Military Industry Evacuation at the Beginning of World War II and the NKVD

2020 ◽  
Vol 152 ◽  
pp. 142-151
Author(s):  
Uta G. Lagvilava ◽  

A few months after the fascist Germany’s attack on the USSR, under harsh wartime conditions, at the end of 1941 military industry of the Soviet Union began to produce such a quantity of military equipment that subsequently was providing not only replenishment of losses, but also improvement of technical equipment of the Red Army forces . Successful production of military equipment during World War II became one of the main factors in the victory over fascism. One of the unlit pages in affairs of the People’s Commissariat of Internal Affairs (NKVD) is displacement and evacuation of a huge number of enterprises and people to the east, beyond the Urals, which were occupied by German troops at the beginning of the war in the summer of 1941. All this was done according to the plans developed with direct participation of NKVD, which united before the beginning and during the war departments now called the Ministry of Internal Affairs, FSB, SVR, the Russian Guard, Ministry of Emergency Situations, FAPSI and several smaller ones. And all these NKVD structures during the war were headed by Lavrenty Pavlovich Beria.

2021 ◽  
pp. 53-73
Author(s):  
O. Lysenko ◽  
O. Fil ◽  
L. Khoynatska

Discussions around various aspects of World War II in the world’s scientific space and memory field have continued throughout the postwar decades. Initially, they were determined by polar and antagonistic ideological paradigms, and after the end of the Cold War – the discovery and introduction into scientific circulation of previously classified sources, testing of avant-garde methods of scientific knowledge, the development of interpretive tools. In the late 1930s, the Soviet Union found itself virtually isolated, alone with the Axis bloc and their allies. It was difficult for the Soviet leadership to overcome the existing threats on its own, especially after the German attack. Only the realization by the Western Allies that Berlin’s aggressive course had become a global challenge made it possible to find a constructive way to join forces in the fight against a common enemy. One of the channels of cooperation between the states of the Anti-Hitler Coalition was the organization of supplies to the USSR of military equipment, ammunition, food, and materials necessary for the facilities of the Soviet military-industrial complex within the framework of the land lease program. Until recently, the problem of land lease was more in ideological discourse than in purely scientific. The currently available source base allows for an unbiased analysis of this phenomenon and elucidation of the place and role of foreign revenues to the USSR in strengthening its defense capabilities during the war against Germany and its allies. However, to this day, the researchers look out of focus, because of the perception of this phenomenon by veterans who fought on foreign military equipment, ate food from overseas. The authors of the article sees their task as combining these two dimensions of the lend-lease and finding out its impact not only on the scale of the large-scale armed confrontation, but also on the moral and psychological condition of the Red Army, for whom the war was an extremely difficult test.


2015 ◽  
Vol 7 (1) ◽  
pp. 51-59
Author(s):  
Eleonóra Matkovits-Kretz

Abstract The German community in Hungary suffered many blows at the end of World War II and after it, on the basis of collective guilt. Immediately after the Red Army had marched in. gathering and deportation started into the camps of the Soviet Union, primarily into forced-labour camps in Donetsk, the Caucasus, and the Ural mountains. One third of them never returned. Those left behind had to face forced resettlement, the confiscation of their properties, and other ordeals. Their history was a taboo subject until the change of the political system in 1989. Not even until our days, by the 70th anniversary of the events, has their story reached a worthy place in national and international remembrance. International collaboration, the establishment of a research institute is needed to set to rights in history the story of the ordeal of the German community after World War II. for the present and future generations


2020 ◽  
Vol 12 (3) ◽  
pp. 7-44
Author(s):  
A. Yu. Borisov

It is unfortunate to note again today that World War II did not end, it continues in the form of the war of memory. Politicians and scholars who stand as ideological successors of collaborators are trying to rewrite the history of those tragic days, to downplay the role of the Soviet Union in the victory over fascism. They try to revive certain political myths, which have been debunked long ago, that the Soviet Union and the Nazi Germany bear equal responsibility for the outbreak of World War II, that the Red Army did not liberate Eastern Europe but ‘occupied’ it. In order to combat these attempts it is necessary to examine once again a turbulent history of the inter-war period and, particularly, the reasons why all attempts to form a united antifascist front had failed in the 1930s, but eventually led to the formation of the anti-Hitler coalition.The paper focuses on a complex set of political considerations, including cooperation and confrontation, mutual suspicions and a fervent desire to find an ally in the face of growing international tensions, which all together determined the dynamics of relations within a strategic triangle of the Soviet Union — the United States — Great Britain in the late 1930s and early 1940s. The paper shows how all attempts to establish a collective security system during the prewar period had shattered faced with the policy of appeasement, which allowed the Nazi Germany to occupy much of Europe. Only the Soviet Union’s entry into the war changed the course of the conflict and made a decisive contribution to the victory over fascist aggressors. The author emphasizes that at such crucial moment of history I.V. Stalin, F.D. Roosevelt and W. Churchill raised to that challenge, demonstrating realism, common sense and willingness to cooperate. Although within the anti-Hitler coalition there was a number of pending issues, which triggered tensions between the Allies, their leaders managed to move beyond old grievances, ideological differences and short-term political interests, to realize that they have a common strategic goal in the struggle against Nazism. According to the author, this is the foundation for success of the anti-Hitler coalition and, at the same time, the key lesson for contemporary politicians. The very emergence of the anti-Hitler coalition represented a watershed in the history of the 20th century, which has determined a way forward for the whole humanity and laid the foundations for the world order for the next fifty years.


2010 ◽  
Vol 17 (2) ◽  
pp. 135-137
Author(s):  
Charles A. Goldstein

The Harvard Law School Symposium, “Spoils of War v. Cultural Heritage: The Russian Cultural Property Law in Historical Context,” was convened in February 2008 to bring together legal, historical, and other academic experts who might shed some light on the issues raised by Russia's 1998 law that essentially nationalized and declared Russian ownership of the great many works of art, books, and archives that were taken under orders by the Red Army to the Soviet Union at the end of World War II. The symposium was jointly sponsored by the Commission for Art Recovery, the Foundation for International Cultural Diplomacy, the Harvard Law School Arts and Literature Law Society, the Harvard Law School European Law Research Center, and the Davis Center for Russian and Eurasian Studies of Harvard University.


2020 ◽  
Vol 13 (4) ◽  
pp. 7-51
Author(s):  
M. Yu. Myagkov

The article offers an overview of modern historical data on the origins, causes of World War II, the decisive role of the USSR in its victorious end, and also records the main results and lessons of World War II.Hitler's Germany was the main cause of World War II. Nazism, racial theory, mixed with far-reaching geopolitical designs, became the combustible mixture that ignited the fire of glob­al conflict. The war with the Soviet Union was planned to be waged with particular cruelty.The preconditions for the outbreak of World War II were the humiliating provisions of the Versailles Peace Treaty for the German people, as well as the attitude of the "Western de­mocracies" to Russia after 1917 and the Soviet Union as an outcast of world development. Great Britain, France, the United States chose for themselves a policy of ignoring Moscow's interests, they were more likely to cooperate with Hitler's Germany than with Soviet Russia. It was the "Munich Agreement" that became the point of no return to the beginning of the Second World War. Under these conditions, for the USSR, its own security and the conclusion of a non-aggression pact with Germany began to come to the fore, defining the "spheres of interests" of the parties in order to limit the advance of German troops towards the Soviet borders in the event of German aggression against Poland. The non-aggression pact gave the USSR just under two years to rebuild the army and consolidate its defensive potential and pushed the Soviet borders hundreds of kilometers westward. The signing of the Pact was preceded by the failure in August 1939 of the negotiations between the military mis­sions of Britain, France and the USSR, although Moscow took the Anglo-French-Soviet nego­tiations with all seriousness.The huge losses of the USSR in the summer of 1941 are explained by the following circum­stances: before the war, a large-scale modernization of the Red Army was launched, a gradu­ate of a military school did not have sufficient experience in managing an entrusted unit by June 22, 1941; the Red Army was going to bleed the enemy in border battles, stop it with short counterattacks by covering units, carry out defensive operations, and then strike a de­cisive blow into the depths of the enemy's territory, so the importance of a multi-echeloned long-term defense in 1941 was underestimated by the command of the Red Army and it was not ready for it; significant groupings of the Western Special Military District were drawn into potential salients, which was used by the Germans at the initial stage of the war; Stalin's fear of provoking Hitler to start a war led to slowness in making the most urgent and necessary decisions to bring troops to combat readiness.The Allies delayed the opening of the second front for an unreasonably long time. They, of course, achieved outstanding success in the landing operation in France, however, the en­emy's losses in only one Soviet strategic operation in the summer of 1944 ("Bagration") are not inferior, and even exceed, the enemy’s losses on the second front. One of the goals of "Bagration" was to help the Allies.Soviet soldiers liberated Europe at the cost of their lives. At the same time, Moscow could not afford to re-establish a cordon sanitaire around its borders after the war, so that anti- Soviet forces would come to power in the border states. The United States and Great Britain took all measures available to them to quickly remove from the governments of Italy, France and other Western states all the left-wing forces that in 1944-1945 had a serious impact on the politics of their countries.


Author(s):  
Aleksandr Fedorov ◽  
Gennadiy Golyadkin

Today we are witnessing another surge of Anti-Russian sentiment, resuscitating the old myth of Russia’s eternal aggressiveness. Obviously, it was needed for the West anti-Russian forces in order to dictate our country their conditions and rules of the game. Ultimately doodle, these goals are also served to distorting the truth about World War II. This scientific article discusses a number of the most controversial issues in the history of World War II. From the point of historicism view and scientific objectivity, their interpretation of Western historiography and politicians of anti-Russian orientation is criticized. The efforts of modern Anti-Russian sentiments are equating the pre-war policy of the USSR with the aggressive policy of Nazi Germany had exposed. Myths about the allegedly “preventive” nature of the treacherous attack of the latter on the Soviet Union are refuted, as well as attempts to justify the collapse of the “blitzkrieg” not by the heroic resistance of the Red Army, but by difficult climatic conditions, huge distances and numerous water barriers on the way of German troops. The authors of the article draw attention to the fact that in many Western military-historical works, the main reasons for the defeat of the Wehrmacht on the Eastern Front by the filing of German “memoirs” generals are primarily called Hitler’s incompetence and stubbornness, betrayal of satellite countries, etc., but not the superiority of Soviet military strategy and operational art, the ability to fight, the courage and steadfastness of a Soviet soldier who fought both for the freedom of his Fatherland and for the liberation of all Europe from the Nazi yoke.


Author(s):  
Marianna Kmeťová ◽  
Marek Syrný

After the German campaign at the beginning of World War II (1939), Poland was divided between nazi Germany which occupied the west and center of the country, and the Soviet Union which occupying the Eastern regions. The controversial relationship with Moscow has seen several diametrical breaks from a positive alliance after the invasion of the Soviet Union by the Axis powers in 1941, to a very critical relationship with the USSR after the revelation of the so-called Katyn massacre in 1943. With the approach of the Eastern Front to the frontiers of pre-war Poland, massive Polish Resistance was also activated to get rid of nazi domination and to restore of pre-war Poland. The neutralization of possible claims by the Soviets on the disputed eastern areas (Western Ukraine, Belarus, Lithuania), respectively to prevent the crushing sovietization of Poland, it was also intended to serve a clear and world-wide resistance act in the sense of liberating at least Warsaw from the German occupation. This was to prevent the repeat of the situation in the east of the country, where the Red Army and the Soviet authorities overlooked the merits and interests of the Polish Resistance and Polish authorities. The contribution will therefore focus on the analysis of the causes, assumptions, course and consequences of the ultimate outcome of the unsuccessful efforts of the Armia Krajowa and the Warsaw inhabitants to liberate the city on their own and to determine the free post-war existence of the country.


2021 ◽  
Vol 53 (4) ◽  
pp. 691-702
Author(s):  
Firoozeh Kashani-Sabet

In 1946, the entertainer and activist Paul Robeson pondered America's intentions in Iran. In what was to become one of the first major crises of the Cold War, Iran was fighting a Soviet aggressor that did not want to leave. Robeson posed the question, “Is our State Department concerned with protecting the rights of Iran and the welfare of the Iranian people, or is it concerned with protecting Anglo-American oil in that country and the Middle East in general?” This was a loaded question. The US was pressuring the Soviet Union to withdraw its troops after its occupation of the country during World War II. Robeson wondered why America cared so much about Soviet forces in Iranian territory, when it made no mention of Anglo-American troops “in countries far removed from the United States or Great Britain.” An editorial writer for a Black journal in St. Louis posed a different variant of the question: Why did the American secretary of state, James F. Byrnes, concern himself with elections in Iran, Arabia or Azerbaijan and yet not “interfere in his home state, South Carolina, which has not had a free election since Reconstruction?”


Author(s):  
Vēsma Lēvalde

The article is a cultural-historical study and a part of the project Uniting History, which aims to discover the multicultural aspect of performing art in pre-war Liepaja and summarize key facts about the history of the Liepāja Symphony Orchestra. The study also seeks to identify the performing artists whose life was associated with Liepāja and who were repressed between 1941 and 1945, because of aggression by both the Soviet Union and National Socialist Germany. Until now, the cultural life of this period in Liepāja has been studied in a fragmentary way, and materials are scattered in various archives. There are inaccurate and even contradictory testimonies of events of that time. The study marks both the cultural and historical situation of the 1920s and the 1930s in Liepāja and tracks the fates of several artists in the period between 1939 and 1945. On the eve of World War II, Liepāja has an active cultural life, especially in theatre and music. Liepāja City Drama and Opera is in operation staging both dramatic performances, operas, and ballet, employing an orchestra. The symphony orchestra also operated at the Liepāja Philharmonic, where musicians were recruited every season according to the principles of contemporary festival orchestras. Liepāja Folk Conservatory (music school) had also formed an orchestra of students and teachers. Guest concerts were held regularly. A characteristic feature of performing arts in Liepaja was its multicultural character – musicians of different nationalities with experience from different schools of the world were encountered there. World War II not only disrupted the balance in society, but it also had a very concrete and tragic impact on the fates of the people, including the performing artists. Many were killed, many repressed and placed in prisons and camps, and many went to exile to the West. Others were forced to either co-operate with the occupation forces or give up their identity and, consequently, their career as an artist. Nevertheless, some artists risked their lives to save others.


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