scholarly journals Filled/non-filled pairs: an empirical challenge to the integrated information theory of consciousness

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Amber Hopkins ◽  
Kelvin McQueen
Keyword(s):  
Information Theory ◽  
Visual Field ◽  
Experimental Testing ◽  
Brain Activity ◽  
Empirical Support ◽  
Retinal Input ◽  
Image Pairs ◽  
Visual Properties ◽  
Integrated Information Theory ◽  
Integrated Information

Perceptual filling-in for vision is the insertion of visual properties (e.g., color, contour, luminance, or motion) into one’s visual field, when those properties have no corresponding retinal input. This paper introduces and provides preliminary empirical support for filled/non-filled pairs, pairs of images that appear identical, yet differ by amount of filling-in. It is argued that such image pairs are important to the experimental testing of theories of consciousness. We review recent experimental research and conclude that filling-in involves brain activity with relatively high integrated information (Phi) compared to veridical visual perceptions. We then present filled/non-filled pairs as an empirical challenge to the integrated information theory of consciousness, which predicts that phenomenologically identical experiences depend on brain processes with identical Phi.

scholarly journals Brain states matter. A reply to the unfolding argument.

2019 ◽  
Author(s):  
Johannes Kleiner
Keyword(s):  
Information Theory ◽  
Empirical Test ◽  
Brain Activity ◽  
Brain States ◽  
Almost All ◽  
Integrated Information Theory ◽  
Integrated Information

Recently, it has been claimed that Integrated Information Theory and other theories of its type cannot explain consciousness ("unfolding argument"). We unravel this argument mathematically and prove that the premises of the argument imply a much stronger result according to which the observed problem holds for almost all theories of consciousness. We find, however, that one of the premises is unwarranted and show that if this premise is dropped, the argument ceases to work. Thus our results show that the claim of the unfolding argument cannot be considered valid. The premise in question is that measures of brain activity cannot be used in an empirical test of theories of consciousness.

scholarly journals Awareness and integrated information theory identify plant meristems as sites of conscious activity

PROTOPLASMA ◽  
2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Anthony Trewavas
Keyword(s):  
Information Theory ◽  
Nervous System ◽  
Complex Networks ◽  
Environmental Changes ◽  
Biological Function ◽  
Human Consciousness ◽  
Extrinsic Information ◽  
Integrated Information Theory ◽  
Conscious Activity ◽  
Integrated Information

AbstractLacking an anatomical brain/nervous system, it is assumed plants are not conscious. The biological function of consciousness is an input to behaviour; it is adaptive (subject to selection) and based on information. Complex language makes human consciousness unique. Consciousness is equated to awareness. All organisms are aware of their surroundings, modifying their behaviour to improve survival. Awareness requires assessment too. The mechanisms of animal assessment are neural while molecular and electrical in plants. Awareness of plants being also consciousness may resolve controversy. The integrated information theory (IIT), a leading theory of consciousness, is also blind to brains, nerves and synapses. The integrated information theory indicates plant awareness involves information of two kinds: (1) communicative, extrinsic information as a result of the perception of environmental changes and (2) integrated intrinsic information located in the shoot and root meristems and possibly cambium. The combination of information constructs an information nexus in the meristems leading to assessment and behaviour. The interpretation of integrated information in meristems probably involves the complex networks built around [Ca2+]i that also enable plant learning, memory and intelligent activities. A mature plant contains a large number of conjoined, conscious or aware, meristems possibly unique in the living kingdom.

How to Catch an AI Zombie

2020 ◽  
pp. 439-458
Author(s):  
Susan Schneider
Keyword(s):  
Information Theory ◽  
Natural Language ◽  
Real World ◽  
Phenomenal Consciousness ◽  
Artificial Consciousness ◽  
High Level ◽  
Integrated Information Theory ◽  
Integrated Information

How can we determine if AI is conscious? The chapter begins by illustrating that there are potentially very serious real-world costs to getting facts about AI consciousness wrong. It then proposes a provisional framework for investigating artificial consciousness that involves several tests or markers. One test is the AI Consciousness Test, which challenges an AI with a series of increasingly demanding natural-language interactions. Another test is based on the Integrated Information Theory, developed by Giulio Tononi and others, and considers whether a machine has a high level of “integrated information.” A third test is a Chip Test, where speculatively an individual’s brain is gradually replaced with durable microchips. If this individual being tested continues to report having phenomenal consciousness, the chapter argues that this could be a reason to believe that some machines could have consciousness.

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