scholarly journals ‘Intentional binding’ without intentional action

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Keisuke Suzuki ◽  
Peter Lush ◽  
Anil Seth ◽  
Warrick Roseboom
Keyword(s):  
Spatial Information ◽  
Conscious Experience ◽  
Intentional Action ◽  
Sense Of Agency ◽  
Fundamental Aspect ◽  
Implicit Measure ◽  
Intentional Binding ◽  
Related Information ◽  
Temporal And Spatial

The experience of authorship over one’s actions and their consequences - sense of agency - is a fundamental aspect of conscious experience. In recent years, it has become common to use intentional binding as an implicit measure of the sense of agency. However, it remains contentious whether binding effects indicate the role of intention-related information in perception or merely represent a strong case of multisensory causal binding. Here, we use a novel virtual reality setup to demonstrate identical magnitude binding effects both in the presence and complete absence of intentional action, when perceptual stimuli are matched for temporal and spatial information. Our results demonstrate that intentional binding-like effects are most simply accounted for by multisensory causal binding, without necessarily being related to intention or agency. Future studies which relate binding effects to agency must provide evidence for effects beyond that expected for multisensory causal binding by itself.

scholarly journals Intentional Binding Without Intentional Action

2019 ◽  
Vol 30 (6) ◽  
pp. 842-853 ◽  
Author(s):  
Keisuke Suzuki ◽  
Peter Lush ◽  
Anil K. Seth ◽  
Warrick Roseboom
Keyword(s):  
Spatial Information ◽  
Conscious Experience ◽  
Intentional Action ◽  
Sense Of Agency ◽  
Fundamental Aspect ◽  
Implicit Measure ◽  
Intentional Binding ◽  
Related Information ◽  
Temporal And Spatial

The experience of authorship over one’s actions and their consequences—sense of agency—is a fundamental aspect of conscious experience. In recent years, it has become common to use intentional binding as an implicit measure of the sense of agency. However, it remains contentious whether reported intentional-binding effects indicate the role of intention-related information in perception or merely represent a strong case of multisensory causal binding. Here, we used a novel virtual-reality setup to demonstrate identical magnitude-binding effects in both the presence and complete absence of intentional action, when perceptual stimuli were matched for temporal and spatial information. Our results demonstrate that intentional-binding-like effects are most simply accounted for by multisensory causal binding without necessarily being related to intention or agency. Future studies that relate binding effects to agency must provide evidence for effects beyond that expected for multisensory causal binding by itself.

scholarly journals Intentional binding as Bayesian cue combination: testing predictions with trait individual differences

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Peter Lush ◽  
Warrick Roseboom ◽  
Axel Cleeremans ◽  
Ryan Bradley Scott ◽  
Anil Seth ◽  
...  
Keyword(s):  
Individual Differences ◽  
Intentional Action ◽  
Sense Of Agency ◽  
Implicit Measure ◽  
Access To Information ◽  
Cue Combination ◽  
Intentional Binding ◽  
Precise Timing ◽  
Hypnotic Suggestion ◽  
Backward Shift

Intentional binding refers to the subjective compression of the time between an action and its outcome, typically indicated by a forward shift in the judged time of an action toward its outcome (action binding) and the backward shift of an outcome toward the action that caused it (outcome binding). The effect is considered an implicit measure of the sense of agency as it is sensitive to intentional action without requiring explicit reflection upon agency. One way of explaining the sensitivity of intentional binding is to see it as a simple case of multisensory cue combination in which awareness of intentions increases knowledge of the timing of actions. Here we present results consistent with such a mechanism. An experience of involuntariness is central to hypnotic responding, and may arise from strategically being unaware of one’s intentions. Trait differences in the ability to respond to hypnotic suggestion may reflect differing levels of access to motor intentions, with highly hypnotisable people having relatively low access and low hypnotisable people greater access. In a contingent presentation of action and outcome events, low hypnotisables had more precise timing judgements of actions than highs, and showed weaker action binding than highs. These results support the theory that trait hypnotisability is related to access to information related to motor intentions, as increased availability of such information should support more precise judgements of the timing of an intentional action. Intentional binding may thus reflect the Bayesian combination of cross-modal cues.

Role of Spatial and Temporal Coincidence in Depth Organization

Perception ◽  
1998 ◽  
Vol 27 (5) ◽  
pp. 541-552 ◽  
Author(s):  
Haruyuki Kojima ◽  
Randolph Blake
Keyword(s):  
Spatial Information ◽  
Space Perception ◽  
Video Monitor ◽  
Lateral Separation ◽  
Temporal Phase ◽  
Spatial Alignment ◽  
Uncrossed Disparity ◽  
Left And Right ◽  
Temporal And Spatial

The linking of spatial information is essential for coherent space perception. A study is reported of the contribution of temporal and spatial alignment for the linkage of spatial elements in terms of depth perception. Stereo half-images were generated on the left and right halves of a large-screen video monitor and viewed through a mirror stereoscope. The half-images portrayed a black vertically oriented bar with two brackets immediately flanking this bar and placed in crossed or uncrossed disparity relative to the bar. A pair of thin white ‘bridging lines' could appear on the black bar, always at zero disparity. Brackets and bridging lines could be flickered either in phase or out of phase. Observers judged whether the brackets appeared in front of or behind the black bar, with disparity varied. Compared to conditions when the bridging lines were absent, depth judgments were markedly biased toward “in front” when bridging lines and brackets flashed in temporal phase; this bias was much reduced when the bridging lines and brackets flashed out of phase. This biasing effect also depended on spatial offset of lines and brackets. However, perception was uninfluenced by the lateral separation between object and brackets.

The Role of Temporal and Spatial Information Cues in Locating Missing Persons

2016 ◽  
Vol 30 (4) ◽  
pp. 514-525 ◽  
Author(s):  
Kara N. Moore ◽  
James M. Lampinen ◽  
Andrew C. Provenzano
Keyword(s):  
Spatial Information ◽  
Missing Persons ◽  
Information Cues ◽  
Temporal And Spatial

scholarly journals The Power of Suggestion: Posthypnotically Induced Changes in the Temporal Binding of Intentional Action Outcomes

2017 ◽  
Vol 28 (5) ◽  
pp. 661-669 ◽  
Author(s):  
Peter Lush ◽  
Emilie A. Caspar ◽  
Axel Cleeremans ◽  
Patrick Haggard ◽  
Pedro Alexandre Magalhães De Saldanha da Gama ◽  
...  
Keyword(s):  
Intentional Action ◽  
Sense Of Agency ◽  
Intentional Binding ◽  
Strategic Action ◽  
Temporal Binding ◽  
Induced Changes

The sense of agency is the experience of initiating and controlling one’s voluntary actions and their outcomes. Intentional binding (i.e., when voluntary actions and their outcomes are perceived to occur closer together in time than involuntary actions and their outcomes) is increased in intentional action but requires no explicit reflection on agency. The reported experience of involuntariness is central to hypnotic responding, during which strategic action is experienced as involuntary. We report reduced intentional binding in a hypnotically induced experience of involuntariness, providing an objective correlate of reports of involuntariness. We argue that this reduced binding results from the diminished influence of motor intentions in the generation of the sense of agency when beliefs about whether an action is intended are altered. Thus, intentional binding depends on awareness of intentions. This finding shows that changes in metacognition of intentions affect perception.

scholarly journals Time perception and the experience of agency in meditation and hypnosis

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Peter Lush ◽  
Zoltan Dienes
Keyword(s):  
Time Perception ◽  
Mindfulness Meditation ◽  
Intentional Action ◽  
Theoretical Background ◽  
Voluntary Action ◽  
Intentional Binding ◽  
Related Information ◽  
Intentional Actions ◽  
Intention To Move ◽  
Perception Of Time

Mindfulness meditation and hypnosis are related in opposing ways to awareness of intentions. The cold control theory of hypnosis proposes that hypnotic responding involves the experience of involuntariness while performing an actually intentional action. Hypnosis therefore relies upon inaccurate metacognition about intentional actions and experiences. Mindfulness meditation centrally involves awareness of intentions and is associated with improved metacognitive access to intentions. Therefore, mindfulness meditators and highly hypnotisable people may lie at opposite ends of a spectrum with regard to metacognitive access to intention-related information. Here we review the theoretical background and evidence for differences in the metacognition of intentions in these groups, as revealed by chronometric measures of the awareness of voluntary action: the timing of an intention to move (Libet’s ‘W’ judgements) and the compressed perception of time between an intentional action and its outcome (‘intentional binding’). We review these measures and critically evaluate their proposed connection to the experience of volition and sense of agency.

scholarly journals Intentions with actions: The role of intentionality attribution on the vicarious sense of agency in human-robot interaction

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Cecilia Roselli ◽  
Francesca Ciardo ◽  
Agnieszka Wykowska
Keyword(s):  
Social Contexts ◽  
Human Robot Interaction ◽  
The Other ◽  
Sense Of Agency ◽  
Intentional Stance ◽  
Action Representation ◽  
Contributing Factors ◽  
Intentional Binding ◽  
Robot Interaction

Sense of Agency (SoA) is the feeling of control over one’s actions and their consequences. In social contexts, people experience a “vicarious” SoA over other humans’ actions; however, the phenomenon disappears when the other agent is a computer. The present study aimed to investigate factors that determine when humans experience vicarious SoA in human-robot interaction (HRI). To this end, in two experiments we disentangled two potential contributing factors: (1) the possibility of representing the robot’s actions, and (2) the adoption of Intentional Stance toward robots. Participants performed an Intentional Binding (IB) task reporting the time of occurrence for self- or robot-generated actions or sensory outcomes. To assess the role of action representation, the robot either performed a physical keypress (Experiment 1) or “acted” by sending a command via Bluetooth (Experiment 2). Before the experiment, attribution of intentionality to the robot was assessed. Results showed that when participants judged the occurrence of the action, vicarious SoA was predicted by the degree of attributed intentionality, but only when the robot’s action was physical. Conversely, digital actions elicited reversed effect of vicarious IB, suggesting that disembodied actions of robots are perceived as non-intentional. When participants judged the occurrence of the sensory outcome, vicarious SoA emerged only when the causing action was physical. Notably, intentionality attribution predicted vicarious SoA for sensory outcomes independently of the nature of the causing event, physical or digital. In conclusion, both intentionality attribution and action representation play a crucial role for vicarious SoA in HRI.

scholarly journals Learning from informative losses boosts the sense of agency

2020 ◽  
Vol 73 (12) ◽  
pp. 2272-2289
Author(s):  
Bartosz Majchrowicz ◽  
Eugenia Kulakova ◽  
Steven Di Costa ◽  
Patrick Haggard
Keyword(s):  
Learning Task ◽  
Event Related Potential ◽  
Sense Of Agency ◽  
Implicit Measure ◽  
Intentional Binding ◽  
Effective Learning ◽  
Future Performance ◽  
Adaptive Property ◽  
Eeg Data ◽  
Human Sense

Sense of agency, the feeling of having control over one’s actions, is modulated by whether one’s choices lead to desired or undesired outcomes. Learning similarly depends on outcome values from previous experience. In the current study, we evaluate a possible link between the sense of agency and learning, by investigating how intentional binding, an implicit measure of agency, changes during a probabilistic learning task. In two experiments, we show increased intentional binding in trials that follow losses, compared with trials that follow wins. Experiment 1 demonstrated that this post-error agency boost (PEAB) effect is rule-specific, as it did not occur if the trial following an error involved different action–outcome contingencies. Furthermore, PEAB was not modulated by the type of outcome presentation (monetary vs. affective). Experiment 2 showed that the PEAB effect can also occur when the current action involves a forced (as opposed to free) choice, but only when the previous, loss-provoking action was chosen freely. Thus, PEAB occurs when current actions are informed by outcomes of one’s own previous action choices. Electroencephalography (EEG) data linked these effects to two event-related potential components, namely, the Feedback Related Negativity and the P300. Taken together, these results support the notion that PEAB reflects an adaptive property of human sense of agency, facilitating effective learning about the action–outcome structure of a specific task, to optimise future performance. By clarifying the conditions for enhancing the sense of agency through learning, this work adds to our understanding of human learning and agency.

Sense of agency for future-directed intentions: Intentional binding for intermediate outcomes

2019 ◽  
Author(s):  
Saurabh Ranjan ◽  
Narayanan Srinivasan
Keyword(s):  
Reaction Time ◽  
Tracking Control ◽  
Response Times ◽  
Sense Of Agency ◽  
Implicit Measure ◽  
Intentional Binding ◽  
Intermediate Outcome ◽  
Intermediate Outcomes ◽  
Main Effect ◽  
Initial Action

Intentions can be present-directed or future-directed. Given that previous studies have primarily focused on understanding present-directed intentions, we studied sense of agency (SoA) for future-directed intentions by focusing on intermediate action-outcome events. The intermediate outcome exactly predicted the final perceptual outcome. We hypothesized that if SoA is conceptualized as tracking control, then IB (an implicit measure of SoA) should be present even at intermediate stages i.e. between initial action and appearance of intermediate outcome, which was associated with the intended outcome. In addition, we hypothesized faster response times for those intermediate outcome events that predicted the intended outcome. We also manipulated the contingency between intended outcome and intermediate outcome. We found as hypothesized a main effect of intention on interval judgement and reaction time for the intermediate outcome. Durations were judged shorter (more IB) for the intermediate outcome that predicted the intended outcome. The results support accounts of SoA that emphasize tracking control and the presence of IB for intermediate outcomes can be explained through post-dictive mechanisms.

scholarly journals Try and try again: Post-error boost of an implicit measure of agency

2018 ◽  
Vol 71 (7) ◽  
pp. 1584-1595 ◽  
Author(s):  
Steven Di Costa ◽  
Héloïse Théro ◽  
Valérian Chambon ◽  
Patrick Haggard
Keyword(s):  
Reinforcement Learning ◽  
Subjective Experience ◽  
Action Selection ◽  
Quantitative Model ◽  
Sense Of Agency ◽  
Implicit Measure ◽  
Positive Outcomes ◽  
Negative Outcomes ◽  
Intentional Binding ◽  
Reward Probability

The sense of agency refers to the feeling that we control our actions and, through them, effects in the outside world. Reinforcement learning provides an important theoretical framework for understanding why people choose to make particular actions. Few previous studies have considered how reinforcement and learning might influence the subjective experience of agency over actions and outcomes. In two experiments, participants chose between two action alternatives, which differed in reward probability. Occasional reversals of action–reward mapping required participants to monitor outcomes and adjust action selection processing accordingly. We measured shifts in the perceived times of actions and subsequent outcomes (‘intentional binding’) as an implicit proxy for sense of agency. In the first experiment, negative outcomes showed stronger binding towards the preceding action, compared to positive outcomes. Furthermore, negative outcomes were followed by increased binding of actions towards their outcome on the following trial. Experiment 2 replicated this post-error boost in action binding and showed that it only occurred when people could learn from their errors to improve action choices. We modelled the post-error boost using an established quantitative model of reinforcement learning. The post-error boost in action binding correlated positively with participants’ tendency to learn more from negative outcomes than from positive outcomes. Our results suggest a novel relation between sense of agency and reinforcement learning, in which sense of agency is increased when negative outcomes trigger adaptive changes in subsequent action selection processing.

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