Krąg rodziców i dzieci uprawnionych do posiadania karty dużej rodziny a konstytucyjna zasada równości wobec prawa

2015 ◽  
pp. 137-153
Author(s):  
Filip Dziedzic

The subject of the article is the justification of the thesis that the differentiation of the legal situation of parents on the basis of the Act on the Large Family Card, who have established a family with at least three children violates the constitutional principle of equality before the law. On the one hand some parents are entitled to use the card without any time limit, and on the other hand there is a group of parents who also have large families, but are totally deprived of the right. According to the author of the article, the diversity does not represent any constitutionally protected value and the discrimination occurs due to the unlimited duration of the right to own the Card by eligible parents. The result of the above, as well as the fourth (another) child’s right to the Card depending on holding the Card by the parent, is discriminatory for the children born as the fourth (next) child in the family. The article is also an attempt to answer the question which way would be the best to remove the above-mentioned discrimination thus making it most coherent with the objective and content of the analyzed regulation.

2020 ◽  
pp. 255-269
Author(s):  
Pablo Ferrando-García

We present an analysis of the filmic representation of Funny Games to highlight its playful structure as a game of games. Through a series of narrative efforts, a double operation is carried out, aimed at a specular relationship with the viewer. On the one hand, Michael Haneke’s film offers a series of expressive mechanisms that are aimed at shifting the objective gaze to subjective in order to transfer the perception of the subject presented to the viewer. On the other, it presents a brutal clash between the registers of comedy and tragedy through the young psychopaths, Peter and Paul, who emerge as contemporary clowns, in the figures of Pierrot and Harlequin, whose negative resonances lead to the incarnation of absolute EVil. In turn, the family are the victims, and this is presented as the prototype of the family institution while Peter and Paul are mere archetypes. In this way, the cinematographic screen is turned into a device for interrogating its modes of representation and, in turn, offers a solid moral dimension. The ultimate objective of the Hanekian story is to cover it with “a pedagogical function: to familiarize the cinema, to bring it closer to a daily life so that it speaks from you to you to the experience –to the conscience– of the viewer” (Font, 2002, p. 16). Resumen Nuestra propuesta trata de desarrollar un análisis de la representación fílmica con el propósito de poner de relieve la estructura lúdica de Funny Games como juego de juegos. A través de toda una serie de gestiones narrativas se efectúa una doble operación dirigidas a una relación especular con el espectador. Por un lado, la película de Michael Haneke ofrece una serie de mecanismos expresivos que van encaminados al desplazamiento de la mirada objetiva en subjetiva con el fin de trasladar la percepción del sujeto de la enunciación al narratario/espectador. Por otro, presenta un brutal choque entre el registro de la comedia con la tragedia a través de los jóvenes psicópatas, Peter y Paul, que se erigen en los payasos contemporáneos, en las figuras de Pierrot y Arlequín, cuyas resonancias negativas conducen a la encarnación del Mal absoluto. A su vez, George y Anne Schöber son las víctimas y estos son expuestos como el prototipo de la institución familiar mientras Peter y Paul son meros arquetipos narrativos. De este modo, la pantalla cinematográfica se convierte en un dispositivo de interrogación sobre sus modos de representación y, a su vez, ofrece una sólida dimensión moral. El objetivo último del relato hanekiano es revestirlo de “una función pedagógica: familiarizar el cine, acercarlo a una cotidianidad para que hable de tú a tú a la experiencia –a la conciencia– del espectador” (Font, 2002: 16).


Author(s):  
Christopher Grout*

Abstract The extent to which members of the clergy are considered ‘employees’ for the purposes of secular employment and equality legislation has been the subject of much discussion, but essentially remains a fact sensitive question. The Equality Act 2010 (‘the 2010 Act’) seeks to prevent discrimination on the basis of nine ‘protected characteristics’. While recognizing that the application of the 2010 Act to the variety of clergy offices is ‘not straightforward’, the Church of England (‘the Church’) has opined that an equitable approach to clergy appointments is to proceed as if they were subject to the provisions of the 2010 Act. What follows is in`tended to be a thorough review of the eligibility criteria for clergy appointment in the Church to assess their compatibility with the requirements of the 2010 Act. In addition, particular consideration will be given to Schedule 9(2) to the 2010 Act which makes specific provision relating to religious requirements concerning the protected characteristics of sex, sexual orientation, and marriage and civil partnership. In short, where the employment is for the purposes of an organized religion, such as the Church, requirements which relate to these protected characteristics will not constitute discrimination where they engage the ‘compliance or non-conflict principle’. What these principles mean and how they might operate in practice is discussed below, taking into account the likely canonical and theological justifications for discriminating against certain individuals. Whether the law strikes the right balance between, on the one hand protecting clergy and, on the other, providing the Church with the autonomy to act in accordance with its established doctrine, will be explored in the final analysis.


2021 ◽  
Vol 21 (1) ◽  
pp. 59-70
Author(s):  
Alexander A. Sanzhenakov ◽  

The article is devoted to showing the connection between the moral progress and the cos­mopolitanism of the Stoic. Since the early Stoics considered the right reason (ὀρθὸς λόγος) as one of the basic conditions for the unification of gods and humankind into a single com­munity (κοσμόπολις), anyone who intends to join to this community must develop his or her reason to the highest level. It means that the cosmopolitan must be morally perfect, which implies that he or she has successfully completed the process of moral progress. However, the concept of moral progress in Stoicism (especially in the early one) is prob­lematic because the Stoics denied a qualitative difference between vicious people and be­lieved that all bad deeds are equal. The author of the article tries to remove this contradic­tion by introducing a two-level structure of moral progress, in which the gradation of moral development and qualitative changes in the moral character of the subject are spaced. The cosmopolitanism of the Stoics and their ideas about moral progress are united not only by the concept of «right reason», but also by their doctrine of «oikeiôsis», which implies the development of natural inclinations to the highest principles of morality. Finally, the inter­dependence of moral progress and the cosmopolitanism is demonstrated by their evolution with the development of the Stoic school. This evolution is expressed in the fact that, on the one hand, the Stoics perfected the tools for moral development, which paved a clearer path to the cosmopolis, and on the other hand, they reduced the requirements for the citi­zens of the cosmopolis, which also led to the growth of the community of gods and people.


1964 ◽  
Vol 9 (5) ◽  
pp. 417-430
Author(s):  
Louis Corman
Keyword(s):  

The application of psychoanalytic rules to the family drawing permits an interpretation in depth which leads to the understanding of conflicts in the child's mind. In this work, the author has limited himself more particularly to the study of the projection of forbidden tendencies to an animal symbol, as this projection enables the subject to gratify 'by proxy' his instincts without feelings of anguish or without being punished. This is surely a theory and it will be necessary, in each case, to check it by means of an extensive clinical and projective analysis. It was possible, however, to support this theory with several arguments. The first is that the familiar animal which is supposed to assume the forbidden tendency is emphasized by the place it occupies, the care with which it is drawn and the comment describing its action. Sometimes even, it has human features which indicate its intimate collusion with the subject. Secondly, in such a case, the subject himself is absent from the drawing; he has not depicted himself. One is led to wonder under what other person's features he appears and when the super-added animal is set out, it may be assumed that it is representing the subject in the drawing. The third argument is inferred from identification. It is quite obvious that, when the subject claims to be identified with the animal, no doubt is possible. However, more often than not, as we have seen, the child evades the question, and when he is invited to identify himself, he is either the father or he is someone absent. This is quite understandable, as we have seen that the person assuming the forbidden action is also the one who will have to accept punishment. Therefore, in one case, the adder is chased away; in other cases, the aggressor animal is killed. In all those cases, it will be necessary to establish identification in an indirect manner, outside of the statements of the child. Identification will be based in the first place on the signs of emphasis given to the animal shown, as we have said; secondly, on the convergence of indices which are brought out by the other tests or psychodramas, as has been illustrated in those observations.


1986 ◽  
Vol 30 (3) ◽  
pp. 266-284 ◽  
Author(s):  
Colin Power

While the move towards criterion-referenced assessment in Australia represents a step in the right direction, the path is fraught with political and technical hazards. Advocates of criterion-referenced assessment tend to overdraw the distinction between norm and criterion-referenced assessment, and to play down the difficulties inherent in spelling out criteria and setting standards at the Year 12 level. Nevertheless it is a good idea to try to clarify the domains of each subject (integrated structures of knowledge and ability which underly areas of expertise) and to experiment with new tools and technologies being developed by measurement specialists. We must also recognize that we cannot hope to improve the art of assessing the quality of students' work by an infinite expansion along a scientific-technological path in all areas of the curriculum. In many areas, we will always be dependent on the expertise and judgment of connoisseurs, and judgments will always represent an uncertain blend of criteria derived from the subject and the assessors on the one hand, and norms ebbing from those being assessed on the other.


2010 ◽  
Vol 54 (3) ◽  
pp. 517-546 ◽  
Author(s):  
Hamish Stewart

Abstract The confessions rule—the requirement that the Crown prove the voluntariness of the accused’s statements to persons in authority—is a well-established rule of criminal evidence and is closely connected with the constitutional principle against self-incrimination that it structures. The confessions rule is thus a natural candidate for recognition as a principle of fundamental justice under section 7 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms. However, there are two distinct routes by which the confessions rule might be constitutionalized. Under the “rule of evidence” approach, the confessions rule would be recognized as an aspect of the accused’s constitutional right to a fair trial. Under the “rights violation” approach, the conduct of the state in obtaining an involuntary statement would be treated as a violation of the accused’s constitutional rights. In R. v. Singh, despite having previously adopted the “rule of evidence” approach, the Supreme Court of Canada applied the “rights violation” approach and linked the confessions rule very closely to the constitutional right to silence. In so doing, the Court conflated the distinct protections offered by the right to silence on the one hand and the confessions rule on the other, particularly when Singh is read in light of other recent cases that appear to weaken the confessions rule. Fortunately, the Court’s recent decisions concerning the confessions rule may also be read as instances of appellate deference to trial judges’ factual findings on voir dires. Thus, they leave room for the recognition that neither the right to silence nor the confessions rule is reducible to the other, and that each has a distinct role to play: the right to silence protects the accused’s decision to speak at all, while the confessions rule concerns the accused’s motivations for speaking as he or she did.


1841 ◽  
Vol 131 ◽  
pp. 59-68 ◽  

Mr. F. J., the subject of the present memoir, is the son of a physician; of scrofulous diathesis, but otherwise of robust constitution; of irritable temperament, but of contented and happy disposition; and endowed with an excellent understanding, quick power of conception, and retentive memory. In both the eyes of his father, cataract (with the addition, I suspect, of glaucoma) has manifested itself within the last four years, after a severe attack of influenza. The relatives on the paternal side are predisposed to diseases of the eye, but in the mother, and in the relatives on her side, no such predisposition can be traced. With regard to the cause of the ophthalmic affections which form the subject of this paper, the mother seemed to lay much stress on the following circumstance, which, although it may possibly have had some share in the cause of one of them, can have had no influence, in my opinion, in producing the other. She stated to me that in the eighth month of her pregnancy, which up to this period had proceeded favourably, she received from her youngest child, which she was carrying in her arms, a severe blow on the eye. This accident caused inflammation of the eye, accompanied with a curious visual illusion, viz. that all objects which she saw, but especially those situated on the ground, appeared of a deep concave form; an illusion which lasted for several months. The fright experienced from the accident also brought on convulsions, which, recurring several times, extended even to the fœtus. The recurrence of these convulsions produced in the mind of the mother a continual anxiety and fear for the health of the child, while the pain arising from the ophthalmia, together with the visual illusion just mentioned, gave her fears a direction more especially towards its eyes. Delivery took place at the proper period, when the eyes of the infant, which was otherwise healthy and well-formed, were found to present a twofold defect of organization. The father, to whose statement, on account of his professional knowledge, more weight is to be attached, informed me that both eyes were turned inwards to such an extent that a portion of the cornea was hidden by the inner canthus, and that in both pupils a yellowish-white discoloration was to be observed, which, being situated behind the iris, could not be the pupillary membrane. That the strabismus and cataract of both eyes in this case were congenital, is evident from the testimony both of the parents and of the nurse, whom I have closely questioned on this subject. The latter, who can distinctly remember all the circumstances of the case, told me that when the child was a few months old, she held a light before its eyes, of which it took no notice. I ascertained also from her that the eye-balls had not that restless motion which is generally observed in those who are born blind, but that both eyes were always turned inwards, and that but rarely either the one or the other was moved from the internal canthus. It was also stated to me, that towards the end of the second year the operation of keratonyxis was performed on the right eye, upon which a severe iritis ensued, terminating in atrophy of the eye-ball. Within the next four years two similar operations were performed on the left eye, which did not indeed destroy the organ, but at the same time did not remove the opacity in the pupil. The colour of the opacity became in time, however, of a clearer white; and the patient acquired a certain sensation of light, which he did not seem to have had before the operation. Both eyes for a long time retained a disposition to inflammation, and suffered repeatedly from conjunctivitis, whence the vessels of the conjunctiva were increased in number and size to such an extent, that it was necessary they should be several times excised.


2016 ◽  
Vol 2 (1) ◽  
pp. 0-0
Author(s):  
Błażej Juliusz Kmieciak

Law and education are phenomena that constantly intermingle. On the one hand, in the educational process we use the concepts of rights, freedoms and autonomy. Education must result in shaping a pupils fully mature personality. One of its elements is to build awareness of their rights, taking into account respect for the rights of others. On the other hand, the right is continuously working on society and the individual. It works by: informing, motivating, and educating. The areas of action are related to the relationship that exists between parents and child. This relationship is unique. It refers to the value that family institution has in a society. In the family reveals the crucial role of parental authority. On the other perspective as important it seems to be the problem of respect for the rights of the child which is under the care of their parents. Analyzing the information media and the results of scientific studies more often can be seen the emergence of a particular thread, which is violence. This applies above of violence, which is observed in the educational process. This subject for many years, meets with interest of the Polish, constitutional authority responsible for protecting the child rights, which is the Children Ombudsman. At the end of 2015., on behalf of the above Ombudsman, has been developed an extensive report entitled. “Violence in education. Between the legal ban, and public acceptance. Monitoring of the Children Ombudsman”. Analysis of this document indicates that i society existence a clear and disturbing phenomenon of violence in education. At this point, there are several important questions. In the first place it is worth considering: What is the relationship between the rights of the child and parental authority? Is similar institutions can work together, and "co-exist"? It is also worth to considering: Is education of a child can exist without the element of coercion? Is this compulsion can have a positive face? At the end it is justified to stop the on the socio - legal context of domestic violence formulation. Is the existence of the Polish legal system similar phrases, effectively defends the rights of the family, or may result in the violation of?


2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Asos Namiq

The contract is the Sharia of the Contracting Party as a rule that does not govern the contract only upon formation, but also upon execution, since the terms of the contract are transformed, after its formation, into a law that imposes itself, and its sanctity cannot be violated. That is, when the contract is valid and enforceable, it must be executed according to what it contains and in accordance with good faith and trust between people, and this is called the principle of binding force of the contract. Whenever the contract is binding on both parties, one of the parties cannot be the only one to rescind or amend it. The mandatory limits of the contract are not limited to what the contracting parties have agreed only, but include all of its requirements in accordance with legislative and customary rules, and what justice requires, and what is imposed by the nature of the full-time obligation of the contract. When executing the contract, the extent of the debtor’s commitment to the contract is measured in the manner in which it is implemented, and his agreement with the requirements of the contract, that is, the closer the method of implementation is with the requirements of the contract, the debtor is considered on the right path in fulfillment, and the more the method of implementation is far from the requirements of the contract, the debtor is considered in breach of his contractual obligations. Since the debtor may deviate from the prescribed path in some cases due to the difficulty of implementing the obligation on the one hand, and the difficulty of harmonizing the circumstances and methods of implementation on the other hand, the law allowed the creditor to object to the debtor’s behavior whenever he saw it as different from the contract based on the binding force of the contract. But this right granted to the creditor is not an absolute right. Rather, it is restricted by his act or statement that revealed to the debtor the safety of his conduct in the implementation of the contract, meaning that despite the recognition of the right to object to the creditor, the creditor may be suspended by what was previously issued by him, i.e. closed The door of objection to it, and this is called the rule of judgment closure that we have chosen as the subject of our study. We deal with it by research and study to show the limits of this rule, and its impact on modifying the binding force of the contract, whether by making mandatory certain clauses in the contract or even creating new clauses, or by stripping a contractual obligation of its binding force.


2005 ◽  
Vol 18 (4) ◽  
pp. 691-710
Author(s):  
Denis Bourque

Clause 1(b) of the Canadian Bill of Rights specifies that every person has the right to equality before the law. The purpose of this article is to analyse, on the one hand, the meaning that the judges of the Supreme Court have given to this concept of equality before the law and, on the other hand, the way in which they have applied this aforementioned principle of Clause 1(b) of the Canadian Bill of Rights. Four judgements are the subject of Mr. Bourque's study. He concerns himself with the Drybones, Lavell, Burnshine and Canard judgements. In the course of analysing these cases, Mr. Bourque brings out the shilly-shallying of the judges in connection with their concept of equality before the law. In spite of this beating about the bush two concepts emerge at the level of the judges of the Supreme Court, namely an equalitarian concept of equality before the law, and a concept which makes equivalent equality before the law and the rule of law. According to Mr. Bourque, the analysis of these four judgements shows that it is the concept which makes equivalent equality before the law and the rule of law, which represents, the position of the Supreme Court, at the present time.


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