Gödel`s Ontological Argument, Positive Properties, and Gaunilist Objection

The article is devoted to Gödel’s ontological argument, its place in the history of philosophy, and the current debate over the validity of ontological proof. First, we argue that Gödel's argument is a necessary step in the history of the development of ontological proof. Second, we show that Gödel’s argument (namely, its core concept of “positive property”) is based on implausible axiological principles (this fact raises many objections like Hajek’s counter-argument), but can be appropriately reformulated in terms of plausible axiological principles (Gustafsson’s argument). Also, we consider the debate over the validity of Gödel’s argument between contemporary neo-Gaunilist Graham Oppy and the advocate of Gödel’s ontological proof Michael Gettings. We conclude that Gödel’s ontological argument is immune to Oppy’s neo-Gaunilism. Finally, given the fact that Oppy’s parody is arguably the most fine-grained Gaunilo-style argument in the history of philosophy, we conclude that Gaunilist line of argumentation, even if successful in refuting Anselm’s ontological proof of God’s existence, does not work against Gödel’s ontological argument (what is evidenced by the results of the debate between Oppy and Gettings).

Mendelssohn und Kant über den ontologischen Gottesbeweis

This essay develops a new interpretation of Moses Mendelssohn’s ontological argument in the Morning Hours: Lectures on God’s Existence. At the beginning, Immanuel Kant’s famous criticism of the ontological proof of God’s existence in the Critique of Pure Reason is presented. Then I offer an in-depth analysis of Mendelssohn’s original ontological argument in the Morning Hours. It is shown that with Mendelssohn’s new proof of God, Kant’s objections are answered. Finally, it is explained why Mendelssohn does not succeed in completely refuting Kant’s objections.

Missiotropic Axiologic of the University

The authors view the of the university as a system of values that is logically connected with the nature of knowledge as the subject, goal, and highest value of the university’s main scientific and educational activities. The key criterion of knowledge is the evidential validity. The article reveals its meaning from the position of Russian intuitionism, which combines the method of reflexive analysis with the tradition of ontological proof. The authors treat the meaning of absolute truth intuition as the basis of the value function of knowledge in relation to university education. In accordance with the essential orientation of universities to the reproduction of knowledge, that is the unconditional public good, they are qualified as missiotropic organizations. The University’s missiotropic axiologic is justified as a humanistic alternative to the capitalist ideal of global social harmony. Based on the methodological potential of the fundamental motivational matrix (FMM), the caste attributes of the latter are revealed. The specific nature of the appeal to moral responsibility in the context of corporate governance is revealed; the tendency to legalize ethical responsibility in connection with its instrumental understanding in the context of global market competition is noted.

Bering and Kant on a Hundred Actual and Possible Thalers

This paper has three aims. First, to show Kant’s originality in using the celebrated example of the hundred thalers as a criticism of the ontological proof, despite being inspired by a 1780 booklet by Johann Bering. Second, to assess Bering’s and Kant’s different reasons for supporting the truth meant to be illustrated by the case of the thalers. Third, to point out that the debate on the example demands a discussion of the problem of universals. Indeed, the value and scope of Kant’s (and Bering’s) critique of the ontological argument is decisively determined by his position on this problem.

Schelling’s Criticism of Ontological Argument and Interpretation of Kant’s Doctrine of the Ideal of Reason

To reconstruct a critique of the ontological proof of the existence of God in Schelling’s philosophy I examine his interpretation of the ontological argument by Anselm of Canterbury and Descartes as well as Schelling’s assessment of the critique of the Kantian ontological proof of the existence of God. I propose a reconstruction of Schelling’s account of undoubted being which cannot be deduced from the concept of the totality of all that is possible and therefore must come before any thought. He interprets reason as having an ecstatic nature which posits precedent undoubted being. This enables Schelling to formulate his own version of the thesis on the unity of being and thought, whereby being comes first and thought is only second. Against this background I analyse Schelling’s interpretation of the Kantian account of the ideal of reason. Schelling, on the one hand, agrees with Kant that being is not a real predicate, hence real existence cannot be deduced from essence in the sense of “what.” But, on the other hand, in contrast to Kant, he believes that real existence of the individual absolute must be assumed, which would be the subject for all possible predicates and whose being is ecstatically posited by reason as being external to itself. I raise the question of the relevance of Schelling’s thought for modern ontology, above all in overcoming ontotheology. Proceeding from the works of J. F. Courtine and L. Tengelyi I single out two aspects of Schelling’s doctrine that are relevant to my subject: (1) the priority of existence over essence in God’s being and (2) the fundamental irreducibility of God to a necessarily existent being, i.e. God’s freedom. It is evident that, in his interpretation of Kant, Schelling somewhat simplifies his train of thought and leaves it unclear how Kant links the concepts of necessary being and the supremely perfect being. It is also evident that Schelling’s concepts of “contingency,” “contingent necessity,” “the whole experience” need further study.

Purism

This article presents an ontological proof that God is impossible. I define an ‘impossibility’ as a condition which is inconceivable due to its a priori characteristics (e.g. a ‘square circle’). Accordingly, said conditions will not ever become conceivable, as they could in instances of a posteriori inconceivability (e.g. the notion that someone could touch a star without being burned). As the basis of this argument, I refer to an a priori observation (Primus, 2019) regarding our inability to imagine inconsistency (difference) within any point of space. This observation renders the notion of absolute power to be inconceivable, a priori. I briefly discuss the moral implications of religious faith in the context of Purism: a moral rationalist paradigm. I conclude that whilst belief in God can be aesthetically expressed it should not be possessed as a material purpose, due to the illogicality of the latter category of belief and/or expression. With this article I provide conceptual delineation between harmless religious belief and expression—which, I argue, should be protected from persecution, as per any other artistic expression—and religious belief and expression which is materially harmful to society. Whilst I aim to protect religious freedom of expression on one hand, I duly aim to reduce instances of material faith in God(s) on the other. Finally, I aim to bring hope in the possibility for human salvation via technology—such that they should exist indefinitely as ‘demi-gods,’ defined by conditional, relative power over their environment.

Gödels ontologischer Gottesbeweis im Kontext der Systematischen Theologie

ZusammenfassungKurt Gödels Ontological Proof von 1970 ist einer der bedeutendsten Beweise der Existenz Gottes unserer Zeit. Die Formulierung in formaler Logik erschwert erstens das Verständnis und scheint zweitens einen unbedingten Wahrheitsbezug zu implizieren. Seit seiner Veröffentlichung bis heute wurde sich auf vielfältige Weise mit dem Beweis auseinandergesetzt und dazu publiziert. Allerdings fehlt bislang eine theologische – insbesondere eine protestantisch-theologische – Auseinandersetzung. Dieser Aufsatz soll eine systematische Übersicht über die bisherige Forschung sowie eine Einführung und Erläuterung des Beweises geben. Der theologische Forschungsbeitrag besteht hierbei vor allem in einer Relativierung einiger mit dem Beweis und seiner Rezeption verbundenen Ansprüche.

The Objectivity of the Concept

Chapter 6 explores the transition to “Objectivity,” continuing the investigation into the role of the Gattung as an objective universal. Hegel’s chapters on “Mechanism,” “Chemism,” and “Teleology,” establish the genus not only as an objective context of predication but also as the necessary context of objective existence, determining the degree to which self-determining activity can be realized. This chapter defends Hegel’s employment of the ontological proof and argues that the being or existence that can be inferred from the Concept is being as self-individuating activity. The processes of mechanism, chemism, and external purposiveness all fall short of self-determining activity, which is marked by descriptions of striving and violence. This chapter also discusses what Hegel calls “objective judgment,” and considers its relation to the practical syllogism. Hegel’s analysis reveals that there is an irreducible role for judgment as an act of self-determination and self-constitution, an activity that is immediately manifest in the activity of life.

The Emergence of Onto-Gnoseology among Russian Intuitivists as Criticism of Neo-Kantianism

At the beginning of the twentieth century in the Russian-speaking philosophical space philosophical projects emerged which brought ontology and gnoseology closer together. One can observe this process, for example, in the philosophical doctrines of the Russian intuitivists Nikolay Lossky and Semyon Frank. I demonstrate that the emergence of these doctrines and the development of their onto-gnoseological categorial apparatus were mainly connected with the criticism of the Neo-Kantian theory of cognition and the possibility of transcendent knowledge as such. The main sources of my study are The Intuitive Basis of Knowledge and The World as an Organic Whole by N. O. Lossky and The Object of Knowledge and The Unknowable by S. L. Frank. My investigation makes it possible to treat Lossky’s categorial framework as the representation of a system of levels of the universe each of which is characterised by two aspects: the ontological, i.e. it is part of the unity of the world, and the gnoseological, i.e. it has an independent cognitive significance. Frank considers categories to be an organic part of the ontological proof of intuitivism. A common trend in the construction of categorial schemes by Lossky and Frank is their striving to combine gnoseological and ontological descriptions of categories. The key difference is the way an onto-gnoseological system as a whole is justified. In revealing the contradictions in Lossky’s conception, I proceed from the critical remarks of S. A. Askoldov (Alexeyev), pointing out that these contradictions stem from an absolutisation of intuition in cognition, the renunciation of the idea of gnoseological transcendence, incompleteness of the theory of immanence and discordance between onto-gnoseological categories. Askoldov’s critical comments clarify the substantive features of Lossky’s theory and the essence of the transformations carried out in Frank’s absolute ideal-realism.