Business Intelligence in Corporate Governance and Business Processes Management

Author(s):  
Alexander Yakovlev

Today is the time of transnational corporations and large companies. They bring to their shareholders and owners the major profits, and they are the main sponsors of scientific and technological progress. However, the extensive way of its development is not possible for environmental, marketing, resource, and many other reasons. So, the main field of competition between companies becomes a fight for the client, the individualization of approach to him, and the maximum cost reduction. At the same time, a series of scandals that erupted in the early 2000s with such major corporations as Enron Corporation, WorldCom, Tyco International, Adelphia, and Peregrine Systems has shown that the system of corporate governance, on which depends the welfare of hundreds of thousands of people, requires serious improvements in terms of transparency and openness. In this regard, the U.S. adopted the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, under which management companies legally obliged to prove that his decisions are based on reliable, relevant, credible and accurate information (Devenport & Harris, 2010).

2009 ◽  
Vol 7 (1) ◽  
pp. 84-95 ◽  
Author(s):  
Chia-Ling Ho ◽  
Gene Lai ◽  
Jin-Ping Lee

This paper examines the impact of corporate governance and audit quality on risk-taking in the U.S. property casualty insurance industry. The evidence shows that some corporate governance variables, as well as some audit quality variables are related to risk-taking. We find that longer board tenure is associated with low underwriting risk. But the higher percentage of financial experts on the board is associated with high underwriting risk. The possible reason is that financial experts possess a deep understanding of a firm’s financial situation and may encourage the management to take higher risk in anticipation of a higher return for a positive net present value project. The results are consistent with agency theory and wealth transfer hypothesis in that high risk taking is consistent with shareholder interest maximization. In addition, we find a non-monotonic relation between insider ownership and leverage risk. Finally, we do not find evidence that the Sarbanes-Oxley act have impact on the risk taking behavior.


Author(s):  
Lee-Hsien Pan ◽  
Shuo Chen ◽  
Chieh-Chung Wu ◽  
K. C. Chen

This paper examines the effects of cross listing and Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) on corporate governance and firm performance of the cross-listed firms from four Tiger Cub Economics: Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, and Thailand. We find that these non-U.S. firms that list their shares as American Depositary Receipts (ADRs) experience an improvement in corporate governance and a decrease in firm performance after issuing ADRs in the U.S. However, SOX appears to be effective in enhancing firm performance for these ADRs, though it has little impact on improving corporate governance.


Author(s):  
Frank Stevens

Corporate governance has received a lot of attention over the last few years. A big contributing factor to this was a number of major corporate fraud cases and the subsequent introduction of new regulations such as the Sarbanes-Oxley Act in 2002. The attention to Corporate Governance also leads to questions about IT governance as well, since direction and control over IT plays a vital role in supporting the business processes. A number of frameworks are used for implementing and improving IT governance in an organization. This chapter discusses and compares two such frameworks: ITIL V3 and Cobit 4.1 and shows that ITIL V3 and Cobit 4.1 create the most added value when used in combination.


Author(s):  
Marc I. Steinberg

This concluding chapter focuses on the future federalization of corporate governance. From proposals to require federal incorporation and federal minimum standards early in the twentieth century to present times (such as the enactment of the Sarbanes-Oxley and Dodd-Frank Acts), the presence of federal mandates as an essential component of the corporate governance landscape is clear. Although future federalization of corporate governance is uncertain, the impression remains that this federalization process is firmly entrenched. As in the past, the federalization of corporate governance is a process that will evolve and adapt to changing circumstances as they arise. This federalization process will remain as a key determiner for the continuing stability of the U.S. capital markets and the protection of investors.


2003 ◽  
Vol 4 (2) ◽  
pp. 127-135 ◽  
Author(s):  
David C. Donald

Rational investment decisions require accurate information regarding the operations and performance of issuers. As the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”) has recently noted: “Accurate and reliable financial reporting lies at the heart of our disclosure-based system for securities regulation, and is critical to the integrity of the U.S. securities markets. Investors need accurate and reliable financial information to make informed investment decisions. Investor confidence in the reliability of corporate financial information is fundamental to the liquidity and vibrancy of our markets.” Issuers have strong motives to signal to investors that the business information they disclose is correct and complete – so as to build solid reputations and avoid discounts that investors might apply to their stock prices as compensation for undisclosed risk or misrepresented results. A similar argument applies to “gatekeeping” reputational intermediaries, such as auditing firms and investment banks that lend their reputations to their clients in various ways. However, dishonest issuers and gatekeepers can take advantage of a generally honest market (that does not contain a substantial fraud risk discount), and the return on fraud for a given member of a firm might exceed such individual's pro rata share of the firm's overall reputational capital, making crime literally pay; therefore, regulation must be introduced to supplement market controls and mandate full and accurate disclosure.


2019 ◽  
Vol 17 (1) ◽  
pp. 116-124
Author(s):  
Mark Bertus ◽  
John S. Jahera Jr. ◽  
Keven Yost

This paper empirically analyzes the impact of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act on the relation between measures of corporate governance and a firm’s dividend policy in the U.S. equity market. Using the IRRC database, we find that there is a statistically significant relation between governance measures and a firm’s dividend policy in the years prior to the introduction of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act. However, following Sarbanes-Oxley, the relation between a firm’s governance structure and dividend policy changes. In particular, shareholders’ rights and the proportion of outside directors are no longer significant in explaining a firm’s dividend policy.


2010 ◽  
Vol 5 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-24 ◽  
Author(s):  
Joann Segovia ◽  
Carol M. Jessup ◽  
Marsha Weber ◽  
Sheri Erickson

A very significant change to the accounting profession occurred in 2002 when the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (SOX) was enacted. This legislation had a significant impact on corporations and their audit firms. The objective was to improve corporate governance and its quality of financial reporting to improve investor confidence. This paper provides instructors with a background on SOX and suggests readings and activities that reflect the requirements of SOX as it relates to the AIS environment and the analysis of internal controls. These activities can strengthen students' understandings of how corporations respond to the various reporting requirements of this Act.


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