scholarly journals “Trump Tariffs”: To Establish an American-Style Multilateralism Model?

2019 ◽  
Vol 2 (2) ◽  
pp. p224
Author(s):  
Yikai WU

One of the goals of the world trade organization is to ensure free and fair trade around the world. Bound tariff rate and most-favored-nation treatment are two basic principles in WTO law, which should be applied and observed among WTO members. The implementation of “trump tariffs” has resulted in a “trade war between China and other countries”, which undoubtedly constitutes a violation of WTO principles, including violation of bound tariff rates and most-favored-nation treatment. At present, the United States is still one of the major setters of the world’s rules, and its every measure has an impact on the whole world. In addition to opposition from around the world, the trump administration’s move to impose tariffs has been criticized by most local economists and lawyers. To achieve fair and free trade, the trump administration should end the implementation of trump tariffs and fulfill its obligations in global multilateral trade and the WTO.

2019 ◽  
Vol 5 ◽  
pp. 1
Author(s):  
Salif Kone ◽  

The trade war, which antagonizes today the United States and China, questions the free trade principle in international trade. To show the dangerousness of this trade war for the world economy, this paper explores the theoretical limits of the comparative advantage principle by analyzing the limitations of the applicability of the comparative costs and endowments criteria. We conclude that the international trade theories not based on the comparative advantage principle are the exception to the rule and therefore, cannot be used to justify the American positions, except to introduce a certain degree of political considerations. Specifically, we show that the international trade theories, other than the Ricardian theory and the HOS factorial theory, are exceptions to the applicability of the comparative costs and endowments criteria. In light of this argument, one should seek explanations of the war-like trade logic of the Trump Administration in the international political economy. In this perspective, international trade is no longer necessarily a positive-sum game.


2018 ◽  
Vol 112 (3) ◽  
pp. 505-510

Trade tensions between the United States and China have escalated under the Trump administration. Some of this tension has resulted from the steel and aluminum tariffs imposed by the United States on most of its trading partners in the spring of 2018. Another major source of conflict relates to President Trump's concerns with China's perceived unfair practices in relation to intellectual property and technology rights. The Trump administration has addressed these concerns both by pursuing unilateral responses and seeking relief through the World Trade Organization (WTO).


Author(s):  
Özlem Toplu Yılmaz

This chapter analyzes the trade war between the United States of America and China. The United States of America and China are the two biggest trade leaders in the world. The United States supported China for its integration to world trade. The United States accused China of pursuing unfair trade policies. The United States increased tariffs against Chinese imports and China undertook retaliation measures against the United States' tariff increases. The two countries entered a period of a trade war and they started to implement protectionist policies on each other. These protectionist policies between the United States and China are seen as trade wars and could affect the world trade liberalization adversely. As they are trade partners too, it is better for both countries to end this war and to reach an agreement, because trade liberalization efforts could fail.


2021 ◽  
Vol 53 (4) ◽  
pp. 133-150
Author(s):  
Montej Abida ◽  
◽  
Ilhem Gargouri ◽  

Today we are witnessing a serious crisis that could lead to the collapse of the World Trade Organization (WTO). This crisis is the consequence of the uncooperative behavior of the triad: the United States, the European Union and East Asia. When there is a confrontation between these three most powerful regional blocs, there is inevitably a blockage and a destructive trade war similar to that of the 1930s. In these times of crisis, each country tries to save its economy by relying on the strategy of protectionism. The negotiation and regulatory functions of the WTO are paralyzed: the Dispute Settlement Body is seriously affected by the refusal of the United States, since 2016, to renew the members of the Appellate Body (AB) whose mandates were expiring. This jeopardizes international rules negotiated since 1947, when the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) was created. The existence of liberalization fatigue and a growing rejection of globalization raises questions about the future of the WTO.


2018 ◽  
Vol 14 (2) ◽  
pp. 439-449
Author(s):  
Ryszard ŁAWNICZAK

In March 2018, the newly elected President of the United States, Donald Trump, surprised the world by triggering a trade war with his largest trading partners. He announced that he would introduce 25% and 10% of customs tariffs on imports of steel and aluminium. Besides he threatened to impose duties on imports of European cars, as well as on the entire list of other products, as long as the trading partners do not stop unfair trading practices and will not reduce their own barriers to American products. In the article, the author tries to explain why protectionist measures of the American administration should be defined as "neo-protectionism", and why and if justly those protectionist steps President Trump justifies as a “threat to national security".


2017 ◽  
Vol 25 (1) ◽  
pp. 47-65
Author(s):  
Tapiwa V. Warikandwa ◽  
Patrick C. Osode

The incorporation of a trade-labour (standards) linkage into the multilateral trade regime of the World Trade Organisation (WTO) has been persistently opposed by developing countries, including those in Africa, on the grounds that it has the potential to weaken their competitive advantage. For that reason, low levels of compliance with core labour standards have been viewed as acceptable by African countries. However, with the impact of WTO agreements growing increasingly broader and deeper for the weaker and vulnerable economies of developing countries, the jurisprudence developed by the WTO Panels and Appellate Body regarding a trade-environment/public health linkage has the potential to address the concerns of developing countries regarding the potential negative effects of a trade-labour linkage. This article argues that the pertinent WTO Panel and Appellate Body decisions could advance the prospects of establishing a linkage of global trade participation to labour standards without any harm befalling developing countries.


Author(s):  
Simon Caney

In recent years, a number of powerful arguments have been given for thinking that there should be suprastate institutions, and that the current ones, such as the World Trade Organization (WTO), International Monetary Fund (IMF), World Bank, and United Nations Security Council, need to be radically reformed and new ones created. Two distinct kinds of argument have been advanced. One is instrumental and emphasizes the need for effective suprastate political institutions to realize some important substantive ideals (such as preventing dangerous climate change, eradicating poverty, promoting fair trade, and securing peace). The second is procedural and emphasizes the importance of political institutions that include all those subject to their power in as democratic a process as possible, and builds on this to call for democratically accountable international institutions. In this chapter, the author argues that the two approaches need not conflict, and that they can in fact lend support to each other.


2021 ◽  
Vol 115 (1) ◽  
pp. 120-124

On September 15, 2020, a World Trade Organization (WTO) panel ruled that certain tariffs the United States imposed on Chinese products violated Articles I (most-favored-nation) and II (tariff bindings) of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT). The panel rejected the U.S. attempt to invoke a “public morals” defense pursuant to GATT Article XX, holding that although countries receive substantial deference in defining “public morals,” the United States failed to prove that the tariffs were necessary to achieve its stated public morals objective.


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