scholarly journals Investment Decisions of the Blockchain-Based Anti-Counterfeiting Traceability Service in A High-Quality Fresh Supply Chain

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Pan Liu
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Demand Function ◽  
Investment Decisions ◽  
Revenue Sharing ◽  
Circulation Rate ◽  
Traceability System ◽  
Before And After ◽  
Profit Functions ◽  
Repeat Purchase ◽  
Purchase Rate

Abstract Applications of the blockchain-based anti-counterfeiting traceability system (hereafter, blockchain-based ACTS) present a positive result in helping improve the repeat purchase rate and the product circulation rate. However, using the blockchain-based ACTS needs chain members’ additional expenditure. They want to know investment conditions about the blockchain-based ACTS and how to coordinate the supply chain. To solve these problems, we chosen a supply chain with one fresh producer and one retailer as the study object. Afterwards, considering the changes of the repeat purchase rate and the product circulation rate, we revised the demand function. Then, we constructed the profit functions before and after adopting the blockchain-based ACTS, and then a price discount and revenue-sharing contract was put forward to coordinate the supply chain. Findings: with the growth of the repurchase rate, benefits of chain members in the proposed three situations will increase. Thus, we can know that after using the blockchain-based ACTS.

Contracts and Information Structure in a Supply Chain with Operations and Marketing Interaction

2016 ◽  
Vol 18 (04) ◽  
pp. 1650014 ◽  
Author(s):  
Fouad El Ouardighi ◽  
Gary Erickson ◽  
Dieter Grass ◽  
Steffen Jørgensen
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Information Structure ◽  
Wholesale Price ◽  
Revenue Sharing ◽  
Open Loop ◽  
The State ◽  
Current State ◽  
Marketing Activities ◽  
Purchase Rate ◽  
The Impact

The objective of the paper is to study how wholesale price and revenue sharing contracts affect operations and marketing decisions in a supply chain under different dynamic informational structures. We suggest a differential game model of a supply chain consisting of a manufacturer and a single retailer that agree on the contract parameters at the outset of the game. The model includes key operational and marketing activities related to a single product in the supply chain. The manufacturer sets a production rate and the rate of advertising efforts while the retailer chooses a purchase rate and the consumer price. The state of the game is summarized in the firms’ backlogs and the manufacturer’s advertising goodwill. Depending on whether the supply chain members have and share state information, they may either make decisions contingent on the current state of the game (feedback Nash strategy), or precommit to a plan of action during the whole game (open-loop Nash strategy). Given a contract type, the impact of the availability of information regarding the state of the game on the firms’ decisions and payoffs is investigated. It is shown that double marginalization can be better mitigated if the supply chain members adopt a contingent strategy under a wholesale price contract and a commitment strategy under a revenue sharing contract.

scholarly journals Joint Innovation Investment and Pricing Decisions in Retail Supply Chains with Customer Value

2021 ◽  
Vol 13 (3) ◽  
pp. 1309
Author(s):  
Jiali Qu ◽  
Benyong Hu ◽  
Chao Meng
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Cooperative Game ◽  
Customer Value ◽  
Business Models ◽  
Value Added ◽  
Revenue Sharing ◽  
Nash Bargaining ◽  
Product Price ◽  
Pricing Decisions ◽  
Game Equilibrium

In the retail industry, customer value has become the key to maintaining competitive advantages. In the era of new retail, customer value is not only affected by the product price, but it is also closely related to innovations, such as value-added services and unique business models. In this paper, we study the joint innovation investment and pricing decisions in a retailer–supplier supply chain based on revenue sharing contracts and customer value. We first find that, in the non-cooperative game, equilibrium only exists in the supplier Stackelberg game. However, revenue sharing contracts cannot coordinate the supply chain in the non-cooperative game. By considering supply chain members’ bargaining power, we find that there exists a unique equilibrium for the Nash bargaining product. In addition, revenue sharing contracts can coordinate the supply chain and achieve the optimal consumer surplus. When the supply chain is coordinated, supply chain profit is allocated to the supply chain members based on their bargaining powers.

Traceability system using IoT and forecasting model for food supply chain

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ganjar Alfian ◽  
Muhammad Syafrudin ◽  
Norma Latif Fitriyani ◽  
Jongtae Rhee ◽  
Muhammad Rifqi Ma'arif ◽  
...  
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Food Supply ◽  
Forecasting Model ◽  
Food Supply Chain ◽  
Traceability System

Framework for implementing traceability system in the bulk grain supply chain

2009 ◽  
Vol 95 (4) ◽  
pp. 617-626 ◽  
Author(s):  
Maitri Thakur ◽  
Charles R. Hurburgh
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Traceability System

War stimulus: The Japanese threat and rebirth of the North America Pacific Coast shipbuilding industry, 1937-1946

2021 ◽  
Vol 33 (2) ◽  
pp. 382-411
Author(s):  
Chris Madsen
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
Supply Chain ◽  
Pacific Coast ◽  
The United States ◽  
Pearl Harbor ◽  
Shipbuilding Industry ◽  
The North ◽  
The Pacific ◽  
Before And After ◽  
Strategic Procurement

Henry Eccles, in classic studies on logistics, describes the dynamics of strategic procurement in the supply chain stretching from home countries to military theatres of operations. Naval authorities and industrialists concerned with Japanese aggression before and after Pearl Harbor looked towards developing shipbuilding capacity on North America’s Pacific Coast. The region turned into a volume producer of merchant vessels, warships and auxiliaries destined for service in the Pacific and Indian Oceans. Shipbuilding involved four broad categories of companies in the United States and Canada that enabled the tremendous production effort.

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