Investment Committee Voting and the Financing of Innovation

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Andrey Malenko ◽  
Ramana Nanda ◽  
Matthew Rhodes-Kropf ◽  
Savitar Sundaresan
Keyword(s):  
Author(s):  
Ian Ayres ◽  
Colin Rowat ◽  
Nasser Zakariya

1997 ◽  
Vol 72 (Supplement 1) ◽  
pp. S72-S75 ◽  
Author(s):  
C L Elam ◽  
M M Johnson
Keyword(s):  

1972 ◽  
Vol 66 (1) ◽  
pp. 160-162 ◽  
Author(s):  
Thomas W. Casstevens

In legislative systems a bill is commonly considered and reported by an appropriate committee before it is considered on the floor of the house. Since motions on the floor frequently relate to such bills, it is often apposite to refer to a motion's relevant committee. This article presents a mathematical model of the relationship between the relevant committee's divisions on the floor and a motion's probability of passing. Let x be the proportion of the relevant committee voting yea on the floor, z be the proportion of the relevant committee voting nay on the floor, and y be the proportion of the relevant committee neither voting yea nor voting nay on the floor, then a motion's probability of passing is (x2 + y2)/(x2 + y2 + z2). The fit between theory and observation is quite good: six hundred eleven roll calls from the 90th and 91st Congresses have been analyzed; 0.628 of the motions actually passed; and 0.613 of the motions were expected to pass.


1997 ◽  
Vol 72 (10) ◽  
pp. S72???5
Author(s):  
C L Elam ◽  
M M Johnson
Keyword(s):  

1990 ◽  
Vol 84 (2) ◽  
pp. 417-438 ◽  
Author(s):  
John R. Wright

Lobbying efforts and campaign contributions from coalitions of groups are used to explain representatives' voting decisions within the U.S. House Ways and Means and Agriculture Committees. Information about which groups worked together on two controversial issues and which representatives they lobbied was obtained through personal interviews and a mail survey of professional lobbyists. The analysis reveals that committee-level voting, particularly in the Ways and Means Committee, is best explained by the total number of lobbying contacts representatives received from groups on each side of the issue. Campaign contributions proved somewhat useful for explaining groups' lobbying patterns; but it appears to be lobbying, not money, that shapes and reinforces representatives' policy decisions.


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