scholarly journals Территориальные споры в Восточной и Юго-Восточной Азии: особенности и перспективы международно-правового урегулирования

Author(s):  
В. Л. Толстых

Все территориальные споры в Юго-Восточной и Южной Азии в зависимости от их локализации делятся на четыре группы. В первую входят споры, охватывающие территорию бывшей Британской Индии и связанные с нечётко-стью колониальных титулов; во вторую – споры с участием Малайзии, также имеющие колониальный генезис; в третью категорию – споры Японии с её соседями по поводу островов, связанные с нечёткостью послевоенного урегулирования; в четвёртую – споры с участием Китая (помимо споров из первой и третьей групп сюда относится крайне важный спор о принадлежности акватории и сухопутных формирований Южно-Китайского моря). Некоторые из этих споров были разрешены международными судами на основании международного права; к их числу относятся, например, споры о делимитации Бенгальского залива (первая группа). Большинство споров, однако, до сих пор не разрешены, и перспективы правового урегулирования некоторых из них выглядят маловероятными в силу остроты конфликта и сложности историко-правового контекста. Спор о Южно-Китайском море (ЮКМ) является условно-разрешённым: решение по нему было вынесено в 2016 г. Китай, однако, категорически отказался выполнять его. Отношение России к данным тер-риториальным спорам не должно быть пассивным. В отношении споров из первой группы Россия может попробовать вернуться к своей традиционной функции посредника. Конфликты второй группы не затрагивают её интересов; по отношению к ним она должна соблюдать строгий нейтралитет. Что касается конфликтов третьей группы, то Россия сама является их непосредственным участником и поэтому должна предпринимать усилия, направленные на достижение выгодного для неё решения вопроса о Курильских островах. Наконец, применительно к спору о ЮКМ Россия должна встать на сторону Китая, чьи притязания в отношении данной акватории содержательно близки притязаниям России в отношении Арктики. All territorial disputes in Southeast and South Asia are divided into four groups depending on their location. The first group includes the disputes covering the territory of the former British India and provoked by the vagueness of colonial titles. The second group includes the disputes involving Malaysia, which also have a colonial genesis. The third group includes the disputes between Japan and its neighbors over the islands provoked by the vagueness of the post-war settlement. The fourth group includes the disputes involving China, – in addition to the disputes from the first and third groups, this includes an extremely important debate about the ownership of water spaces and land formations of the South China Sea. Some of these disputes have been resolved by international courts under international law; these include, for example, the disputes over the delimitation of the Bay of Bengal (first group). Most disputes, however, are still not resolved and the prospects for legal settlement of some of them seem unlikely due to the severity of the conflict and the complexity of historical and legal contexts. The dispute over the South China Sea is conditionally resolved: a judgment was rendered in 2016, – China, however, categorically refused to comply with it. Russia's attitude to these territorial disputes should not be passive. As for the disputes from the first group, Russia may try to return to its traditional mediator function. The conflicts of the second group do not affect its interests, therefore it must observe a strict neutrality in relation to them. As for the conflicts of the third group, Russia is directly involved in them and therefore should make efforts to achieve an advantageous solution of the Kuril Islands case. Finally, in relation to the South China Sea dispute Russia should support China’s position which is substantially close to Russia's claims in relation to the Arctic.

2016 ◽  
Vol 5 (1) ◽  
pp. 1
Author(s):  
Wishnu Mahendra Wiswayana

In recent years situation on the South China Sea facing an escalationcondition, especially affected from China maritime activities. That conditionemerged when China put South China Sea territory at China's official map,which called 9/10/11 dashed line or u-shaped line. This paper addresses theIndonesian Government respond about territorial disputes with China'sofficial map on Natuna. The U-shaped line at China's official map actuallybecame challenges for Global Maritime Axis idea and Indonesia foreignpolicy under Jokowi-JK administration.Keyword: Global Maritime Axis, South China Sea, Foreign Policy


2017 ◽  
Vol 36 (1) ◽  
pp. 51-88 ◽  
Author(s):  
Hannah Cotillon

In autocracies, nationalism appears to have merged with geopolitical thinking. In light of this geopoliticisation of nationalism, it is surprising that the literature has paid virtually no attention to the role of territorial disputes as a conditioning factor. The present study seeks to further enhance the field by factoring in the role of territorial disputes in triggering different expressions of nationalism. It develops an analytical framework for typologies of nationalism according to four territorial disputes: China's dispute with Vietnam over maritime territory in the South China Sea, China's dispute with Japan over maritime territory in the East China Sea, Vietnam's dispute with Cambodia over territorial border demarcations, and Vietnam's dispute with China over maritime territory in the South China Sea. The respective disputes of China and Vietnam are analysed and tested against criteria of expressions of nationalism in autocracies. We find that territorial disputes and therefore external context are important conditioning factors of nationalism in autocracies.


2017 ◽  
Vol 36 (3) ◽  
pp. 35-61
Author(s):  
Nicole Jenne

The conflicts in the South China Sea have come to dominate debates on Southeast Asian security and specifically on how boundary disputes have been managed within the region. Yet, the case is not necessarily exemplary for the way Southeast Asian countries have dealt with territorial disputes generally. The article gathers three common perceptions about conflict management that are strongly informed by the South China Sea case, but have lesser relevance when looking at other territorial conflicts in the region. I offer a critical reading of the who, why, and how of territorial conflict management and provide tentative guidelines on what to expect in the future.


2020 ◽  
pp. 1-25
Author(s):  
ALVIN CAMBA ◽  
JANICA MAGAT

How do territorial disputes affect bilateral foreign direct investment (FDI) between claimant states? Using a difference model, we find that a regime’s position on the South China Sea (SCS) significantly impacts Chinese FDI. We used a novel dataset on firm registrations in the Philippines, finding that the annual number of new firm entrants with Chinese investment significantly increases when maritime border disputes are stabilized. In contrast, we observe that conflictual relations in the maritime borders tend to decrease the number of new firms. We also notice that disputes do not influence FDI from non-claimant states.


2015 ◽  
Vol 8 (4) ◽  
pp. 178
Author(s):  
Bama Andika Putra

<p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: justify; text-justify: inter-ideograph;"><span style="font-size: 10.0pt; font-family: 'Times New Roman','serif'; mso-fareast-font-family: 宋体; mso-font-kerning: 1.0pt; mso-ansi-language: EN-US; mso-fareast-language: ZH-CN; mso-bidi-language: AR-SA;" lang="EN-US">The territorial disputes in the South China Sea have become the major flashpoints of both potential and existing conflicts in Asia. With claimant states from both China and member states of ASEAN, the aggressive military gestures of the claimant states have led to a myriad number of confrontations throughout the years. The inevitability of ASEAN being in the center of the disputes, have led many critics towards the regional organization on its capacity to establish any significant changes towards the dynamics of the South China Sea disputes. This research argues the opposite of the existing academic literatures, which views ASEAN as not an ideal actor in facing the fast paced dynamics of the South China Sea conflicts. It argues of ASEAN’s ability and capacity to persuade China into some forms of compromises into its policy, reflected through its defined position of a conflict management institution throughout the South China Sea crisis. The research thus argues how there is an existing misperception of ASEAN’s conflict management endeavors with the occurrence of China’s recent assertive gestures, ASEAN’s ability in instilling cooperative values and confidence building measures among conflicted states, and relevance of ASEAN’s multilateralism measures despite of China’s historical stance of bilateral means of conflict resolution in regards to the South China Sea conflict.</span></p><div id="_mcePaste" class="mcePaste" style="position: absolute; left: -10000px; top: 0px; width: 1px; height: 1px; overflow: hidden;"><!--EndFragment--></div>


Crustaceana ◽  
2015 ◽  
Vol 88 (12-14) ◽  
pp. 1255-1263
Author(s):  
B. Y. Lee ◽  
L. Corbari ◽  
B. Richer de Forges

During a recent expedition in the South China Sea, three species of the deep-sea epialtid genusOxypleurodonMiers, 1885 were collected. Two species,O. stimpsoniMiers, 1886, andO. auritum(Rathbun, 1916), are new records for the area. The third species, one of the largest knownOxypleurodonspecies, is described here as new. It is most similar toO. luzonicum(Rathbun, 1916) andO. sanctaeclausiRicher de Forges & Ng, 2009, in possessing a rounded cardiac plate, but can be separated by the structures of the branchial and pseudorostral spines.


Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document