Evaluating Proposed Remedies for Credit Rating Agency Failures

2014 ◽  
Vol 89 (4) ◽  
pp. 1399-1420 ◽  
Author(s):  
S. Jane Jollineau ◽  
Lloyd J. Tanlu ◽  
Amanda Winn
Keyword(s):  
Financial Crisis ◽  
Credit Rating ◽  
Credit Ratings ◽  
Quantitative Model ◽  
Securities And Exchange Commission ◽  
Data Availability ◽  
Rating Agencies ◽  
Credit Rating Agency ◽  
Rating Agency

ABSTRACT: Regulators and the financial press have criticized credit rating agencies (CRAs) for exacerbating the financial crisis by providing overly optimistic debt ratings. Allegedly, CRAs departed from their quantitative models in order to please security issuers with higher credit ratings. In response, the Dodd-Frank Act of 2010 required the Securities and Exchange Commission to conduct a study on alternative models for compensating CRAs. We conduct an experiment exploring how the credit ratings of M.B.A. students, who assume the role of credit rating analysts, are affected by two proposals for reform: (1) changing who pays the CRAs, and (2) requiring analysts to justify departures from a quantitative model. We find that credit ratings are highest when the borrower pays CRAs for ratings and a justification requirement is not in place. Implementing either proposed reform independently reduces credit ratings, but credit ratings are not further reduced when both reforms are implemented together. Data Availability: Data are available from the authors upon request.

Are Credit Ratings More Rigorous for Widely Covered Firms?

2018 ◽  
Vol 93 (6) ◽  
pp. 61-94 ◽  
Author(s):  
Samuel B. Bonsall ◽  
Jeremiah R. Green ◽  
Karl A. Muller
Keyword(s):  
Credit Rating ◽  
Credit Ratings ◽  
Economic Consequences ◽  
Data Availability ◽  
Press Coverage ◽  
Rating Agencies ◽  
Credit Rating Agency ◽  
Business Press ◽  
Market Participants ◽  
Reputational Costs

ABSTRACT We study how business press coverage can discipline credit rating agency actions. Because of their greater prominence and visibility to market participants, more widely covered firms can pose greater reputational costs for rating agencies. Consistent with rating agencies limiting such risk, we find that ratings for more widely covered firms are more timely and accurate, downgraded earlier and systematically lower in the year prior to default, and better predictors of default and non-default. We also find that the recent tightening of credit rating standards is largely explained by growing business press coverage of public debt issuers. Additionally, we find that credit rating agencies take explicit actions to improve their ratings by assigning better educated and more experienced analysts to widely covered firms. Moreover, we document that missed defaults of more visible firms create greater negative economic consequences for rating agencies, and that rating improvements following the financial crisis were greater for more visible firms. Data Availability: All data are publicly available from the sources identified in the text.

The impact of market sectors and rating agencies on credit ratings: global evidence

2019 ◽  
Vol 20 (5) ◽  
pp. 389-410
Author(s):  
Kerstin Lopatta ◽  
Magdalena Tchikov ◽  
Finn Marten Körner
Keyword(s):  
Credit Risk ◽  
Credit Rating ◽  
Credit Ratings ◽  
Content Type ◽  
Rating Agencies ◽  
Credit Rating Agency ◽  
Rating Agency ◽  
Investment Grade ◽  
The Impact ◽  
Rating Downgrades

Purpose A credit rating, as a single indicator on one consistent scale, is designed as an objective and comparable measure within a credit rating agency (CRA). While research focuses mainly on the comparability of ratings between agencies, this paper additionally questions empirically how CRAs meet their promise of providing a consistent assessment of credit risk for issuers within and between market segments of the same agency. Design/methodology/approach Exhaustive and robust regression analyses are run to assess the impact of market sectors and rating agencies on credit ratings. The examinations consider the rating level, as well as rating downgrades as a further measure of empirical credit risk. Data stems from a large global sample of Bloomberg ratings from 11 market sectors for the period 2010-2018. Findings The analyses show differing effects of sectors and agencies on issuer ratings and downgrade probabilities. Empirical results on credit ratings and rating downgrades can then be attributed to investment grade and non-investment grade ratings. Originality/value The paper contributes to current finance research and practice by examining the credit rating differences between sectors and agencies and providing assistance to investors and other stakeholders, as well as researchers, how issuers’ sector and rating agency affiliations act as relative metrics.

Credit Ratings Accuracy and Analyst Incentives

2011 ◽  
Vol 101 (3) ◽  
pp. 120-124 ◽  
Author(s):  
Heski Bar-Isaac ◽  
Joel Shapiro
Keyword(s):  
Financial Crisis ◽  
Credit Rating ◽  
Credit Ratings ◽  
Incentive Contracts ◽  
Revolving Door ◽  
Credit Rating Agencies ◽  
Bank Profitability ◽  
Rating Agencies ◽  
Rating Agency

The financial crisis has brought a new focus on the accuracy of credit rating agencies (CRAs). In this paper, we highlight the incentives of analysts at the CRAs to provide accurate ratings. We construct a model in which analysts initially work at a CRA and can then either remain or move to a bank. The CRA uses incentive contracts to motivate analysts, but does not capture the benefits if the analyst moves. We find that rating agency accuracy increases with CRA monitoring, bank profitability (a positive “revolving door” effect), and can be non-monotonic in the probability of an analyst leaving.

US rating agency reform to rest on enforcement

2016 ◽  
Keyword(s):  
Business Model ◽  
Global Economy ◽  
Annual Report ◽  
Credit Rating ◽  
Credit Ratings ◽  
Securities And Exchange Commission ◽  
Political Support ◽  
Political Debate ◽  
Content Type ◽  
Rating Agencies

Subject The latest annual report of the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) on credit ratings agencies (CRAs). Significance The latest annual report of the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) on credit rating agencies (CRAs) suggests that practices that contributed to the 2007-08 financial crisis persist, and that the prevailing CRA business model continues to incentivise high credit ratings rather than accurate ones. The underlying conflict of interest inherent in the prevailing CRA business model is well-recognised, but there is a lack of broad political support to address the problem. Impacts The report will increase pressure on the SEC to strengthen its CRA enforcement policy. The report is shaping the terms of political debate and providing fodder, especially for Democratic presidential candidate Bernie Sanders. Renewed financial market turbulence and strains in the global economy could provide fresh tests for CRAs.

scholarly journals Wpływ COVID-19 na nastawienie i credit ratingi krajów

2020 ◽  
Vol 8 (4) ◽  
pp. 535-564
Author(s):  
Patrycja Chodnicka-Jaworska
Keyword(s):  
Financial Crisis ◽  
Foreign Currency ◽  
Credit Rating ◽  
Credit Ratings ◽  
Short Term ◽  
Rating Agencies ◽  
Thomson Reuters ◽  
The Impact ◽  
The International Monetary Fund

Covid-19 Impact on Countires’ Outlooks and Credit Ratings The aim of the study is to examine the impact of the financial crisis caused by COVID-19 on chang­es in outlooks and credit ratings of major rating agencies. The research hypothesis was as follows: the financial crisis caused by COVID-19 negatively affected the change in outlooks and credit ratings of countries. The study used long-term and short-term credit ratings and outlooks collected from the Thomson Reuters / Refinitiv database regarding liabilities expressed in foreign currency and macroeconomic data from the International Monetary Fund databases, for 2010–2021. The analysis was carried out using ordered logit panel models. The presented results showed a weak significant im­pact of the COVID-19 pandemic on credit rating. The agency that changed its notes in connection with this situation is Standard & Poor’s (S&P). However, the attitude responded to the situation un­der investigation. During the crisis, country ratings have become less sensitive to growing debt, which may be dictated by widespread loosening of fiscal policy. The rate of GDP growth has a par­ticular impact during the COVID-19 period in the event of a change of outlook. Rising inflation is particularly dangerous in the age of pandemics. It may be related to monetary policy easing.

scholarly journals Empirical evolution of credit risk over a decade in IBEX. 35 companies and its relationship with the qualification of its ratings

2020 ◽  
Vol 16 (2) ◽  
pp. 61
Author(s):  
Josep Patau
Keyword(s):  
Credit Risk ◽  
Credit Rating ◽  
Clear Correlation ◽  
Crisis Period ◽  
Rating Agencies ◽  
Credit Rating Agency ◽  
Rating Agency ◽  
Determining Factors ◽  
Commercial Loans ◽  
The One

Object: The present work responds to two objectives. On the one hand, it describes the evolution of the main economic-financial indicators that influence credit risk (insolvency) for a sample of 10 Spanish companies listed on the IBEX 35. This analysis is studied for a comparative period of 10 years, which coincides with a pre-crisis stage (2002-2005) and an economic post-crisis phase (2012-2015). On the other hand, it corroborates the relationship between the analysed insolvency and the rating or credit-risk rating published for these companies by an internationally recognized credit rating agency, Standard & Poor's (S & P).Design / methodology: A sample of 10 companies and a 10-year period including the years 2002-2005 (pre-crisis) and the years 2012-2015 (post-crisis) are chosen, omitting the Spanish economic crisis that occurred in the year 2008. For the study of its evolution, 6 ratios obtained from the scientific literature that relate to credit risk and its effects on investments and company results are calculated. Finally, the correlations of these variables with the ratings of credit risk assessment by the rating agency S & P are measured. Descriptive statistics will assign value and graphics to this ten-year evolution, and with the incorporation of a factorial analysis, the correlation between the ratios and the S & P rating will be determined. The statistical analysis explains this correlation to a greater extent.Contributions / results: The results show a clear increase in the value of the impairment variable due to credit risk ten years later that directly affects the results of the companies, despite these companies having significantly reduced their investments in commercial loans pending collection and drastically reduced the period means of collection of clients. In turn, there is a clear correlation between the insolvency studied and the variables used by the S & P rating agency for the assessment of credit risk.Added value / conclusions: The empirical study concludes that there is a correspondence between insolvency and the rating given by an internationally prestigious rating agency (S & P) for the sample of 10 companies studied. Three variables – customer balance-accounts receivable, investments and the net amount of turnover – are determining factors explaining this correlation, and these three variables are the same ones that decisively influence both the pre-crisis period and the post-crisis period 10 years apart. The rating agencies weigh the insolvency variable in their analyses.

The Effectiveness of Credit Rating Agency Monitoring: Evidence from Asset Securitizations

2015 ◽  
Vol 90 (5) ◽  
pp. 1779-1810 ◽  
Author(s):  
Samuel Bonsall ◽  
Kevin Koharki ◽  
Monica Neamtiu
Keyword(s):  
Default Risk ◽  
Credit Rating ◽  
Balance Sheet ◽  
Rating Agencies ◽  
Credit Rating Agency ◽  
Rating Accuracy ◽  
Rating Agency ◽  
Debt Issuance ◽  
Current Exposure

ABSTRACT This study investigates how differences between the rating agencies' initial (at the date of debt issuance) and subsequent (post-issuance) monitoring incentives affect securitizing banks' rating accuracy. We hypothesize that the agencies have stronger incentives to monitor issuers when providing initial versus post-issuance ratings. We document that initial ratings are positively associated with off-balance sheet securitized assets and incrementally associated with on-balance sheet retained securities. However, subsequent ratings fail to capture current exposure to off-balance sheet securitizations. We also find that subsequent ratings reflect default risk less accurately than initial ratings. The subsequent ratings' responsiveness to default risk is worse when a bank has more off-balance sheet securitized assets. Collectively, our findings are consistent with lax post-issuance monitoring. They raise questions about the effectiveness of using ratings as an ongoing contracting mechanism and suggest that conclusions about rating accuracy could differ depending on whether researchers focus on initial versus post-issuance ratings.

The Regulatory Role of Credit Ratings and Voluntary Disclosure

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Riddha Basu ◽  
James P. Naughton ◽  
Clare Wang
Keyword(s):  
Voluntary Disclosure ◽  
Credit Rating ◽  
Credit Ratings ◽  
Regulatory Role ◽  
Rating Agencies ◽  
Corporate Credit ◽  
Quasi Experimental ◽  
Rating Changes ◽  
Corporate Credit Rating

We find that corporate credit rating changes have an effect on firms' voluntary disclosure behavior that is independent of the information they convey about firm fundamentals. Our analyses exploit two separate quasi-experimental settings that generate either exogenous credit rating downgrades or credit rating upgrades (i.e., credit rating label changes). We find evidence of a negative relation between the direction of the credit rating label change and the provision of voluntary disclosure in both settings-firms respond to exogenous downgrades by increasing voluntary disclosure and to exogenous upgrades by decreasing voluntary disclosure. The effects we document are attributable to the regulatory role rather than the information role of credit ratings. Overall, our analyses indicate that credit rating agencies as gatekeepers influence firms' provision of voluntary disclosure.

The Existing and Proposed Credit Rating Agency (CRA) Business Models and Compensation Models Are Inefficient

2021 ◽  
pp. 211-251
Keyword(s):  
Capital Markets ◽  
Conflict Of Interest ◽  
Business Models ◽  
Credit Rating ◽  
Global Financial Crisis ◽  
Credit Ratings ◽  
Critical Role ◽  
Credit Rating Agency ◽  
Rating Agency ◽  
The Global Financial Crisis

Credit ratings agencies (CRAs) are prone to various antitrust and conflict-of-interest problems that arise from their regulation and their business and compensation models. CRAs have played a critical role in global capital markets for the last few decades, and the inefficiencies inherent in the compensation contracts, and business models of CRAs were clearly illustrated during the Global Financial Crisis of 2007-2011, during which ABS trusts and some large companies suddenly defaulted without prior downgrades of their ratings – it's well known that markets often price in potential defaults or down-grades before CRAs revise their ratings downwards. This chapter explores the inefficiencies of the existing and proposed CRA business models and compensation models.

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