dynamic incentives
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2021 ◽  
Vol 13 (2) ◽  
pp. 1-34
Author(s):  
Jacopo Bizzotto ◽  
Adrien Vigier

We compare a credit rating agency’s incentives to acquire costly information when it is only paid for giving favorable ratings to the corresponding incentives when the agency is paid up-front, i.e., irrespective of the ratings assigned. We show that, in the presence of moral hazard, contingent fees provide stronger dynamic incentives to acquire information than up-front fees and may induce higher social welfare. When the fee structure is chosen by the agency, contingent fees arise as an equilibrium outcome, in line with the way the market for credit rating actually works. (JEL D21, D82, D83, G24)


2021 ◽  
pp. 215-220
Author(s):  
Patrick Hasch

ZusammenfassungZugang zu Gesundheitsleistungen stellt einen bedeutenden Schutz vor Wohlstandsverlusten durch schwere Krankheit dar. Die Krankenversicherung bietet Schutz. Aber wenn die Versicherung alle Behandlungskosten übernimmt, fehlt der Sparanreiz und es droht eine Überbeanspruchung des Gesundheitswesens. Auch ausufernde Gesundheitskosten können unseren Wohlstand beeinträchtigen. Eine Möglichkeit, den Anstieg der Prämien für die Krankenversicherung zu zähmen, ist der Selbstbehalt. Wenn die Versicherten einen Teil der Behandlungskosten selber zahlen müssen, gehen sie vielleicht sparsamer mit den Leistungen des Gesundheitswesens um. Kann ein Selbstbehalt mehr Sparsamkeit in der Krankenversicherung fördern?Aviva Aron-Dine, Liran Einav, Amy Finkelstein, Mark Cullen (2015), Moral Hazard in Health Insurance: Do Dynamic Incentives Matter? Review of Economics and Statistics 97, 725–741.


2020 ◽  
Vol 20 (85) ◽  
Author(s):  
Rumen Kostadinov ◽  
Francisco Roldán

We study the optimal design of a disinflation plan by a planner who lacks commitment. Having announced a plan, the Central banker faces a tradeoff between surprise inflation and building reputation, defined as the private sector's belief that the Central bank is committed to the plan. Some plans are harder to sustain: the planner recognizes that paving out future grounds with temptation leads the way for a negative drift of reputation in equilibrium. Plans that successfully create low inflationary expectations balance promises of lower inflation with dynamic incentives that make them more credible. When announcing the disinflation plan, the planner takes into account these anticipated interactions. We find that, even in the zero reputation limit, a gradual disinflation is preferred despite the absence of inflation inertia in the private economy.


2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Andrés Dean ◽  
Sebastian Fleitas ◽  
Mariana Zerpa
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