scholarly journals CONCEPT AND STRUCTURE OF THE CONSTITUTIONALLEGAL MECHANISM OF THE RIGHT OF FREEDOM OF THOUGHT AND SPEECH, FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION OF ONE’S OPINIONS AND BELIEFS

2019 ◽  
Vol 2 ◽  
pp. 7-14
Author(s):  
K.I. Barnych ◽  
2020 ◽  
Vol 37 (2) ◽  
pp. 153-169
Author(s):  
Teresa M. Bejan

AbstractThe classical liberal doctrine of free expression asserts the priority of speech as an extension of the freedom of thought. Yet its critics argue that freedom of expression, itself, demands the suppression of the so-called “silencing speech” of racists, sexists, and so on, as a threat to the equal expressive rights of others. This essay argues that the claim to free expression must be distinguished from claims to equal speech. The former asserts an equal right to express one’s thoughts without interference; the latter the right to address others, and to receive a hearing and consideration from them, in turn. I explore the theory of equal speech in light of the ancient Athenian practice of isegoria and argue that the equality demanded is not distributive but relational: an equal speaker’s voice should be counted as “on a par” with others. This ideal better captures critics’ concerns about silencing speech than do their appeals to free expression. Insofar as epistemic and status-harms provide grounds for the suppression and exclusion of some speech and speakers, the ideal of equal speech is more closely connected with the freedom of association than of thought. Noticing this draws attention to the continuing—and potentially problematic—importance of exclusion in constituting effective sites of equal speech today.


Author(s):  
Dominic McGoldrick

This chapter discusses the sources, scope, and limitations of the four fundamental freedoms: thought, expression, association, and assembly. Freedom of thought includes freedom of conscience, religion, and belief. Freedom of expression includes freedom of opinion and freedom of information. Freedom of association concerns the right to establish autonomous organizations through which individuals pursue common interests together. The right of assembly protects non-violent, organized, temporary gatherings in public and private, both indoors and outdoors.


Author(s):  
Sjors Ligthart

Abstract Since advances in brain-reading technology are changing traditional epistemic boundaries of the mind, yielding information from the brain that enables to draw inferences about particular mental states of individuals, the sustainability of the present framework of European human rights has been called into question. More specifically, it has been argued that in order to provide adequate human rights protection from non-consensual brain-reading, the right to freedom of thought should be revised, making it ‘fit for the future’ again. From the perspective of criminal justice, the present paper examines whether such a revision is necessary within the European legal context. It argues that under its current understanding, the right to freedom of thought would probably not cover the employment of most brain-reading applications in criminal justice. By contrast, the right to freedom of (non-)expression will provide legal protection in this regard and, at the same time, will also allow for certain exceptions. Hence, instead of revising the absolute right to freedom of thought, a legal approach tailored to non-consensual brain-reading could be developed under the already existing right not to convey information, ideas, and opinions as guaranteed under the freedom of (non-)expression. This might need to re-interpret the right to freedom of expression, rather than the right to freedom of thought.


2021 ◽  
Vol 8 (2-3) ◽  
pp. 245-270
Author(s):  
Cláudio de Oliveira Santos Colnago ◽  
Bethany Shiner

Abstract The right to freedom of thought is guaranteed by Article 13 of the American Convention on Human Rights, yet current jurisprudence interprets the right as a mere dimension of freedom of expression, also protected by Article 13. Contemporary neurotechnology research presents the possibility for human thoughts to be tracked, recorded, analysed and predicted. This applies pressure upon the Inter-American Court of Human Rights’ current understanding of the right to freedom of thought. Firstly, this paper will examine how Article 13 has been interpreted by the Inter-American Court of Human Rights at different stages of its jurisprudence. Secondly, by considering both technological advances and the other rights guaranteed by the Convention, this paper argues for an evolution in the interpretation of Article 13 whereby the right to freedom of thought is understood as a distinct right, separate from freedom of expression. Finally, this paper proposes that the positive duty to secure Convention rights requires States to enact preventative legislation and regulations. Existing bioethics principles should be drawn upon to inform human rights-compliant laws and regulations that require the architectural design of technologies to limit the potential to infringe upon freedom of thought.


ERA Forum ◽  
2020 ◽  
Vol 21 (4) ◽  
pp. 591-604
Author(s):  
Susie Alegre

AbstractRegulation of the digital space has, so far, focused on the rights to privacy and data protection or the right to freedom of expression. But the increased impact of digital technology and artificial intelligence (AI) on the way we think, feel and behave calls for a new perspective on regulation to protect our rights to freedom of thought and opinion in the “forum internum.” These rights are absolute rights and, as such, require a different and radical approach to regulation including the potential to ban the use of technology that interferes with our minds in any sphere. International and regional organisations like the Council of Europe and UN Special Rapporteurs are increasingly recognising the risks posed by technology for human agency and autonomy. There is an opportunity for Europe to take the lead in regulating digital technology to protect freedom of thought and the potential for innovation in the future. This requires a new approach that must embed the Precautionary Principle in technological research and development as well as the definition of practices that may never be permissible.


Author(s):  
Corey Brettschneider

How should a liberal democracy respond to hate groups and others that oppose the ideal of free and equal citizenship? The democratic state faces the hard choice of either protecting the rights of hate groups and allowing their views to spread, or banning their views and violating citizens' rights to freedoms of expression, association, and religion. Avoiding the familiar yet problematic responses to these issues, this book proposes a new approach called value democracy. The theory of value democracy argues that the state should protect the right to express illiberal beliefs, but the state should also engage in democratic persuasion when it speaks through its various expressive capacities: publicly criticizing, and giving reasons to reject, hate-based or other discriminatory viewpoints. Distinguishing between two kinds of state action—expressive and coercive—the book contends that public criticism of viewpoints advocating discrimination based on race, gender, or sexual orientation should be pursued through the state's expressive capacities as speaker, educator, and spender. When the state uses its expressive capacities to promote the values of free and equal citizenship, it engages in democratic persuasion. By using democratic persuasion, the state can both respect rights and counter hateful or discriminatory viewpoints. The book extends this analysis from freedom of expression to the freedoms of religion and association, and shows that value democracy can uphold the protection of these freedoms while promoting equality for all citizens.


Author(s):  
Guido Raimondi

This article comments on four important judgments given by the European Court of Human Rights in 2016. Al-Dulimi v. Switzerland addresses the issue of how, in the context of sanctions regimes created by the UN Security Council, European states should reconcile their obligations under the UN Charter with their obligations under the European Convention on Human Rights to respect the fundamentals of European public order. Baka v. Hungary concerns the separation of powers and judicial independence, in particular the need for procedural safeguards to protect judges against unjustified removal from office and to protect their legitimate exercise of freedom of expression. Magyar Helsinki Bizottság v. Hungary is a judgment on the interpretation of the Convention, featuring a review of the “living instrument” approach. Avotiņš v. Latvia addresses the principle of mutual trust within the EU legal order and the right to a fair trial under Article 6 of the Convention.


Author(s):  
Dirk Voorhoof

The normative perspective of this chapter is how to guarantee respect for the fundamental values of freedom of expression and journalistic reporting on matters of public interest in cases where a (public) person claims protection of his or her right to reputation. First it explains why there is an increasing number and expanding potential of conflicts between the right to freedom of expression and media freedom (Article 10 ECHR), on the one hand, and the right of privacy and the right to protection of reputation (Article 8 ECHR), on the other. In addressing and analysing the European Court’s balancing approach in this domain, the characteristics and the impact of the seminal 2012 Grand Chamber judgment in Axel Springer AG v. Germany (no. 1) are identified and explained. On the basis of the analysis of the Court’s subsequent jurisprudence in defamation cases it evaluates whether this case law preserves the public watchdog-function of media, investigative journalism and NGOs reporting on matters of public interest, but tarnishing the reputation of public figures.


Author(s):  
Allan Hepburn

In the 1940s and 1950s, Britain was relatively uniform in terms of race and religion. The majority of Britons adhered to the Church of England, although Anglo-Catholic leanings—the last gasp of the Oxford Movement—prompted some people to convert to Roman Catholicism. Although the secularization thesis has had a tenacious grip on twentieth-century literary studies, it does not account for the flare-up of interest in religion in mid-century Britain. The ecumenical movement, which began in the 1930s in Europe, went into suspension during the war, and returned with vigour after 1945, advocated international collaboration among Christian denominations and consequently overlapped with the promotion of human rights, especially the defence of freedom of worship, the right to privacy, freedom of conscience, and freedom of expression.


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