scholarly journals Default Agnosticism

Religions ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 12 (1) ◽  
pp. 54
Author(s):  
Francis Jonbäck
Keyword(s):  
Alvin Plantinga ◽  
Existence Of God ◽  
Santa Claus

Agnosticism has always had its fair amount of criticism. Religious believers often described the first agnostics as infidels and it is not uncommon to see them described as somewhat dull fence-sitters. Moreover, the undecided agnostic stance on belief in gods is often compared with being unsure about such obviously false statements as the existence of orbiting teapots, invisible dragons or even Santa Claus. In this paper, I maintain that agnosticism can properly be endorsed as a default stance. More precisely, I use a strategy presented by Alvin Plantinga and argue that it is rationally acceptable to be agnostic about the existence of God. I also anticipate and answer a number of objections. Finally, I offer my conclusion.

Can Belief in God be Basic?

Horizons ◽  
1988 ◽  
Vol 15 (2) ◽  
pp. 262-282
Author(s):  
Anthony M. Matteo
Keyword(s):  
Natural Theology ◽  
Theory Of Knowledge ◽  
Sufficient Evidence ◽  
Alvin Plantinga ◽  
Human Beings ◽  
Existence Of God ◽  
The Enlightenment ◽  
Belief In God ◽  
Natural Tendency ◽  
Marginal Status

AbstractAt least since the Enlightenment, religious thinkers in the West have sought to meet the “evidentialist” challenge, that is, to demonstrate that there is sufficient evidence to warrant a rational affirmation of the existence of God. Alvin Plantinga holds that this challenge is rooted in a foundationalist approach to epistemology which is now intellectually bankrupt. He argues that the current critique of foundationalism clears the way for a fruitful reappropriation of the Reformed (Calvinist) tradition's assertion of the “basic” nature of belief in God and its concomitant relegation of the arguments of natural theology to marginal status. After critically assessing Plantinga's proposal—especially its dependence on a nonfoundationalist theory of knowledge—this essay shifts to an analysis of the transcendental Thomist understanding of the rational underpinnings of the theist's affirmation of God's existence, with particular emphasis on the thought of Joseph Maréchal. It is argued that the latter position is better equipped to fend off possible nontheistic counterarguments—even in our current nonfoundationalist atmosphere—and, in fact, can serve as a necessary complement to Calvin's claim of a natural tendency in human beings to believe in God.

Norman Malcolm e Alvin Plantinga - Duas Versões Analíticas do Argumento do Proslogionde Santo Anselmo

2009 ◽  
Vol 17 (34) ◽  
pp. 333-355
Author(s):  
Maria Helena Reis Pereira ◽  
Keyword(s):  
Possible Worlds ◽  
Alvin Plantinga ◽  
Modal Realism ◽  
Analytical Philosophy ◽  
Existence Of God ◽  
Concept Of God ◽  
De Re ◽  
Necessary Being ◽  
The Sixties ◽  
De Dicto

The purpose of this work is to show some aspects which characterized the way analytical philosophers in the sixties and seventies (last Century) have read Saint Anselm’s argument in the Proslogion, thereby bringing its problematic into a new light. And had the virtue to begin the question of the existence of God in the heart of the analytical philosophy which up to the date was concerned by atheism. In the Introduction, we will point out the most frequent analytical objections to the argument - (i) existence is not a predicate (ii) the concept of God is incoherent (iii) existence is not perfection. Anscombe - an exception in this analytical context - has defended and supported the thesis that the argument is not an ontological one. Malcolm discovered two arguments in the Proslogion: one in chapter II which he considers invalid, another one in Chapter III considered valid and interpreted as modal by him. Plantinga was one of the first critics of the modal proof because there was - according to him - a confusion between necessity de dicto and necessity de re. Plantinga thought that the two arguments implied and/or complemented each other and developed a theory of modal realism in which he explains the nature and divine necessity in terms of possible worlds. Based on this concept he has rewritten a new modal proof considered “victorious” by him but that was later refuted by Mackie, Tooley and Davis (amongst others) and accused of circularity. Plantinga didn’t accept his proof to be considered fallacious and Oppy didn’t also recognize the same claim made by Fergie. However, Plantinga has rephrased his proof and summarized it in just one premise: “maximal greatness is possibly instantiated”. More than a proof of God’s existence, this is a defense of the acceptance of theism, a justification of the rationality of belief. And the possibility of existence of a metaphysically necessary being drives us to a deepest reflection from where every cognitive potentiality from the labor of the philosopher can be taken.

scholarly journals Plantinga's God and other monstrosities

1979 ◽  
Vol 15 (1) ◽  
pp. 91-97 ◽  
Author(s):  
Patrick Grim
Keyword(s):  
Ontological Argument ◽  
Alvin Plantinga ◽  
Existence Of God ◽  
Rational Acceptability ◽  
New Form

In God, Freedom, and Evil, Alvin Plantinga presents a new form of the ontological argument for the existence of God. Though he has reservations concerning its evangelical efficacy, Plantinga considers the proof both valid and sound, and presents it as a defence of the rational acceptability of theism.

HOW REFORMED IS REFORMED EPISTEMOLOGY? ALVIN PLANTINGA AND CALVIN'S ‘SENSUS DIVINITATIS’

1997 ◽  
Vol 33 (4) ◽  
pp. 419-431 ◽  
Author(s):  
DEREK S. JEFFREYS
Keyword(s):  
A Priori ◽  
Sense Perception ◽  
Christian Belief ◽  
Alvin Plantinga ◽  
Existence Of God ◽  
Statistical Probability ◽  
Belief In God ◽  
Sensus Divinitatis ◽  
Reformed Epistemology ◽  
Cognitive Environment

In his recent two volumes on epistemology, Alvin Plantinga surveys contemporary theories of knowledge thoroughly, and carefully defends an externalist epistemology. He promises that in a third volume, Warranted Christian Belief, he will present John Calvin's sensus divinitatis as an epistemic module akin to sense perception, a priori knowledge, induction, testimony and other epistemic modules. Plantinga defines the sensus divinitatis as a ‘many sided disposition to accept belief in God (or propositions that immediately and obviously entail the existence of God) in a variety of circumstances’. Like other epistemic modules, it produces beliefs in an appropriate cognitive environment, aims at the production of true beliefs, and generates beliefs which have a high statistical probability of being true.

The Ontological Argument

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Elizabeth D. Burns
Keyword(s):  
Ontological Argument ◽  
Alvin Plantinga ◽  
Iris Murdoch ◽  
Existence Of God ◽  
Rational Person ◽  
William Rowe

William Rowe claims that Anselm’s ontological argument, as restated by Alvin Plantinga, begs the question because, in order to know the truth of the key premise—“It is possible that God exists in reality”—we must know, independently of the argument, that God exists in reality. This chapter argues that Rowe focuses on Plantinga’s restatement of Anselm’s argument at the expense of Plantinga’s own version of the argument, and that Plantinga anticipates and addresses Rowe’s objection. Although Plantinga concedes that a rational person could reject his argument’s central premise, it might be possible to build on Plantinga’s argument by adding a further step derived from Iris Murdoch, which shows that the existence of God is not only possible but necessary, and therefore actual. This reconstruction is not an ontological argument in its purest form, but a fusion of elements from ontological, moral, and cosmological arguments for the existence of God.

Foundationalism and the Justification of Religious Belief

1983 ◽  
Vol 19 (3) ◽  
pp. 393-406 ◽  
Author(s):  
Julie Gowen
Keyword(s):  
Religious Belief ◽  
Alvin Plantinga ◽  
Existence Of God ◽  
Classical Foundationalism

Alvin Plantinga, in some essays recently published and presented, defends the rationality of a belief in the existence of God on the grounds that it is foundationally justified. Though this belief does not appear to be justified were we to adopt what Plantinga calls classical foundationalism, there are other, less restrictive (and presumably at least equally plausible) versions of foundationalism. Plantinga urges that we recognize that a belief in the existence of God can be warranted within one of these frameworks.

Ukrainian community life of believers

2008 ◽  
pp. 110-134
Author(s):  
Pavlo Yuriyovych Pavlenko
Keyword(s):  
Religious Life ◽  
Main Task ◽  
Community Life ◽  
Religious Activity ◽  
Existence Of God ◽  
Religious System ◽  
Real Presence ◽  
The Status ◽  
Intimate Relations ◽  
The Individual

The cornerstone of any religion is its anthropological concept, which seeks to determine the essential orientations of man, to outline the ideological framework of its existence, to represent the idea of ​​its essence, purpose in earthly life. The main task of the religious system is the act of involving and subordinating man to the spiritual divine realm as the realm of the transcendental existence of God. Belief in the real presence of the latter implies a new understanding of oneself, which ultimately leads the religious individual to the desire to be involved in this transcendental existence, to have intimate relations with him, to have a consciousness inherent in God. Note that in this context, all human being is interpreted as a certain arena for this realization. Therefore, the religious life of the individual acquires the status of religious activity.

The Problem of Evil and Replies to Some Important Responses

2018 ◽  
Vol 10 (3) ◽  
pp. 105-131
Author(s):  
Bruce Russell
Keyword(s):  
Problem Of Evil ◽  
Existence Of God ◽  
Strong Argument ◽  
Parallel Argument ◽  
The Earth ◽  
The Problem Of Evil ◽  
Argument From Evil

I begin by distinguishing four different versions of the argument from evil that start from four different moral premises that in various ways link the existence of God to the absence of suffering. The version of the argument from evil that I defend starts from the premise that if God exists, he would not allow excessive, unnecessary suffering. The argument continues by denying the consequent of this conditional to conclude that God does not exist. I defend the argument against Skeptical Theists who say we are in no position to judge that there is excessive, unnecessary suffering by arguing that this defense has absurd consequences. It allows Young Earthers to construct a parallel argument that concludes that we are in no position to judge that God did not create the earth recently. In the last section I consider whether theists can turn the argument from evil on its head by arguing that God exists. I first criticize Alvin Plantinga’s theory of warrant that one might try to use to argue for God’s existence. I then criticize Richard Swinburne’s Bayesian argument to the same conclusion. I conclude that my version of the argument from evil is a strong argument against the existence of God and that several important responses to it do not defeat it.

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