scholarly journals The Economic Crisis of 2008 and the Financial System Supervision: Towards an European Banking Union

2018 ◽  
Vol 24 (2) ◽  
pp. 45-56
Author(s):  
Evaggelia Kolovou ◽  
Grigorios Gikas ◽  
Kostantinos Kyritsis
Keyword(s):  
Banking System ◽  
Capital Requirements ◽  
Regulatory Framework ◽  
Banking Union ◽  
International Banking ◽  
Risk Capital ◽  
Prudential Supervision ◽  
European Banking Union ◽  
European Banking ◽  
The Impact

The significant repercussions of the recent crisis in the financial sector and the real economy have led to the development of policies aimed at strengthening the stability of the international banking system. Banking regulatory reforms (Basel III) improve micro-prudential supervision and involve macro-prudential supervision to avoid systemic risk. Capital requirements are tightening up and the quality of core capital is upgraded in order to provide greater coverage of losses and better risk management. In addition, a new framework for liquidity risk is introduced, as well as a complementary tool for limiting leverage. Recently, an agreement was reached in the EU to establish a Banking Union in the Eurozone, based on uniform regulation, supervision, bank clearing and deposit protection mechanisms. This framework includes a common banking capital for bank consolidation, which aims to reduce the impact on savers. This study aims to analyse the banking sector's activities and the constituent elements of the existing regulatory framework, particularly those involved in the causes of the financial crisis. It also aims to present the dimensions of the new regulatory framework for joint supervision leading to the European Banking Union and to analyse the pillars that form it, even though they are still in progress. The analysis will also build on the experiences from the recent crisis, in order to reach clear conclusions about the necessity and role of the Banking Union.

scholarly journals The impact of the European Banking Union’s Single Supervisory Mechanism on corporate governance practices in European banks

2018 ◽  
Vol 13 (2) ◽  
pp. 164-177 ◽  
Author(s):  
Udo Braendle
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Governance ◽  
Banking System ◽  
Banking Union ◽  
Single Supervisory Mechanism ◽  
European Banking Union ◽  
Regulatory Changes ◽  
Governance Practices ◽  
European Banking ◽  
European Banks ◽  
The Impact

Weak corporate governance in financial institutions has been a contributing factor of the financial crisis. The topic has, therefore, become the key priorities of banking supervision, because one of the takeaways was that. The article gives an overview about the newly established European Banking Union and about its structure focusing on the first pillar, the Single Supervisory Mechanism (SSM). In a second step, the focus is laid on the recent regulatory changes regarding corporate governance, the related supervisory practice and implications for European banks. Overall, the conducted changes in the regulatory framework, especially regarding corporate governance, seem to meet the objective of ensuring safety and soundness of the European banking system. Room for improvement is found regarding proportionality and transparency of the supervisory practices as well as its influence on banks’ profitability.

scholarly journals European Banking Union: the Impact on Financial Stability

2018 ◽  
Vol 18 (4) ◽  
pp. 123-135
Author(s):  
Cornelia Sahling ◽  
◽  
Nikolai Gusakov
Keyword(s):  
Financial Stability ◽  
Banking Union ◽  
European Banking Union ◽  
European Banking ◽  
The Impact

Justice system and corruption dog Bulgaria’s euro bid

2019 ◽  
Keyword(s):  
Banking System ◽  
Political Support ◽  
Banking Union ◽  
Waiting Room ◽  
Content Type ◽  
Eu Member States ◽  
European Banking Union ◽  
Finance Minister ◽  
European Banking ◽  
The Stability

Significance Bulgaria must also join the European Banking Union (EBU) as part of its Exchange Rate Mechanism (ERM) II bid, in order to alleviate concerns over institutional governance, economic convergence and the stability of its banking system. ERM II accession -- the ‘waiting room to the euro’ -- would bolster Bulgaria’s financial and monetary stability, and help serve as a policy anchor; Bulgaria had hoped to join this month, but Finance Minister Vladislav Goranov said in June he now hoped for entry by year-end if not before. Impacts Timing will depend on Bulgaria’s meeting the new requirement to join both ERM II and the EBU at the same time. Political support from other euro-area states could also affect the ultimate timeline. That Croatia has just applied for ERM II shows adopting the euro is still a goal, particularly for smaller EU member states.

scholarly journals European Banking Union and bank risk disclosure: the effects of the Single Supervisory Mechanism

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Yener Altunbaş ◽  
Salvatore Polizzi ◽  
Enzo Scannella ◽  
John Thornton
Keyword(s):  
Bank Risk ◽  
Banking Union ◽  
Risk Disclosure ◽  
Exogenous Shock ◽  
Bank Supervision ◽  
Single Supervisory Mechanism ◽  
European Banking Union ◽  
European Banking ◽  
Bank Disclosure ◽  
The Impact

AbstractThis paper provides evidence on the impact of European Banking Union (BU) and the associated Single Supervisory Mechanism (SSM) on the risk disclosure practices of European banks. The onset of BU and the associated rules are considered as an exogenous shock that provides the setting for a natural experiment to analyze the effects of the new supervisory arrangements on bank risk disclosure practices. A Difference-in-Differences approach is adopted, building evidence from the disclosure practices of systemically important banks supervised by the European Central Bank (ECB) and other banks supervised by national regulators over the period 2012–2017. The main findings are that bank risk disclosure increased overall following BU but there was a weakening of disclosure by SSM-supervised banks relative to banks supervised by national authorities. We also find that the overall positive effect of the BU on bank disclosure is stronger for less profitable banks and in the most troubled economies of the Eurozone (GIPSI countries), while the negative effect on centrally supervised banks is stronger if bank CEOs act also as chairmen (CEO duality). We interpret these findings in light of the fact that the new institutional arrangements for bank supervision under which the ECB relies on local supervisors to collect the information necessary to act gives rise to inefficiencies with respect to the speed and completeness of the information flow between SSM supervised banks and the ECB, which are reflected in bank disclosure practices.

scholarly journals The missing European Deposit Insurance Scheme

2020 ◽  
pp. 151
Author(s):  
Pery Bazoti
Keyword(s):  
Euro Area ◽  
Deposit Insurance ◽  
Banking System ◽  
Banking Union ◽  
The European Union ◽  
Risk Minimization ◽  
Insurance Scheme ◽  
European Banking Union ◽  
European Banking

The European Banking Union embarked as a highly ambitious project of the European Union as a response to the signifi cant fl aws and weaknesses in the original architecture of the European Monetary Union that became apparent during the economic crisis. However, the establishment of a single European banking system has stumbled upon the creation of a common deposit insurance scheme that could safeguard depositors and create a more stable fi nancial framework in the euro area. The European Deposit Insurance Scheme (EDIS) was fi rstly introduced by the European Commission in 2015. As a bold proposal that comprises wide risk mutualization among the euro area member states, it has spurred a vivid discussion in the European public speech and many proposals have been made since then altering its original planning in an effort to tackle the moral hazard concerns that have risen. The present article, after discussing the reasons that keep obstructing EDIS, presents these suggestions that move around, primarily, the role of the national deposit guarantee schemes. However, as highlighted in the article, before moving to any alterations on the structure and role of a proposed common deposit insurance scheme, signifi cant risk minimization on behalf of the national banking systems, must precede by limiting the sovereign exposures of banks and the size of the Non-Performing Loans. Such steps of risk minimization are critical for addressing concerns and the political unwillingness demonstrated by several European countries in moving forward towards deeper integration.

scholarly journals Evaluating the changes in the European Banking Regulation – MiFID and its possible effects on the Global Economy: A Theoretical Study

2019 ◽  
Vol 3 (4) ◽  
pp. 24-31 ◽  
Author(s):  
S.T. Islam ◽  
M.Y.H. Khan
Keyword(s):  
Financial Crisis ◽  
Financial Management ◽  
Financial Stability ◽  
Global Economy ◽  
Banking System ◽  
Banking Regulation ◽  
Regulatory Framework ◽  
Financial Investment ◽  
European Banking ◽  
The Impact

Banking regulation plays an important role in the process of ensuring financial stability, the national economy, equitable distribution of wealth and the most efficient use of financial resources. As a key regulatory tool, Banking Regulation monitors and monitors financial transactions to improve their profitability and efficiency. The author points out that the main areas of banking regulation and supervision are to control the processes of formation, operation and liquidation of commercial banks. The article focuses on the fact that the 2008 financial crisis has become a motivating driver for reforms in the banking system of Europe and America. The main purpose of the article is to assess the impact of changes in the European Banking System, in particular in the context of the study of the features of the Financial Markets Directive, on the functioning of the global economy. This paper provides a critical review of the literature from the point of view of analyzing the specificity of MiFID II in the context of its impact on the economic aspects of the country’s development. The implementation of the Directive requires significant financial investment, but these costs will pay off given the fact that MiFID II is well-designed and aimed at providing more secure protection and greater customer base stability. However, the author points out the underdevelopment and inconsistency of the regulatory framework, which is of greater concern than the cost of implementing MiFID II. Thus, the idea of the likelihood of financial and economic problems in the process of influence of banking regulation on the development of the global economy is substantiated. Notwithstanding these shortcomings, the regulatory framework for the formulation and implementation of the Directive is a significant contribution to the regulation of the financial sector. The results of the study represent scientific and practical value for academics, politicians, banking financial management of economic entities, stakeholders to better prepare and evaluate future changes as a result of reforming banking regulation. Keywords: Directives, Economic growth, Financial crisis, MiFID, Regulation.

Banking Overleveraging and Macro Instability: A Model and VSTAR Estimations

2016 ◽  
Vol 236 (6) ◽  
Author(s):  
Frauke Schleer ◽  
Willi Semmler
Keyword(s):  
Financial Crisis ◽  
Banking Sector ◽  
Capital Requirements ◽  
Banking Union ◽  
Star Model ◽  
European Banking Union ◽  
Regulatory Policies ◽  
European Banking ◽  
The Difference ◽  
Run Up

Abstract:Overleveraging of the banking sector has been considered one of the main causes of the 2007–09 financial crisis and the subsequent great recession. It was also of major concern for the subsequent BIS regulatory policies resulting in Basel III and its request for higher capital requirements. It has now become highly relevant for the planned European banking union. Overleveraging of the banking sector exposes the financial sector and the macroeconomy to vulnerabilities, but also, as critics state, seems to constrain credit flows to the private sector. We present here a measure of overleveraging, defined as the difference between actual and sustainable debt, conduct an empirical study on overleveraging for 40 banks in Europe, and study the vulnerabilities and credit contractions that can arise subsequently. Before the year 2004 overleveraging had not been a serious problem as leverage was on a sustainable level. However, in the run-up to the financial crisis, actual and optimal debt spread apart and the banking sector began to suffer from overleveraging. We use a non-linear Vector STAR model to evaluate the hypothesis that periods of increasing debt levels are accompanied by more severe credit constraints than periods of low leveraging. We demonstrate this for country groups across Europe.

scholarly journals Zehn Jahre nach Ausbruch der Finanzkrise – viel erreicht, noch viel zu tun

2018 ◽  
Vol 87 (3) ◽  
pp. 9-25
Author(s):  
Felix Rutkowski ◽  
Alexander Schäfer ◽  
Isabel Schnabel
Keyword(s):  
Banking Sector ◽  
Global Financial Crisis ◽  
Financial System ◽  
Banking Regulation ◽  
Capital Requirements ◽  
Banking Union ◽  
European Banking Union ◽  
Regulation And Supervision ◽  
European Banking ◽  
The Global Financial Crisis

Zusammenfassung: Die globale Finanzkrise und die Krise im Euroraum offenbarten deutliche Schwächen in der Bankenregulierung und -aufsicht. Drei wesentliche Reformstränge sollen das Finanzsystem stärken: die Erhöhung der Eigenkapitalanforderungen für Banken, die Gründung der Europäischen Bankenunion und die Einführung einer makroprudenziellen Regulierung und Aufsicht. Diese Reformen stellen zwar erhebliche Fortschritte dar, sie reichen jedoch nicht aus. Die Eigenkapitalanforderungen sollten vor allem für große Banken stärker erhöht werden. Um den Staaten-Banken-Nexus zu durchbrechen, sollten die Privilegierung von Staatsanleihen in der Bankenregulierung beendet und die Glaubwürdigkeit des Abwicklungsregimes erhöht werden. Eine wirksame makroprudenzielle Aufsicht erfordert eine Ausweitung des Instrumentenkastens sowieeine stärkere Berücksichtigung von Finanzinstitutionen außerhalb des Bankensektors. Rufen nach einer Deregulierung im Finanzsystem ist eine Absage zu erteilen. Summary: The global financial crisis and the euro area crisis revealed clear weaknesses in banking regulation and supervision. Three major reform strands shall strengthen the financial system: an increase in capital requirements for banks, the establishment of the European Banking Union, and the introduction of macroprudential regulation and supervision. While these reforms are significant advances, they are not sufficient. Capital requirements should be increased more, especially for large banks. To break the sovereign-bank nexus, the regulatory privileges for sovereign exposures of banks should be removed and the credibility of the bank resolution regime should be fostered. An effective macroprudential supervision requires an expanded toolkit and an additional focus on financial institutions beyond the banking sector. Calls for deregulation in the financial system should be rejected.

Discretionary Accruals in Italian Private Firms and Non-Linear Bank Loan Granting

2017 ◽  
pp. 83-99
Author(s):  
Elisabetta Mafrolla ◽  
Viola Nobili
Keyword(s):  
Financial Reporting ◽  
Banking System ◽  
Regulatory System ◽  
Discretionary Accruals ◽  
Bank Loans ◽  
Bank Loan ◽  
Banking Union ◽  
Private Firms ◽  
European Banking Union

This paper investigates whether and at what extent private firms reduce the quality of their accruals in order to signal a better portrait to the bank and obtain new or larger bank loans. We measure earnings discretionary accruals of a sample of Italian private firms, testing whether new and larger bank loans are associated with a higher (lower) quality of earnings in borrowers' financial reporting. We study bank loan levels and changes and how they impact discretionary accruals and found that, surprisingly, private firms' discretionary accruals are systematically positively affected by an increase in bank loans, although they are negatively affected by the credit worthiness rating assigned to the borrowers. We find that the monitoring role of the banking system with regard to the adoption of discretionary accruals is effective only when the loan is very large. This paper may have implications for policy-makers as it contributes to the understanding of the shortcomings of the banking regulatory system. This is an extremely relevant issue since the excessive amount of non-performing loans held by Italian banks recently threatened the stability of the European Banking Union as a whole.

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