Ethical Particularism and Morally Relevant Properties

This paper follows a path that takes us from utilitarianism to particularism. Utilitarianism is the leading one-principle theory; its falsehood is here simply asserted. W. D. Ross’s theory of prima facie duty is offered as the strongest many-principle theory. Ross’s two accounts of his notion of a prima facie duty are considered and criticized. But the real criticism of his view is that being a prima facie duty is a context-sensitive notion, since a feature that is a prima facie duty-making feature in one case may be prevented from playing that role in another. Since the strongest many-principle theory is therefore false, the only conclusion is a no-principle theory: a theory that allows moral reasons but does not suppose that they behave in the regular way required for there to be moral principles—namely, moral particularism.

Necessity, Universality, and the A Priori in Ethics

This paper asks what form of moral epistemology is best fitted to the claims of moral particularism. It argues that moral truths can be known a priori even though moral truths about particular cases are context-sensitive and so contingent. The general idea is that although one needs empirical knowledge of the situation, one’s knowledge of how to respond is not thereby shown to be empirical. We emerge with synthetic a priori knowledge of a range of truths including among them the moral. Particular attention is paid to Kant’s claim that since moral truths apply to all rational beings, they must be universal in form

A Particularist but Codifiable Virtue Ethics

Moral particularism of the kind developed by Jonathan Dancy is treated as a topic in meta-ethics. Until it is applied to a suitable type of normative theory criticisms which have assailed it are difficult to rebut. This chapter aims to apply Dancy’s particularism to target centred virtue ethics, showing how many of these criticisms are off the mark. At the core of these criticisms is that of uncodifiability. Virtue ethics is held to be codifiable through the virtue rules which encode virtue-reasons for action, reasons which are argued to be particularist in Dancy’s sense. That is it is possible even for reasons expressed through the thick virtue concepts to switch valence. In the course of the argument a virtue ethical view of right action (the target-centred view) is further developed.

Epilogue

This chapter reviews the abstract reflection on the philosophical foundations of democratic state authority and the more mundane details of administrative decision that make their contextual bases. It covers a set of theoretical spaces that range from Kantian universalism to moral particularism, from conceptual analysis to the interpretation of legal doctrines, and from political philosophy to organizational theory. It also discusses the principle of politics that is drawn from experiential cognition of human beings, which have in view the mechanism for administering right and how it can be managed appropriately. The chapter analyses the claim that neoliberalism, of which the privatization of governance is a signature feature, is haunted by an internal and irresolvable contradiction between ideology and practice. It explores neoliberalism as an ideology that promises a free world where individuals or entrepreneurs can fully realize and express their independent selves through free and competitive markets.

Moral Integrity

This article outlines different attempts to define integrity, and argues, with reference to the theory of moral particularism, that definitions acquire universal applicability at the expense of their informative value. The article then proceeds to more delimitating definitions that emphasise the social aspect, and argues that their ideas of the concept, like courage, require certain situations in order to unfold. Since not every person is challenged to act with integrity, the delimitation requires a distinction between manifest integrity and dormant integrity, or dormant lack of integrity. Persons of influence, like politicians and managers, on the other hand, are challenged on a regular basis because their position requires communication of values in a public space, against which the public can evaluate their actions. A delimitating definition therefore ties the question of integrity to people in leading positions.

Moral particularism

Moral particularism is a broad set of views which play down the role of general moral principles in moral philosophy and practice. Particularists stress the role of examples in moral education and of moral sensitivity or judgment in moral decision-making, as well as criticizing moral theories which advocate or rest upon general principles. It has not yet been demonstrated that particularism constitutes an importantly controversial position in moral philosophy.