The Ontological Argument Revisited: A Reply to Rowe

2010 ◽  
Vol 15 (1) ◽  
pp. 37-44
Author(s):  
Eric Wilson

Saint Anselm’s Ontological Argument is perhaps the most intriguing of all the traditional speculative proofs for the existence of God. Yet, his argument has been rejected outright by many philosophers. Most challenges stem from the basic conviction that no amount of logical analysis of a concept that is limited to the bounds of the “understanding” will ever be able to “reason” the existence in “reality” of anything answering such a limited concept. However, it is not the intent of this paper to prove or disprove Anselm’s argument. Rather, in this paper we concern ourselves with arriving at a sound interpretation of Anselm’s leading critic—Immanuel Kant. Kant put forth perhaps the most vaunted criticism of Anselm’s argument. However, Kant has been perhaps the most misunderstood objector to Anselm’s argument. This paper confirms that charge, simultaneously offering what I believe to be a sound interpretation of Kant’s criticism.

2016 ◽  
Vol 15 (1) ◽  
pp. 69
Author(s):  
Martinus Ariya Seta

Abstrak: Di dalam filsafat teoretis Kant, status Tuhan bukan lagi transenden tetapi transendental. Perubahan status Tuhan menjadi transendental memiliki dampak ganda. Di satu sisi, Kant memberikan pendasaran rasionalitas konsep Tuhan. Akan tetapi di sisi lain, Kant menghindari penegasan terhadap eksistensi Tuhan. Menurut Kant, konsep Tuhan adalah sebuah ide regulatif. Ide regulatif tidak memiliki referensi di luar pikiran manusia. Kant hanya menegaskan urgensi logis konsep Tuhan bagi kesatuan pengetahuan. Akan tetapi, urgensi logis tidak cukup memadai sebagai argumen pembuktian eksistensi Tuhan. Kant memisahkan antara keternalaran dan ada. Pemisahan ini terlihat jelas di dalam kritik Kant terhadap pembuktian ontologis. Menurut penulis, profil filsafat transendental menjadi transparan di dalam kritik Kant terhadap pembuktian ontologis. Pengadopsian secara parsial paham dasar rasionalisme dan empirisme melatarbelakangi filsafat transendental dan memicu pemisahan antara keternalaran dan ada yang tampak jelas di dalam kritik Kant terhadap pembuktian ontologis. Kata-kata Kunci: Konsep, transendental, keternalaran, ada, ide regulatif, pembuktian ontologis. Abstract: In Kant’s theoretical philosophy, the status of God is not transcendent anymore, but transcendental. The transcendental status of God has a double impact. On the one hand, the concept of God is conceivable. But on the other hand, Kant avoids the affirmation of the existence of God. The conceivability of God is not an argument for God’s existence because the concept of God is a regulative idea. A regulative idea has no reference outside the mind. Kant only affirms the logical necessity of the concept of God. However, the logical necessity is not an adequate argument for the existence of God. Kant separates between conceivability and being. The separation is obvious in his critique toward the ontological argument. In my opinion, the profile of the transcendental philosophy is transparent in Kant’s critique toward the ontological argument. The partial adoption of empirical and rational principles works behind the transcendental philosophy and leads to the separation between conceivability and being, which is visible in the Kant’s critique toward the ontological argument. Keywords: Concept, transcendental, conceivability, being, regulative idea, ontological argument.


2012 ◽  
Vol 17 (2) ◽  
pp. 245-268
Author(s):  
Tadeusz Grzesik

In the first part of my paper, I shall consider how Anselm of Canterbury’s so-called ontological argument has been misapprehended by those treating it as a proof for the existence of God. In the second part, I shall focus on Chapter One of the Proslogion and on the Epistola de incarnatione Verbi to show what Anselm’s real purpose was regarding the problem of the existence of God. I shall support my view by referring also to the thought of John Henry Newman and Henri de Lubac.


Author(s):  
Uygar Abacı

This chapter examines the way Kant’s revolutionary theory of modality radicalizes his critique of ontotheology in the Ideal of Pure Reason. First it shows how Kant’s downgrading of his own precritical ‘only possible argument’ from an objectively valid demonstration of the real necessity of the existence of God to a subjectively valid demonstration of the necessity of assuming the idea of such a being is due to his shift from an ontological to an epistemological interpretation of the actualist principle. Second, it argues that Kant’s refutation of the traditional ontological argument in the Ideal follows a multilayered strategy, consisting of a combination of two historical lines of objection, only the second of which presupposes his negative thesis that existence is not a real predicate, as well as an additional, third objection based on his further thesis that all existential judgments are synthetic, albeit in a peculiar sense.


Author(s):  
Geraldine Coggins

Metaphysical nihilism is an answer to the question ‘could there have been nothing?’ In recent analytic philosophy this tends to be interpreted as ‘could there have been no concrete objects?’ There are three ways of answering this question. The first is metaphysical nihilism, which answers in the affirmative: ‘there could have been nothing’. The second and third answers give negative replies. The second answer is based on the ontological argument for the existence of God. This argument leads us to claim that there is a necessarily existing object. If there is one object which must exist, then there could not have been nothing, there had to be this one object. The third answer also claims that there could not have been nothing but does not rely on the existence of a necessary object. This view is that whilst there had to be something, there is no one particular object which had to exist.


Mnemosyne ◽  
2020 ◽  
pp. 1-30
Author(s):  
Rafael Ferber

Abstract This paper deals with the deuteros plous, literally ‘the second voyage’, proverbially ‘the next best way’, discussed in Plato’s Phaedo, the key passage being Phd. 99e4-100a3. I argue that (a) the ‘flight into the logoi’ can have two different interpretations, a standard one and a non-standard one. The issue is whether at 99e-100a Socrates means that both the student of erga and the student of logoi consider images (‘the standard interpretation’), or the student of logoi does not consider images (‘the non-standard interpretation’); (b) the non-standard one implies the problem of the hypothesis, a problem analogous to the problem of the elenchus; (c) there is a structural analogy between Descartes’ ontological argument for the existence of God in his 5th Meditation and the final proof for the immortality of the soul in the Phaedo.


Author(s):  
Martin Bell

This chapter is about Hume’s critiques of the cosmological, ontological, and design arguments for the existence of God, as proposed by Samuel Clarke and other Newtonian theologians. Clarke regarded the cosmological argument (in a form that incorporates the ontological argument) as essential to prove the uniqueness, eternity, infinity, and omnipresence of God and the design argument as essential to prove the wisdom and foresight of God. The criticisms Hume makes all depend on his empiricist theory of ideas and his revolutionary theories of causation and causal reasoning. Most of the chapter discusses these themes. The concluding section draws attention to recent research that shows two things. One is how central to Hume’s whole philosophical enterprise is his rejection of theological ideas and doctrines. The other is how this relates to his rejection of certain parts of Newtonian metaphysics.


2015 ◽  
Vol 36 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Chibuikem C. Nnaeme

This article is concerned with how we can know about the existence of God. In attempting to do this, the article will single out two medieval thinkers, Anselm and Aquinas, and will examine their stances on the subject. The former holds, as exemplified in his ontological proof,that human beings can rationally know the existence of God, whilst the latter objects to theformer�s claim by proffering that human beings can know God�s existence through effects of God�s creation. Over the years these positions have appealed to people who defend eitherstr and of the argument. Such a followership makes worthwhile my efforts to contribute to the ongoing debate. It is my intention to show the argument of each of these positions and indicate which is more plausible to human beings. It is vital to note that Anselm and Aquinas both accept the existence of God; therefore, the existence of God is not in question for them.The article will only concentrate on where the two thinkers differ in terms of how human beings can know God�s existence.Intradisciplinary and/or interdisciplinary implications: This article challenges idealists�philosophy that human beings can prove God�s existence from the concept, God, as epitomisedby Anselm�s ontological argument. The critique of the argument through the application of Aquinas�s realism exposes the limitedness of the human beings in epistemological conception of the absolute metaphysical reality.


2017 ◽  
Vol 3 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Graham Oppy

Graham Oppy explores formulations of Gödel’s ontological argument for the existence of God in third-order modal logic and argues that these arguments do not allow us to decide between theistic and naturalistic positions.


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