Fiscal Decentralisation and Urban Local Governments in India: An Empirical Review

2006 ◽  
Vol 45 (1) ◽  
pp. 157-161
Author(s):  
Durre-e- Nayab

The Local Government Ordinance (LGO), formulated by the National Reconstruction Bureau (NRB) in 2000 and promulgated by provincial governments in August 2001, assigns powers, responsibilities, and service delivery functions to three levels of local governments: district, tehsil, and union. Responsibilities for the delivery of social and human development services, such as primary and basic health, education and social welfare, are delegated to the district level, whereas municipal services, such as water, sanitation and urban services are assigned to the tehsil level. The LGO does not only deal with the delivery of public services in its plan but also stresses the need for fiscal decentralisation, claiming that “Fiscal decentralisation is the heart of any devolution exercise. Without fiscal decentralisation no authority is devolved.”


1995 ◽  
Vol 13 (3) ◽  
pp. 351-360 ◽  
Author(s):  
S Nath ◽  
B C Purohit

Reassignment of local functions to state government and fiscal decentralisation seem to be contradictory. Whether these fiscal strategies are compatible policy packages is an empirical question. The crucial issue is as to how local governments respond to reassignment, a response which may be reflected in their willingness to spend on remaining functions. If reassignment stimulates local expenditure such that the extent of decline in fiscal decentralisation (the local share in total state–local expenditure) is less than the amount warranted, the two fiscal strategies can be taken to be compatible. To test this hypothesis, conditions for compatibility are postulated in terms of tax efforts of state and local governments. With use of Indian fiscal data, state and local tax efforts are computed and compared for selected states, as a first approximation. There is no conclusive evidence to show that reassignment has invariably exerted any dampening impact on local expenditure.


2018 ◽  
Vol 37 (2) ◽  
pp. 360-381 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jose M Alonso ◽  
Rhys Andrews

Fiscal decentralisation arguably improves government efficiency because it enhances responsiveness to local policy issues and incentivises fiscal discipline. However, critics suggest that central control over local spending is necessary to equalise fiscal outcomes between prosperous and deprived areas. Using a two-stage analysis, we investigate the validity of these arguments by analysing the separate and combined effects of fiscal decentralisation and socio-economic deprivation on the productive efficiency of English local governments during 2002–2008. The results suggest that decentralisation is positively related to productive efficiency and that there is a negative relationship between socio-economic deprivation and efficiency. Further analysis reveals that deprivation weakens the positive decentralisation–efficiency relationship, calling into question simplistic proposals for fiscal decentralisation.


2016 ◽  
Vol 14 (3) ◽  
pp. 431-450 ◽  
Author(s):  
Sanja Kmezić ◽  
Jadranka Kaluđerović ◽  
Mijat Jocović ◽  
Katarina Đulić

This article examines the fiscal decentralisation process and local government financing in Montenegro from 2002 to 2015 by focusing on the key legislative changes that occurred during the period under observation, as well as on the fiscal impact these changes and the economic crisis have had on municipal budgets. The analysis identifies two distinct phases of municipal financing in Montenegro. In the first phase (2003-2008), the Republic adopted legislation that strengthened the role and fiscal autonomy of local governments. During the second phase (2008-2015), several of the national government’s centralistic policies came into force. Together with the effects of the economic crisis, they deteriorated both local public finance and macroeconomic stability and hindered local economic development.


2014 ◽  
Vol 64 (4) ◽  
pp. 441-461 ◽  
Author(s):  
Fernando Toboso

This paper investigates the evolution of sub-central government borrowing in Spain over the period 1996–2011. The arguments and figures provided show that the intense process of political and fiscal decentralisation that took place over the 1990s and 2000s did not lead to higher debt ratios in terms of GDP at these tiers of government until 2007. Although a kind of overspending bias was in effect until the late 2000s, the paper shows that the evolution of GDP and tax revenues provided regional and local governments with enough resources to vigorously pursue their devolved public policy responsibilities and still keep their debt ratios under control. However, since 2008, when the world financial crisis broke out, the situation has changed dramatically. Even though the crisis originated in the financial sector, the paper concludes by stressing the importance of creating incentives and setting controls through institutional arrangements characterising multilevel government for all tiers of government to save in periods of economic growth in order to confront the impact of recession once it comes.


2015 ◽  
Vol 13 (3) ◽  
pp. 595-613 ◽  
Author(s):  
Martina Halásková ◽  
Renata Halaskova

Fiscal decentralisation aims to provide own financial resources or transfers from the central government for an efficient use of the original competences by local governments. This paper deals with the role of fiscal decentralisation and its impact on local public services. Rational indicators of revenue and expenditure fiscal decentralisation and selected local government expenditure are compared by public services, including the extent of decentralisation in selected EU countries. Modelling and comparison of selected EU countries is carried out through the method of multidimensional scaling according to the similarity of local government expenditure on services of social protection, healthcare, education, and recreation and culture (as % GDP) in years 2006, 2009 and 2012.


2017 ◽  
Vol 15 (3) ◽  
pp. 685-703 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jadranka Kaludjerovic ◽  
Milika Mirković ◽  
Mijat Jocović

The goal of the paper is to determine the extent to which local governments in Montenegro have managed to direct their increasing fiscal autonomy towards supporting local economic development. Our analysis of local business support programmes has shown that local governments have space to improve their business environments and business support programmes. Econometric analysis of data for 21 municipalities for 2007-2014 period, showed that the increase of own-source and shared revenues has a positive impact on local economic development. However, these findings are insufficient to conclude the extent to which decentralisation influences economic development and identify channels whereby it exerts this influence.


2000 ◽  
Vol 39 (4II) ◽  
pp. 981-1011
Author(s):  
Aisha Ghaus Pasha ◽  
Hafiz A Pasha

Fiscal decentralisation represents the transfer of resources from higher to lower levels of government usually accompanied by an enhancement in responsibilities and functions of sub- national governments and greater autonomy in their budget making and financial decisions. The rising demand generally for decentralisation in developing countries in recent years is a consequence of the broader processes of globalisation, liberalisation and deregulation. Political imperatives for decentralisation have been created by the urge for more effective democratisation and the need to bring governments closer to the people for greater accountability and better articulation of their needs and preferences. In a number of countries, including Pakistan, the failure of central or state/provincial governments to adequately capture local preferences and provide basic services have strengthened the case for use of local governments as delivery agents, such that the production and distribution of services is carried down to the lowest unit of government capable of capturing the associated costs and benefits.


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