scholarly journals Funt szterling i brytyjska polityka pieniężna w latach 1945-2010

Author(s):  
Piotr Jachowicz

The paper analyses two fundamental questions of British monetary policy after Second World War and the policies implemented as answers to them. The dilemma analysed was whether to support strong international position of pound or internal development? In the end the British government was not able to choose it's priority and in consequence the policy implemented was icoherent and the results mixed.

Modern Italy ◽  
2008 ◽  
Vol 13 (1) ◽  
pp. 5-20 ◽  
Author(s):  
Claudia Baldoli

Within the wider attempt to transform Italian communities abroad into Fascist colonies, the Italian Fasci Abroad sought to build nationalist propaganda in the Mediterranean. The irredentist activities and the propaganda of the Fasci in Malta alarmed the British governors on the island, the British government and MI5. This article analyses the cultural conflict organised in Maltese schools, bookshops and universities by the Italian nationalists against the British protectorate–a conflict the British suspected could be followed by military activity, in particular when Italy began building its empire in Ethiopia. The nationalist offensive was supported in the 1920s and, more vigorously, in the 1930s by the Fasci, the Italian consulate on the island and, ultimately, the Italian government. Not even the Second World War and the bombing of Malta by the Italian air force concluded the conflict between Italian and British imperialism on the island.


2004 ◽  
Vol 65 ◽  
pp. 117-135 ◽  
Author(s):  
Neil Redfern

For a few years after its foundation in 1920 the Communist Party of Great Britain (CPGB) attempted, energetically prompted by the Comintern, to work in solidarity with anticolonial movements in the British Empire. But after the Nazi victory in Germany the Comintern's principal concern was to defend the Soviet Union and the liberal democracies against the threat of fascism. British communists criticized the British Government for failing to defend the Empire against the threat from its imperial rivals. After the entry of the Soviet Union into the war in 1941 they vigorously supported the British war effort, including the defense of Empire. This was not though simply a manifestation of chauvinism. British communists believed that imperialism was suffering a strategic defeat by “progressive” forces and that colonial freedom would follow the defeat of fascism. These chimerical notions were greatly strengthened by the allies' promises of postwar peace, prosperity and international cooperation. In the last year or so of war British communists were clearly worried that these promises would not be redeemed, but nevertheless supported British reassertion of power in such places as Greece, Burma and Malaya. For the great majority of British communists, these were secondary matters when seen in the context of Labour's election victory of 1945 and its promised program of social-imperialist reform.


2016 ◽  
Vol 40 (158) ◽  
pp. 230-246
Author(s):  
William Butler

AbstractThis article explores the problems encountered in the formation of the Ulster Home Guard, supposedly a direct equivalent to its well-known British counterpart, as part of the paramilitary Ulster Special Constabulary in Northern Ireland, during the Second World War. Predictably, the Ulster Home Guard became an almost exclusively Protestant organisation which led to many accusations of sectarianism from a variety of different national and international voices. This became a real concern for the British government, as well as the army, which understandably wished to avoid any such controversy. Though assumptions had previously been made about the numbers of Catholics in the force, this article explores just how few joined the organisation throughout the war. Additionally, the article investigates the rather awkward constitutional position in which the Ulster Home Guard was placed. Under the Government of Ireland Act, the Stormont administration had no authority on matters of home defence. It did, however, have the power to raise a police force as a way to maintain law and order. Still, the Ulster Home Guard, although formed as part of the Ulster Special Constabulary, was entrusted solely with home defence and this had wider implications for British policy towards Northern Ireland throughout the Second World War.


2008 ◽  
Vol 18 ◽  
pp. 1-42 ◽  
Author(s):  
Martin Daunton

ABSTRACTDuring the Second World War, attention turned to reconstructing the world economy by moving away from competitive devaluations, protectionism and economic nationalism that had marred the 1930s. The Americans had considerable economic and political power, and they wished to restore multilateral trade, fixed exchanges and convertibility of currencies. The British government was in a difficult position, for it faced a serious balance of payments deficit and large accumulations of sterling in the Commonwealth and other countries. Multilateralism and convertibility posed serious difficulties. This address considers whether the American government had economic and financial hegemony after the war, or whether it was constrained; and asks how the British government was able to manoeuvre between America, Europe and the sterling area. The result was a new trade-off between international monetary policy, free trade, capital controls and domestic economic policy that was somewhat different from the ambitions of the American government and from British commitments made during and at the end of the war.


Author(s):  
Catherine S. Chan

As the Second World War unfolded in Hong Kong, it created various crises that intensified pre-existing racial tensions in the colony. In exchange for the liberties and safety of being ‘neutral’ or third nationals, Anglicized Macanese rushed to revoke their British status in favor of Portuguese certificates. Some sought refuge in Macau, where they would live, perhaps for the first time ever, side-by-side with Macanese subjects who were different in terms of cultural and political orientation. Despite acquiring Portuguese status, three Anglophile Macanese—Eddie Gosano, Leo d’Almada e Castro and Clotilde Barretto—continued to work for the British government, risking their lives for the BAAG. The Epilogue ends with the aftermath of the war and a reappraisal of the resilience of identity.


1998 ◽  
Vol 38 (323) ◽  
pp. 267-291 ◽  
Author(s):  
Catherine Rey-Schirr

In 1945, at the end of the Second World War, the British government clearly stated its intention of granting independence to India.The conflict between the British and the Indian nationalists receded into the background, while the increasing antagonism between Hindus and Muslims came to the fore. The Hindus, centred round the Congress Party led by Jawaharlal Nehru, wanted to maintain the unity of India by establishing a government made up of representatives of the two communities. The Muslims, under the banner of the Muslim League and its President, Mohammed Ali Jinnah, demanded the creation of a separate Muslim State, Pakistan. The problem was further complicated by the fact that the approximately 300 million Hindus, 6 million Sikhs and 100 million Muslims in British India were not living in geographically distinct regions, especially in Punjab and Bengal, where the population was mixed.


1976 ◽  
Vol 2 (1) ◽  
pp. 5-26 ◽  
Author(s):  
David Greenwood

The United Kingdom's defence effort has undergone profound transformation in the thirty years since the end of the Second World War. Further change is foreshadowed in the programme for the forthcoming decade which emerged from the Labour Government's 1974 Defence Review. Indeed, as Britain's economic distress persisted through 1975 it became apparent that the budgetary projections yielded by this “most extensive and thorough review of our system of defence ever undertaken by a British Government in peacetime” would themselves come in for further scrutiny and revision. Even the future is not what it used to be.


1999 ◽  
Vol 8 (2) ◽  
pp. 175-208 ◽  
Author(s):  
MICHAEL JABARA CARLEY

In September 1939, only a few weeks after the signature of the Nazi–Soviet non-aggression pact, the British government made perhaps its strongest effort since the Bolshevik revolution to achieve a rapproachement with the Soviet Union. This effort was interrupted and almost ruined by the Finno-Soviet ‘Winter War’, but the British initiative resumed after the war ended in March 1940. The Soviet government, though not the Soviet ambassador in London, Ivan M. Maiskii, was cool to British overtures, thus reversing the inter-war pattern where Moscow had often been the first to ask for better Anglo-Soviet relations. The publication of many Soviet diplomatic papers permits a comparison between Soviet and British accounts of important diplomatic meetings, a comparison which illustrates both British and Soviet foreign policy during the early months of the Second World War.


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