scholarly journals Dynamic Incentives in Retirement Earnings-Replacement Benefits

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Andrés Dean ◽  
Sebastian Fleitas ◽  
Mariana Zerpa
Keyword(s):  
Dynamic Incentives

scholarly journals Dynamic Incentives in Organizations: Success and Inertia

2014 ◽  
Vol 83 (4) ◽  
pp. 475-497 ◽  
Author(s):  
Martin Ruckes ◽  
Thomas Rønde
Keyword(s):  
Dynamic Incentives

scholarly journals Delegation and Dynamic Incentives

2014 ◽  
Author(s):  
Dongsoo Shin ◽  
Roland Strausz
Keyword(s):  
Dynamic Incentives

Microfinance Games

2010 ◽  
Vol 2 (3) ◽  
pp. 60-95 ◽  
Author(s):  
Xavier Giné ◽  
Pamela Jakiela ◽  
Dean Karlan ◽  
Jonathan Morduch
Keyword(s):  
Experimental Economics ◽  
Risk Taking ◽  
Free Riding ◽  
Risk Averse ◽  
Group Lending ◽  
Dynamic Incentives ◽  
Theoretical Predictions ◽  
Experimental Games

Microfinance banks use group-based lending contracts to strengthen borrowers' incentives for diligence, but the contracts are vulnerable to free-riding and collusion. We systematically unpack microfinance mechanisms through ten experimental games played in an experimental economics laboratory in urban Peru. Risk-taking broadly conforms to theoretical predictions, with dynamic incentives strongly reducing risk-taking even without group-based mechanisms. Group lending increases risk-taking, especially for risk-averse borrowers, but this is moderated when borrowers form their own groups. Group contracts benefit borrowers by creating implicit insurance against investment losses, but the costs are borne by other borrowers, especially the most risk averse. (JEL D82, G21, G31, O16)

Static and dynamic incentives for Twitter usage in the European Parliament

2017 ◽  
Vol 25 (6) ◽  
pp. 771-781 ◽  
Author(s):  
William T Daniel ◽  
Lukas Obholzer ◽  
Steffen Hurka
Keyword(s):  
Social Media ◽  
Political Parties ◽  
Electoral Systems ◽  
European Parliament ◽  
Social Media Platform ◽  
Dynamic Incentives ◽  
Dynamic Factors ◽  
Media Platform

In this article, we examine the static and dynamic factors that explain the use of the Twitter social media platform by all active Members of the European Parliament (MEPs) during the Fall and Winter of 2015–2016. Our analysis demonstrates that MEPs have an incentive to take to Twitter that varies across the European Parliament's (EP) highly segmented legislative calendar, but that MEPs are also affected by more constant differences in their national political parties and electoral systems of origin, as well as by their home constituencies. Our findings contribute to a picture of the EP as a diverse legislature that fosters diverse legislator interests with respect to voter outreach.

Occupational Choice and Dynamic Incentives

2000 ◽  
Author(s):  
Maitreesh Ghatak ◽  
Massimo Morelli ◽  
Tomas Tomas Sjöström
Keyword(s):  
Occupational Choice ◽  
Dynamic Incentives

Dynamic incentives and dual-purpose accounting

2006 ◽  
Vol 42 (3) ◽  
pp. 417-437 ◽  
Author(s):  
Gerald Feltham ◽  
Raffi Indjejikian ◽  
Dhananjay Nanda
Keyword(s):  
Dual Purpose ◽  
Dynamic Incentives
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