AbstractOn 9 July 2014, the European Commission (the Commission) published its White Paper “Towards more effective EU merger control”, which reviewed the operation of the EU Merger Regulation (EUMR) ten years after the introduction of the substantive test of “significant impediment to substantial competition” (SIEC) and proposed certain specific improvements, including the review of non-controlling minority interests under the EUMR. The 2014 White Paper followed approximately one year of consultation with Member States and interested parties, and was accompanied by a Staff Working Document, which analyses in more detail the considerations underlying the policy proposals in the 2014 White Paper, and an Impact Assessment, which analyses the potential benefits and costs of the various policy options considered.Less than six months after the consultation on the 2014 White Paper closed, Competition Commissioner Margrethe Vestager indicated that the Commission is reconsidering its proposals to allow it to review the acquisition of non-controlling minority shareholdings under the EUMR. This decision has been welcomed by many in the business and legal community as the “targeted transparency system” proposed by the Commission had raised a number of concerns regarding proportionality, legal certainty, cost and administrative burden.Whilst we await the Commission’s next move, this article considers whether non-controlling minority shareholdings should be subject to EU merger control and the extent to which the Commission’s originally envisaged system adequately dealt with the issues it sought to address. This article also proposes a number of principles that the authors suggest should be taken into account when designing a balanced system of merger review for acquisitions of non-controlling minority shareholdings in which the burden of the additional review is proportionate to the goals pursued.
Bureaucrats or Ideologues? EU Merger Control as Market‐centred Integration*