The UK courts and EU law post-Brexit

2021 ◽  
Vol 20 (3) ◽  
pp. Christopher-Vajda
Author(s):  
Christopher Vajda
Keyword(s):  
Supreme Court ◽  
Transition Period ◽  
Case Law ◽  
Eu Law ◽  
National Courts ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
The Future ◽  
The Status ◽  
The Uk ◽  
Court Of Appeal

Following the expiry on 31 December 2020 of the ‘transition period’ under the UK/EU Withdrawal Agreement, the relationship between UK and EU law had changed. Whilst much EU legislation at that date will continue to apply in UK law as ‘retained EU law’ and judgments of the EU courts handed down before that date will remain binding on UK courts as ‘retained EU case law’, the Court of Appeal and Supreme Court can depart from that case law. Whilst EU court judgments handed down after that date are not binding on UK courts, they may be taken into account. This article considers both the status of EU retained case law and when the Supreme Court and Court of Appeal may depart from it, and the future of EU law that is not ‘retained EU case law’ and how judgments of the European Courts and national courts of its Member States may influence UK judges in the future.

11 The Supreme Court and the European Union

2019 ◽  
Author(s):  
Dickson Brice
Keyword(s):  
European Union ◽  
Supreme Court ◽  
European Community ◽  
Separation Of Powers ◽  
Case Law ◽  
Eu Law ◽  
The European Union ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
The Status ◽  
The Way

This chapter charts the way in which the Irish Supreme Court has applied the law of the European Community/Union. It takes the reader through several seminal cases which illustrate the Court’s readiness to accommodate EC/EU standards within domestic Irish law. These include the Campus Oil case, the Crotty case, the Meagher case, the Maher case, and the Pringle case. This entails explaining and critiquing the Supreme Court’s approach to the doctrine of separation of powers and the status of EC/EU law within the Irish Constitution. The case-law in this field illustrates how activist the Supreme Court can sometimes be. The chapter ends by looking at other respects in which the Supreme Court has interacted with EU law

Proprietary Rights and Insolvency

2016 ◽  
Author(s):  
Richard Calnan
Keyword(s):  
First Principles ◽  
Common Law ◽  
Case Law ◽  
Reference Source ◽  
Property Law ◽  
Privy Council ◽  
Current State ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
The Status ◽  
Court Of Appeal

This book explains how a creditor of an insolvent debtor can take priority over other creditors by claiming a proprietary interest in assets held by the debtor, and concentrates on the circumstances in which proprietary interests are created by operation of law or are implied from the arrangements between the parties. This is a subject of particular importance and difficulty in common law systems because of the changeable nature of equitable proprietary interests, and this book provides a clear and structured explanation of the current state of the law, with detailed reference to case law from England and Wales as well as Commonwealth jurisprudence, and suggests how it might be clarified and simplified by returning to first principles. The new edition considers a number of important developments which pertain to proprietary rights and insolvency. It evaluates the key decision of the Supreme Court in FHR European Ventures v Cedar Capital Partners. Although this has settled the question of whether constructive trusts extend to bribes, it has raised more general issues regarding the approach of the courts to the imposition of proprietary remedies, which the book explores. It also covers recent Privy Council and Court of Appeal decisions concerning constructive notice (Credit Agricole v Papadimitrou, Central Bank of Ecuador v Conticorp, and SFO v Lexi), as well as interesting issues concerning the new status of intangibles (Armstrong v Winnington) and the status of the anti-deprivation rule (Belmont Park v BNY). Proprietary Rights and Insolvency is a lucid and practical reference source on insolvency and property law.

O caso Enka Insaat v. Insurance Company Chubb e a questão relativa à lei aplicável à cláusula arbitral: entre a lex contractus e a Lei da Sede

2021 ◽  
Vol 3 (5) ◽  
pp. 159-194
Author(s):  
Nadia de Araujo ◽  
Caio Gomes de Freitas
Keyword(s):  
Supreme Court ◽  
Case Law ◽  
Insurance Company ◽  
Party Autonomy ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
The Law ◽  
The Uk ◽  
The Way

When negotiating a contract, parties usually establish that future and eventual disputes arising out and related to the performance of their obligations shall be resolved by arbitration. Such a choice, a clear expression of the principle of party autonomy, is embedded in a contractual clause, commonly referred to as arbitration agreement. The way by which the agreement is written and, to some extent, how it is construed can, and most commonly will, result in extensive and costly disputes. In the UK, the Supreme Court has recently decided a case related to the construction of an arbitration agreement, specifically to the law applicable to its validity, scope and effectiveness. According to the Court, in the absence of an express choice made by the parties, the system of law chosen to govern the substance of the contract will apply to the validity and scope of the agreement to arbitrate. Where no such choice is expressly or implied made by the parties, it will be the law of the seat of arbitration since it represents the system of law most closely connected to the agreement. This article reviews the case-law and provides some relevant excerpts of the case.

The Origins of the Re Hastings-Bass Rule

2015 ◽  
Author(s):  
Michael Ashdown
Keyword(s):  
Supreme Court ◽  
Present State ◽  
Practical Importance ◽  
Future Application ◽  
Precise Nature ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
The Future ◽  
The Law ◽  
The Many ◽  
Court Of Appeal

The present state of the law must now be treated as authoritatively set out by Lord Walker in Pitt v Holt, and to a lesser but still important extent by the earlier judgment of Lloyd LJ in the Court of Appeal in the same case. This chapter, however, is concerned with the earlier development of the Re Hastings-Bass doctrine. Its purpose is to establish the doctrinal legitimacy of the rule in Re Hastings-Bass as an aspect of the English law of trusts. Whilst this is primarily of academic and theoretical concern, in view of the Supreme Court’s reformulation of the law into its present shape, it is also of practical importance. In particular, the future application of the doctrine to novel situations will depend upon understanding the precise nature and scope of the rule propounded by the Supreme Court. That decision cannot simply be divorced from the many decided cases which preceded it, and from its place in the wider compass of the law of trusts.

6. The Doctrine of Judicial Precedent

2019 ◽  
pp. 160-195
Author(s):  
James Holland ◽  
Julian Webb
Keyword(s):  
Human Rights ◽  
Supreme Court ◽  
Case Law ◽  
Stare Decisis ◽  
Legal Principles ◽  
Legal Problems ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
Pure Case ◽  
The Impact ◽  
Court Of Appeal

This chapter examines the use of case law to solve legal problems. In the study and practice of law we seek to analyse legal principles; and the ‘principles’ in English law are derived from pure case law or from case law dealing with statutes. The discussions cover the idea of binding precedent (stare decisis); establishing the principle in a case; the mechanics of stare decisis; whether there are any other exceptions to the application of stare decisis to the Court of Appeal that have emerged since 1944; whether every case has to be heard by the Court of Appeal before it can proceed to the Supreme Court; precedent in the higher courts; other courts; and the impact of human rights legislation.

scholarly journals Judicial leadership on the UK Supreme Court

Legal Studies ◽  
2018 ◽  
Vol 38 (2) ◽  
pp. 191-220 ◽  
Author(s):  
Rosemary Hunter ◽  
Erika Rackley
Keyword(s):  
Supreme Court ◽  
Quantitative Data ◽  
Community Leadership ◽  
The Other ◽  
Three Dimensions ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
The Future ◽  
Uk Supreme Court ◽  
The Uk ◽  
Substantial Degree

AbstractThis paper examines judicial leadership on the UK Supreme Court. It does not confine itself to the formal roles of the President and Deputy President. Rather, building on existing categories of judicial leadership, including administrative, jurisprudential and community leadership, it considers the contributions of all 12 Justices. In so doing, it provides a significant compilation of quantitative data on the activities of the Justices of the Supreme Court both on and off the bench from the the Court's inception in 2009 to the end of the 2014-2015 legal year. From this, we suggest that while a number of the Justices engaged in one or two broad forms of leadership – with Lady Hale in particular demonstrating a substantial degree of leadership across all three dimensions – at the other end of the spectrum, at least on the measures used in this paper, a significant minority did not. In the light of this, and the significant number of recent and forthcoming retirements from the Court, the paper concludes by considering the implications of our findings for the future of the Court. We argue that these retirements will result in gaps in both formal and informal judicial leadership, and it is vital that these gaps are filled by appointees who are capable of, and prepared to step up to, diverse and varied forms of judicial leadership.

The Nature of the Re Hastings-Bass Duty

2015 ◽  
Author(s):  
Michael Ashdown
Keyword(s):  
Supreme Court ◽  
Future Development ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
The Future ◽  
The Law ◽  
Matters Of Concern ◽  
Court Of Appeal ◽  
Relevant Consideration ◽  
Two Alternatives

Lord Walker’s analysis in Pitt v Holt in the Supreme Court accords in all essential respects with the reasons put forward in Chapter 3 to prefer a duty (‘weak’) rather than results-oriented (‘strong’) account of the Re Hastings-Bass rule, as does the approach adopted by Lloyd LJ in the Court of Appeal, which Lord Walker expressly endorses. Yet Lord Walker’s judgment does not yet provide a wholly comprehensive basis for the future development of the law. There remain a number of loose ends, arising predominantly from issues not specifically before the court in Pitt, but which have been matters of concern in earlier Re Hastings-Bass cases, including: how a ‘relevant consideration’ is defined; the significance of establishing that the trustees ‘would’ or ‘might’ have acted differently, in view of Lord Walker’s refusal to choose between these two alternatives; the specific problems arising from the use of professional advisers, and in cases concerning tax liability and pension trusts. These matters are addressed in detail in chapters 5 to 8. But in order to do this it is first necessary to clarify the juridical nature of the ‘duty of consideration’ upon which Lord Walker’s analysis depends.

Presumption of Marriage in Uganda

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jamil Ddamulira Mujuzi
Keyword(s):  
Supreme Court ◽  
International Law ◽  
Common Law ◽  
Case Law ◽  
African Countries ◽  
High Court ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
Living Together ◽  
Law And Legislation ◽  
Court Of Appeal

Abstract Case law, amongst other sources, shows that many people in Uganda are living together as husband and wife although they are not married. Unlike legislation in other African countries such as Tanzania and Malawi, in Uganda, the pieces of legislation governing marriages are silent on the issue of presumption of marriage. Likewise, unlike in Kenya and South Africa where legislation does not provide for presumption of marriage but courts have held that such a presumption exists based on long cohabitation, Ugandan courts, the High Court, and the Court of Appeal, have held that Ugandan law does not recognise marriage based on long cohabitation (marriage by repute). However, courts will presume the existence of a marriage where a marriage ceremony took place. Since 2003, attempts to enact legislation to provide for the presumption of marriage in Uganda have not been successful. In this article, the author argues that there is still room for the Supreme Court to hold, on the basis of common law, that Ugandan law recognises the principle of presumption of marriage. This recognition would also be in line with Uganda’s international law obligation as the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women has called upon States Parties to CEDAW to enact legislation giving effect to de facto unions. The author relies on case law and legislation from some African countries to suggest ways in which the Supreme Court could deal with the issue of presumption of marriage.

scholarly journals TESTAMENTARY FREEDOM REAFFIRMED IN THE SUPREME COURT

2017 ◽  
Vol 76 (3) ◽  
pp. 499-502 ◽  
Author(s):  
Brian Sloan
Keyword(s):  
Supreme Court ◽  
Royal Society ◽  
Case Law ◽  
Moral Claim ◽  
Her Family ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
The Will ◽  
Cruelty To Animals ◽  
First Time ◽  
Court Of Appeal

The case now known as Ilott v The Blue Cross [2017] UKSC 17 was the first time that the Inheritance (Provision for Family and Dependants) Act 1975 was considered at the highest judicial level. The Court of Appeal ([2015] EWCA Civ 797, noted in [2016] C.L.J. 31) had significantly enhanced the award given to an estranged and “disinherited” but needy daughter (Heather Ilott) at the expense of the charities (the Blue Cross, Royal Society for the Protection of Birds and Royal Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals) who were the principal beneficiaries under the will of her mother, Melita Jackson, leaving her with £143,000 out of the £486,000 estate primarily to purchase the council house in which she and her family were living. The Supreme Court unanimously allowed the charities’ appeal, restoring Judge Million's original £50,000 order. Giving the lead judgment, Lord Hughes reasserted the centrality of testamentary freedom in English law, emphasised the importance of the Act's limitation to “reasonable financial provision” for maintenance for non-spouse/civil partner applicants (s. 1(2)(b)), and held that a need for maintenance was a necessary but not sufficient condition for a successful claim. He approved previous case law in holding that maintenance could not “extend to any or everything which it would be desirable for the claimant to have” (at [14]), but was not limited to “subsistence” either (at [15]). He also confirmed that the focus of the correct test under the 1975 Act is not on the behaviour of the testatrix, but opined the reasonableness of her decision may still be a significant consideration, as may the extent of any “moral claim” even if that is not a “sine qua non” (at [20]).

scholarly journals (Just) Give Me A Reason …

2018 ◽  
Vol 27 ◽  
pp. 12-35
Author(s):  
Julia Laffranque
Keyword(s):  
Human Rights ◽  
The Netherlands ◽  
Supreme Court ◽  
European Convention ◽  
Eu Law ◽  
European Union Law ◽  
National Courts ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
Summary Judgment

Judicial systems often wrestle with whether to sacrifice always presenting thorough judicial reasoning for the sake of an effective leave-to-appeal system. The paper outlines issues of reference to the Luxembourg Court, particularly with regard to Estonian circumstances in light of the ECtHR judgment in Baydar v. the Netherlands. The interplay between EU law and the European Convention on Human Rights in this regard is considered first, along with the importance of giving reasons, courts’ authority, the different roles of domestic and European courts, the duty of referring questions to the CJEU and exemption, consequences of non-referral in EU law, the Strasbourg Court’s role in dialogue between national courts and the CJEU, etc. Examined next are such matters as influences on preliminary references in European Union law, summary reasoning and limits to the reasoning duty (especially with regard to the Ullens de Schooten case of the ECtHR), associated division of competencies between the Strasbourg and Luxembourg courts, and finally the reasoning of the ECtHR itself as good or bad example. The author then considers the Supreme Court of Estonia’s leave-to-appeal system and the national courts’ practice in relation to Baydar, concluding that, while reasoned judgments are important and a right, no right exists for the applicant’s case to be referred by a domestic judge to the Luxembourg Court, though it is vital that summary judgment not be arbitrary / manifestly unreasonable; that Estonian courts have made reasonable use of the preliminary reference procedure before the Luxembourg Court thus far; and that they should articulate well the reasoning for referral/non-referral for litigants. The author proposes that the Estonian Supreme Court explain, exceptionally in one refusal of leave to appeal (cf. the Netherlands), that the general requirements for granting leave to appeal cover also the situation of preliminary questions to the CJEU and C.I.L.F.I.T. arguments of the CJEU. Above all, neither the interplay between EU law and the European Convention on Human Rights nor the role of national courts finding their way in complex legal surroundings should be neglected. 

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