當代生命倫理學危機的根源及解決方案——David Solomon文章評析

Author(s):  
Ruipeng LEI

LANGUAGE NOTE | Document text in Chinese; abstract in English only.David Solomon proposes in his article that deep divisions in our culture, which are reflected in the variety and opposition of foundational normative theories, are key to understanding the contemporary crisis in bioethics. Solomon examines two recent attempts to respond to this crisis of authority in bioethics and suggest that both proposals make the situation worse. However, his criticism of principlism, which has been dominant in bioethics since the 1980s, seems implausible. As observed by Aristotle, the rationale of a principle-based approach lies in the tensions between generality, considered judgment and ethical deliberation. The principle-based approach to meta-ethics is characterized as a dialectic between moral principles and considered judgment, which is analogous to Rawls’s concept of reflective equilibrium. The four principles formulated by Beauchamp and Childress are prima-facie binding, but subject to specification and balancing. It is possible for us to overcome these deep foundational disagreements in normative ethics by emphasizing the foundational principle held by the ancient Greeks; that is, our natural desire to live a good life.DOWNLOAD HISTORY | This article has been downloaded 41 times in Digital Commons before migrating into this platform.

2021 ◽  
pp. 213-232
Author(s):  
Brad Hooker

This paper starts by juxtaposing the normative ethics in the final part of Parfit’s final book, On What Matters, volume iii (2017), with the normative ethics in his earlier books, Reasons and Persons (1984) and On What Matters, volume i (2011). The paper then addresses three questions. The first is, where does the reflective-equilibrium methodology that Parfit endorsed in the first volume of On What Matters lead? The second is, is the Act-involving Act Consequentialism that Parfit considers in the final volume of On What Matters as plausible as Rossian deontology? The third is, how is the new argument that Parfit puts forward for Rule Consequentialism supposed to work?


2021 ◽  
pp. 37-50
Author(s):  
Jonathan Dancy

This paper follows a path that takes us from utilitarianism to particularism. Utilitarianism is the leading one-principle theory; its falsehood is here simply asserted. W. D. Ross’s theory of prima facie duty is offered as the strongest many-principle theory. Ross’s two accounts of his notion of a prima facie duty are considered and criticized. But the real criticism of his view is that being a prima facie duty is a context-sensitive notion, since a feature that is a prima facie duty-making feature in one case may be prevented from playing that role in another. Since the strongest many-principle theory is therefore false, the only conclusion is a no-principle theory: a theory that allows moral reasons but does not suppose that they behave in the regular way required for there to be moral principles—namely, moral particularism.


1989 ◽  
Vol 23 (2-3) ◽  
pp. 141-145 ◽  
Author(s):  
Miriam Gur-Arye

This issue of the Israel Law Review is devoted to a written academic symposium on the Report of the Commission of Inquiry into the Methods of Investigation of the General Security Service (GSS) Regarding Hostile Terrorist Activity (the “Landau Report”). The Commission was established in May, 1987 to investigate GSS interrogation practices and to reach legal conclusions concerning them. The need to establish the Commission followed revelations of activity within the GSS which was prima facie unlawful.The Report discusses a dilemma fundamental to any democratic state forced to cope with hostile terrorist activity (HTA): the dilemma “between the vital need to preserve the very existence of the State and its citizens, and [the need] to maintain its character as a law-abiding State which believes in basic moral principles” (R., 77). The only solution to that dilemma, according to the Report, requires that the “law itself … ensure a proper framework for the activity of the GSS regarding Hostile Terrorist Activity” (R., 79).


2019 ◽  
Vol 56 (2) ◽  
pp. 151-166
Author(s):  
Johnnie R.R. Pedersen ◽  

This paper discusses a challenge to normative ethics motivated by experimental philosophy. Experimental philosophers object to the perceived “armchair” or a priori nature of philosophy, claiming it should rather be empirical or naturalistic. The paper investigates the application of this claim to normative ethics. Dubbing the application of the experimental philosophers’ contention to normative ethics “the Armchair Claim,” I distinguish descriptive and normative versions of this challenge, and consider their merits as comments on the method of normative ethics (descriptive versions), and as comments on how normative ethics should be done (normative versions). Characterizing normative ethics as essentially involving the use of the method of reflective equilibrium, I show how the versions of the Armchair Claim that I distinguish either misconstrue normative ethics, or are committed to metaethical views that are controversial. To bring home the latter point, I contrast two meta-ethical positions, and show how, on one such view, naturalism, the descriptive version could be correct, whereas on another, intuitionism, it would be false. The normative version, in turn, is consistent with naturalism, but begs the question against the intuitionist since she argues that normative ethics cannot be empirical. The upshot is that a conclusive assessment of the Armchair Claim will have to await the resolution of disputed issues in meta-ethics. However, normative ethicists can get on with their work since reflective equilibrium is unaffected by such debates.


1998 ◽  
Vol 7 (4) ◽  
pp. 405-413 ◽  
Author(s):  
Christopher Tollefsen

In a recent article Thomas May has argued that the use of advance directives (ADs) to respect a no longer competent patient's autonomy is a failed strategy. Respect for patient autonomy is clearly one of the guiding moral principles of modern medicine, and its importance is reflected in medical emphasis on informed consent. Prima facie, at least, ADs seem likewise to respect patient autonomy by allowing patients to make decisions about treatment in advance of situations in which the patient may no longer be able to specify the form of treatment desired. So a claim that ADs do not extend patient autonomy to these situations of diminished competence represents a serious criticism of our understanding not only of advance directives, but of autonomy as well.


1979 ◽  
Vol 1 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Ernst Tugendbat

AbstractIn the first part of the paper Rawls’ conception of a ,reflective equilibrium" with our „considered moral judgements“ is criticized. Moral judgements cannot form a court of appeal for the justification of moral principles, since they are themselves in need of justification. An analysis of the meaning of the sentences in which moral judgements are expressed is called for in order to establish their method of justification.In the second part of the paper the consequence which Rawls' repudiation of semantic analysis has had for his conception of the „original position“ is discussed. In retrogressive extension of his four-stage-sequence a zero-stage is postulated which represents the moral point of view. At this stage the reasons would have to be given for adopting the original position and for conceiving it with just those characteristics that Rawls has assumed. Only thus can the advantages and disadvantages of these characteristics be analytically assessed.


Author(s):  
Stephen Finlay

A tripartite distinction is often drawn in moral philosophy between (i) applied ethics, (ii) normative ethical theory, and (iii) metaethics. Applied ethics seeks answers to moral questions about specific practices like abortion, euthanasia and business, while normative ethics seeks abstract moral principles that apply generally. We can loosely define metaethics as seeking answers to questions about normative ethics. It does not, at least directly, seek answers to moral or normative questions about (e.g.) which acts are right, what things are good, or how we ought to live our lives; instead it asks a variety of nonmoral questions about morality. While it is sometimes claimed that metaethics is morally neutral in the sense that it leaves normative questions open, metaethical theories can have normative implications, and it is sometimes argued that they all do. Since there is in principle no limit to the kinds of nonmoral questions one might ask about morality, there is no limit to the possible kinds of metaethical questions other than their relation to the subject of morality. One central kind of question is semantic, concerning the meaning of moral language. For example, what do we mean by saying that something is ‘right’ or ‘good’? Another central kind of question is metaphysical. For example, what kind of property is moral goodness, and does such a thing exist? A third central kind of question is epistemological, concerning how we might come to know moral truths. Some of the many other kinds of metaethical questions are psychological (concerned with the mental attitudes we call ‘moral judgments’ and how they motivate us to action), logical (concerning the inferences we can legitimately draw between different moral claims), sociobiological (concerning how humans may have evolved as beings with a moral sense), and – although it may blur the distinction between metaethics and normative ethics – normative (concerning the rational justification for acting morally). The boundaries of metaethics are vague. For example, just as normative ethics on a broader conception concerns itself not merely with morality narrowly construed but with all practical or normative questions about how to act, choose and live, so too metaethics on a broader conception asks nonnormative questions about normativity more generally.


2015 ◽  
Vol 66 (1) ◽  
pp. 75-87 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jerzy Kosiewicz

AbstractIn reference to the monograph entitled “Sports and Ethics: Philosophical Studies”, published in the “Physical Culture and Sport. Studies and Research” quarterly (2014, vol. 62), and in particular in reference to the paper entitled “The Normative Ethics and Sport” (Kosiewicz, 2014, pp. 5-22), the article presents new and at the same time supplementary views on the relationships between sports and normative ethics. The main objective of the paper is to provide a rationale as to why these relationships may be viewed in the context of the assumptions of ethical pluralism, ethical relativism, ethical panthareism, and axionormative negationism.The text is of a strictly cognitive and extra-ideological nature and it attempts to avoid moral valuation, moralism, and moralizing. The view it postulates is also labeled as ethical negationism, which rejects the necessity for external support and enhancement of sports rivalry rules with moral principles. It assumes that regulations, book rules, and game rules as well as the principles of sports rivalry ought to be of an entirely amoral character, independent of ethics.The article suggests minimizing the impact of moral postulates on sport. It postulates a need for widespread propagation of this point of view in competitive, professional, spectator, and Olympic sport disciplines, as well as in top-level sports or elite sports. The views presented in the paper point to the need to separate normative ethics from sports as far as it is at all possible in contemporary sports indoctrinated with obligations or attitudes of a moral tenor. This is because normative ethics – according to the author - is relative ethics, depending on an unlimited number of variables, e.g., various social contexts or individual points of view.The text engages in a polemic with colloquial and evaluative opinions of those sports fans who by all means strive to bolster its formal, functional, and axiological status. A significant part of them erroneously attributes sports to an extraordinary moral mission related to promoting an intuitively understood good with a religious and extra-confessional tenor.


Author(s):  
Jianguang WANG

LANGUAGE NOTE | Document text in Chinese; abstract also in English.隨著現代科學技術的發展,生命技術已經將人與技術的傳統物化關係和對象化的二元關係變成了一種“技術人”的關係。這種技術人一方面豐富了傳統的“人”的生物學屬性,另一方面也挑戰著人的社會角色和道德的主體屬性。生命的傳統價值內涵及其歷史主體性地位也因之受到弱化、虛化或被改寫。這不僅影響到人的生存方式,而且道德行為的虛幻化也侵蝕了人的責任和義務的道德基石,模糊了人的法律責任和道德自律性。在此基礎上,使人應當承擔的道義責任變成了一種可以進行技術性解讀的智識化命題。這種因技術而改寫的生命形象也挑戰著傳統的應用倫理原則。中國生命倫理學的建設,不應脫離中國歷史文化的語境和社會現實,並在此基礎上對現代生命技術和技術生命的倫理內涵進行創造性的解讀。它要反映中國文化在新的技術作用下對“人”的內涵進行的一種倫理模式的檢討。這種解讀也應當重視那種從當下的“百姓日用”的角度進行的道用之思。這種道用之思不僅要堅持道用一致、體用相即的原則,更是要植根於中國文化的人生觀、價值觀中,以體現出對現代技術與人的關係的倫理把握。在某種意義上,人類社會倫理的發展史就是不斷地否定和放棄一些舊道德而接受和適應新道德及其標準的過程。因此,中國生命倫理學的建構也就必須重視生命倫理內涵和標準的發展性。Biotechnology is a field of applied biology that involves the use of living organisms and bioprocesses in areas such as engineering, technology, and medicine. This paper discusses the relationship between the Dao (i.e., the essence) of biotechnology and the function of biotechnology. In describing the situation in China today with regard to the exploration and development of biotechnology, this paper explicates the necessity of paying attention to the ethical implications and moral principles of science and technology. It is the author’s contention that we must put “humanity” and “human flourishing” (i.e., the common good of the Dao) first before we talk about the utility of science and technology. As China tries to catch up with the world in biotechnological technology such as stem cell research, xenotransplantation, regenerative medicine, and the use of genetically modified organisms, we need to be careful not to overstep our ethical boundaries.DOWNLOAD HISTORY | This article has been downloaded 49 times in Digital Commons before migrating into this platform.


Author(s):  
Li LIANG

LANGUAGE NOTE | Document text in Chinese; abstract also in English.以患者利益為重被視為醫學的傳統美德,也是醫生的職責。它的基本宗旨是將患者的利益放在首位。當醫生的利益不受其他因素干擾時,他們較能承擔“患者利益至上”這一責任。而當出現利益衝突時,醫生則會面臨特殊的挑戰,有時還有可能需要做出一定的自我犧牲。西方醫學倫理在強調醫師職業道德的同時也通過制度建設盡量避免利益衝突的發生,以更好維護患者和醫生雙方的利益。中國傳統醫學倫理中,“患者利益至上”雖然沒有作為具體道德原則予以規定,但在醫療實踐中卻常常可以體現出醫生“患者利益至上”的情懷。之所以如此,與儒家文化的影響密不可分。儒家“仁”的思想強調愛人,提出對待病人要“皆如至親之想”。儒家將愛親的情感擴展到病人身上,同時也將“博施於民而能濟眾”視為自己高尚的道德追求。在義利關係問題上,儒家提出了獲取利益的正當性問題,即“不以其道得之,不處也”。醫生受其影響,反對“恃己所長,專心經略財物”,強調維護病人健康利益的重要性。另一方面,儒家修身的實踐精神有助於“仁”、“義”等從一種自然情感上升為真正意義上的道德德性,而古代重視家庭親情的傳統對於醫生的品德修養也起到了重要作用。醫生在修德的同時注重自身專業技能的訓練和提高,良好品德和精湛的技藝為維護患者的利益提供了重要條件。目前,患者利益至上的職業精神正面臨著經濟、政治、科技等多方面的挑戰,中國傳統文化缺失帶來的個體道德情感的弱化使這一問題更為突出。The doctor-patient relationship in China is currently experiencing a crisis of trust brought on by the absence of traditional morals and values in healthcare. The Confucian doctrine of ren (benevolence) is based on the possibility of moral perfection in humanity, which in turn guides one how to treat others in family and non-family social relationships. Ren as a relational virtue is particularly important for the doctor-patient relationship. That is why the Confucian idea of “treating a patient like a family member” was popular in traditional medical practice. However, current medical practice is designed around the people who deliver the care, who happen to pay more attention to their own interests and benefits than those of their patients.The essay contends that although Confucian teaching does not exclude the pursuit of self-interest or self-benefit, it does emphasize virtue and personal character, especially for doctors. No doctor is expected to make a profit that is not within the scope of moral principles, even in a resource-constrained setting. It is thus time to realign the values of the Chinese healthcare system based on Confucian virtues so that the patient is again the center of attention. The essay puts forward suggestions for medical professionals to discipline themselves by ensuring good professional and interpersonal skills.DOWNLOAD HISTORY | This article has been downloaded 228 times in Digital Commons before migrating into this platform.


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