scholarly journals Los órganos administrativos transitorios

2021 ◽  
pp. 407-434
Author(s):  
Miguel José IZU BELLOSO
Keyword(s):  
Specific Task ◽  
Administrative Procedure ◽  
Administrative Agencies ◽  
Scientific Doctrine

LABURPENA: Administrazio-organoen sailkapenek jakintzat eman ohi dute organo guztiek izaera egonkorra eta iraunkorra dutela. Ez dute kontuan hartzen guztiz normala dela zenbait administrazio-organo aldi baterako izaeraz ez ezik, baita izaera iraunkorraz ere, sortzea, xede jakin batez, maiz administrazio-prozedura bakar bat izapidetzeko, eta hura amaituta, desegin egiten direla. Hala legegileak nola zientzia-doktrinak ez diete jaramonik egiten organo horiei, eta administrazio-organoei aplikatu beharreko araudi orokor gehienak ez dira bateragarriak haien izaerarekin. ABSTRACT: Classifications of administrative bodies or agencies usually assume that all of them are stable and permanent. They ignore the absolutely normal existence of administrative bodies that are created not only temporarily, but also transitory, with a specific task, often for the processing of a single administrative procedure, at the conclusion of which they are dissolved. Both the legislator and the scientific doctrine do not pay attention to these bodies, most of the general regulations applicable to administrative agencies are incompatible with their nature. RESUMEN: Las clasificaciones de los órganos administrativos suelen dar por supuesto que todos los órganos tienen carácter estable y permanente. Ignoran la existencia, absolutamente normal, de órganos administrativos que se crean con un carácter no solo temporal, sino transitorio, con una misión determinada, a menudo para la tramitación de un único procedimiento administrativo, a cuya conclusión quedan disueltos. Tanto el legislador como la doctrina científica no prestan atención a estos órganos, la mayor parte de la normativa general aplicable a los órganos administrativos resulta incompatible con su naturaleza.

American Administrative Law—A Synoptic Survey

1979 ◽  
Vol 14 (4) ◽  
pp. 413-426
Author(s):  
Bernard Schwartz
Keyword(s):  
Judicial Review ◽  
Geographical Area ◽  
Administrative Law ◽  
Administrative Procedure ◽  
Administrative Action ◽  
Administrative Agencies ◽  
Delegation Of Powers

Like the ancient geographical area, American administrative law is also divided into three parts. In the American, as in the British conception, administrative law is concerned with powers and remedies and answers the following questions: (1) What powers may be vested in administrative agencies? (2) What are the limits of those powers? (3) What are the ways in which agencies are kept within those limits?In answering these questions American administrative law deals with the delegation of powers to administrative agencies; the manner in which those powers must be exercised (emphasizing almost exclusively the procedural requirements imposed on agencies); and judicial review of administrative action. These form the three basic divisions of American administrative law: (1) delegation of powers, (2) administrative procedure, and (3) judicial review. This article will seek to present a synoptic survey of these three subjects. Its aim is to present an overview of American administrative law to the Israeli jurist, enabling him to understand the essentials of a system that is, at the same time, so similar to and so different from his own.

Law in Action: The Attorney General's Committee on Administrative Procedure

2008 ◽  
Vol 20 (3) ◽  
pp. 379-418 ◽  
Author(s):  
Joanna Grisinger
Keyword(s):  
Political Development ◽  
Early Republic ◽  
Federal Trade Commission ◽  
American Political Development ◽  
Federal Communications Commission ◽  
Veterans Administration ◽  
National Labor Relations Board ◽  
Administrative Procedure ◽  
Administrative Agencies ◽  
The New Deal

The story of American political development in the twentieth century is in no small part the story of administration. Administrative agencies, bureaus, and departments tasked with handling the work of the federal government had been a feature of governance since the early republic. With the creation of the Interstate Commerce Commission in 1887, however, administrative agencies and independent regulatory commissions began to proliferate across the federal landscape. By the end of the massive expansion of federal power that characterized the New Deal, Americans very much experienced government through their interactions with bureaucrats and with administrative boards. Individuals and businesses claimed benefits from the Railroad Retirement Board and Veterans Administration, defended themselves against claims of unfair competition before the Federal Trade Commission, requested permits from the Federal Alcohol Administration and the Federal Communications Commission, and sought to resolve labor disputes before the National Labor Relations Board.

scholarly journals An Overview of the United States Administrative Procedure Act

2020 ◽  
pp. 69-82
Author(s):  
Harold Kernt
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
The United States ◽  
Federal Courts ◽  
Private Firms ◽  
The Public ◽  
Administrative Procedure ◽  
Administrative Agencies ◽  
Policy Statements ◽  
Public Concerns ◽  
Agency Policy

For almost seventy-five years, the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) in the United States has set a procedural framework within which most federal administrative agencies must act. The APA lays out procedures that federal actors must follow in fashioning rules and in resolving adjudications, as well as the standards of review that federal courts must use when reviewing the agencies’ resolution of those adjudications and promulgation of rules. As a consequence the APA has been remarkably effective in ensuring that agency decisionmaking is responsive to public concerns and that the public has an outlet for voicing those concerns. Nonetheless, some of the exceptions carved out by Congress in the APA have created problematic gaps, failing to protect the regulated public adequately, particularly from agency policy statements and interpretations of statutes and regulations, which private firms and individuals cannot challenge directly but may affect their livelihoods.

scholarly journals An Internationally Intelligible Principle: Comparing the Nondelegation Doctrine in the United States and European Union

2015 ◽  
Vol 7 (2) ◽  
pp. 56-84
Author(s):  
Edward Grodin
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
European Union ◽  
The United States ◽  
The European Union ◽  
Administrative Procedure ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
Administrative Agencies ◽  
Degree Of Convergence ◽  
Levels Of Integration

Abstract This article analyzes the degree of convergence between the United States and the European Union regarding the structural role of administrative agencies. As will be argued, the United States and European Union have arrived at the same broad conclusion about a “nondelegation doctrine”: delegations to administrative agencies should be permitted so long as some limiting principle governs the exercise of that power and allows for sufficient judicial review. However, the Supreme Court has taken a more permissive approach than the Court of Justice in defining the limiting principle. The United States has loosened the reins for the sake of modern administration while the European Union has maintained a firmer grip to keep better control over the Europeanization project. Stated another way, the nondelegation doctrine is simply a reflection of the systems’ relative levels of integration. Thus, the nondelegation doctrine will be stretched in Europe as functional regulatory demands arise from wider and deeper integration. At the same time, the focus will be redirected from substantive limits to procedural controls; accordingly, this Note advocates for a European Administrative Procedure Act.

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