of contemporaries far from the standard. The artistic heritage of Mykola Chirsky remains little studied. The urgent task of modern literary studies is the introduction of Mykola Chirsky’s unknown works into the scientific circulation and their thorough scientific understanding.


Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document